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PREFACE

The purpose of the study is to describe the origin and
functions of the office of "commissaire ordonnateur" of French
Louisiana from 1731 to 1769*

It Is shown that none of the fiscal

and judicial officials was conmissioned as an intendant of finance,
justice, and police; and that the colony of Louisiana was a pawn
for the French crown on the diplomatic chessboard of Europe.

With

this in mind, the dissertation, largely written from documents in
the Archives Nationales in Paris, begins with a description of the
colony in 1731 and with some notes on French colonial policy.
Chapter III examines the nature of the office of "coranissaire
ordonnateur".

The subsequent chapters describe the office by

examining the "ordonnateur's" duties and functions in the different
areas of colonial administration:

public administration, finance,

justice, and his relationship with the governor.
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A B S T R A C T

Sharing the governmental administration of French Louisiana
were a governor in charge of the military and general administration
of the colony and the "coranissaire ordonnateur" who, as the legal
and financial officer, was entrusted with public expenditures,
exercised certain judicial functions, presided over the Superior
Council, and, like the governor, reported confidential matters to
the Minister of Marine.
The instructions from the Minister of Marine's office show
that the governor and "commissaire ordonnateur" acted as a check
upon each other.

The system of checks and balances seemed to have

been a contrivance to control the officials.

However, this type

of system naturally fostered friction between the officials
concerning their respective spheres of power.
The office of "comnissaire ordonnateur" is perhaps the
least known in the history of French Louisiana.

Because of this

many authors have used the titles of "commissaire ordonnateur",
royal comnissioner, "ordonnateur", first councillor and intendant
interchangeably.

"Commissaires ordonnateurs" were commissioned

with specific powers and not as intendants of finance, justice,
and police.

The personnel data show that none of the fiscal

officials of French Louisiana was appointed as intendant.
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After 1712 when governmental changes were instituted, the
colonial government was shared by a governor and "coranissaire
ordonnateur".

The French crown attempted to end the confusion

surrounding the particular duties and power of the two officials.
The "ordonnateur" was charged with royal finances and commerce
and the governor with the military duties, while the general
administration was the coranon concern of both.

The move had little

result; for the dual authority remained a constant source of
conflict between the governor and "commissaire ordonnateur".
Before assuming the office of governor and "coranissaire
ordonnateur", officials were informed of their respective duties
and functions.

But, however clear these instructions were, they

seldom improved the relationship between the two top officials
because they subordinated the governor to the "coranissaire
ordonnateur" or vice versa even for the least of matters.

The

"coranissaire ordonnateur" could and did at times render the
governor inactive by his control of the purse.

The administrative

stagnation which frequently plagued French Louisiana is no small
result of this condition.
The drawbacks of the system of dual authority in governing
colonies were common knowledge to officials in Versailles.
Conflicts of personalities played a disruptive role in French
Louisiana because they were ever present between military and
civil officials whom the French government had invested with twin
powers.

The ultimate reasons for this conflict lie not in French

vii

Louisiana, but rather in Versailles, in the mechanism created
there for colonial administration and its effect on officials in
the New World.
character.

This shaped colonial government and gave it its

The motives behind the nominations of colonial

officials, the conflicts, and cliques that ensued, were conditioned
and as such explained by the characteristics of this mechanism.
That the colony of Louisiana was governed from Versailles
there is no doubt.

But the New World influenced the old and

affected the diplomacy and dictates of Versailles.

But when all

is said and done, the structure of the colonial system, once
established, developed a momentum of its own; and the governors
and "conmissaires ordonnateurs" who would not often play the role
of puppets did not advance far in the bureaucracy.
This dissertation is largely written from documents in the
Archives Nationales in Paris and describes the office of
"commissaire ordonnateur" by examining his duties and functions in
the different areas of colonial administration:
administration, finances, and justice.
governor is also explained.

public

His relationship with the

The conclusions reached are that the

"coranissaire ordonnateur" was an indispensable figure, though not
an intendant of finance, justice, and police, in the administration
of an area which was a pawn for the French crown on the diplomatic
chessboard of Europe.
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C H A P T E R

I

THE COLONY OF FRENCH LOUISIANA IN 1731

On October k, 1731» Edme-Gatien Salmon, the first
"commissaire ordonnateur" after retrocession from the Company of
the Indies, arrived at New Orleans after forty-six days at sea1 and
found the city in the midst of a severe epidemic caused by a recent
flood.

"The air was thick with the stench of dead fish.

the colonists along with the soldiers were sick.

Most of

Many had died ."2

Since half of the soldiers were hospitalized and others on patrols ,3
Salmon admitted not having reviewed the troops in November for fear
of exposing the weak garrison to the few Indians in the capital city .4
Besides, most of the troops were without uniforms .5

Versailles

expected her governor and "commissaire ordonnateur" to convert
this miserable colony into a profitable possession.

1Salmon to Maurepas, New Orleans, November 2k , 1731> AC,

C13A13.
2Ibid.
^ o r t y soldiers had recently been despatched to help St. Denis,
commander at Natchitoches, lift the siege of the fort by the Natchez.
Salmon to Maurepas, New Orleans, December 1, 1731» AC, C13A13‘‘Ibid.

5Ibid.
1

2

The first task of Governor Etienne Perier and "coranissaire
ordonnateur" Salmon was the reorganistation of the Superior Council
to eliminate the Company's representatives.6

The two officials

allowed the councillors of the Superior Council to continue their
functions until the crown dispatched commissions for those chosen
from a list of nominees.7

The governor and "ordonnateur" did not

include Brusle on the list, even though he was a very able
councillor, because his position as director of the Company of
the Indies would create a conflict of interest.
in a similar position.
Prat from the list.

Dausseville was

However, there was no reason to exclude

The king's physician was an intelligent man

with a pleasant disposition; and, accordingly, Perier and Salmon
asked for his appointment as councillor.

Fazende, a former

councillor who had resigned in protest when the Company gave
greater power to the director general in the Superior Council,
was also included in the list of nominees to fill three vacant
seats in the Council.

He was a good settler and unreproachable.

In order to assure harmony between the two officials, Perier and

a"Projet de lettre patente en forme d'edit concernant
l'^tablissement du conseil superieur de la Louisiane," Versailles,
October l(?), 1731> AC, C1JA13; and Henry Plauche Dart, "The Legal
Institutions of Louisiana," LHQ, II (January, 1919)» 98*
7Perier and Salmon to Maurepas, New Orleans, December 3,
1731> AC, C13A13. Where only the surname of a particular official
is given, it means that the name was not available in either the
"Records of the Superior Council" or in the general correspondence
between Versailles and New Orleans.

3

Salmon asked Versailles to apply in Louisiana both the regulations
of April 27» 1716, made for New France concerning rank in church
and public ceremonies and those for public administration.8
The Superior Council was reorganized on May 7» 1732.
was composed of the following individuals:

It

Governor Perier;

"commissaire ordonnateur" Salmon; two royal lieutenants, Louboey
and D'Artaguiette; Major Benac, commander at New Orleans;
councillors Fazende, Brusl^, Bru, Lafrenifere, Prat and Raguet;
and "procureur general" Fleuriau.9
Both Perier and Salmon promised to devote all their
attention to Versailles' main concern in Louisiana:
the population, production, and commerce.

to Increase

Since Louisiana

attracted so few settlers, Versailles planned to increase the
population by discharging soldiers desirous of becoming
inhabitants of the colony.

"However," Perier and Salmon explained,

"to make this possible one hundred recruits had to be sent each
year to replace those dead, discharged, or who deserted."10

Thus

it was realized that the increase in productivity was dependent
on population growth.

The only means at hand to increase the

population were soldiers who, upon being released from service,
would settle in the colony.

"But," they wrote, "this would not be

8Ibid.
9Charles Gayarre, History of Louisiana (U vols; New
Orleans: Pelican Publishing Co., 1965), I, ^55» and Dart, "Legal
Institutions," 98*
l0Perier and Salmon to Maurepas, New Orleans, December 5 ,
1731, AC, C13A13.

4

sufficient unless the colonists were furnished Negro slaves since
it was impossible to build levees, clear the land and farm without
a substantial influx of slaves."11

However, the colony's need was

never satisfied.12
Probably the most important reason for Versailles' interest
in Louisiana was comnerce.

In 1731 most of the colonists were

familiar with the arrangement established by the Company by which
the inhabitants gave 2/3 of their crops to pay their debts and the
other third was exchanged for supplies.13

One of the crops was

rice which, for want of a market in France, was primarily consumed
locally.

Indigo production had been neglected since the Company

preferred and encouraged the more profitable tobacco crop .14

To

diversify the economy Salmon brought twelve barrels of indigo
seeds for distribution among interested inhabitants.

However,

few colonists showed interest in indigo cultivation.15

Yet,

Salmon hoped to develop this staple since that which was distributed
yielded a good crop.

But frequent rains in the area made harvest

11Ibid.
12Perier and Salmon to Maurepas, New Orleans, December 22,
1731, AC, C13A14; Bienville and Salmon to Maurepas, New Orleans, April
3, 1734, AC, CI3AI8 ; Maurepas to Bienville and Salmon, Versailles,
March 24, 1738, AC, B66; and "Memoire du roi aux Srs. Vaudreuil
gouverneur et Salmon commissaire ordonnateur de la Louisiane,"
Versailles, October 22, 1742, AC, B74.
l3Perier and Salmon to Maurepas, New Orleans, December 5,
1731, AC, C13A13.
l4Ibid.
l5Ibid.

5

difficult.

This more than anything else discouraged the inhabitants

because of crop loss.

Louisiana cotton was of high quality but it

required the tedious process of removing the seeds before shipment
to France .16

Children, who were used greatly for this process,

were few in number in 1731•

Flax and hemp production depended on

the migration of families from Normandy, Britanny and Lanquedoc,
where these products were cultivated and processed.17

Both Salmon

and Perier were convinced that hemp production would be a financial
success in Louisiana because the few individuals who cultivated it
had surprisingly good results.
with regard to flax.

The two officials were as optimistic

However, the main obstacle to the

diversification of crops was tobacco, to which the inhabitants
devoted all their energy.

Thus, tobacco was the principal crop

in 1731, "for the inhabitants considered it their only source of
livelihood after they had painfully realized the futility of
cultivating other crops ."18

Perier and Salmon encouraged the

colonists to send only top quality tobacco to France as a sure
means of realizing advantageous prices.18
had been ordered to do just that.20

Besides, both officials

It was clear to the colonial

16Ibid.
l7Ibid.
l8Ibid.
l9Ibid.
20Sec Mauxepas to Bienville and Salmon, Versailles, March 10,
1739, AC, B68.
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administrators that the immediate growth of the colony depended on
its commerce in tobacco; so much so that Perier and Salmon informed
Versailles that "if the farmers-general in France cease buying
Louisiana tobacco, the nascent colony will be crippled."21
The Company of the Indies had spent large sums of money in
the colony.

Nevertheless, it failed just as Antoine Crozat, its

predecessor, had .22

But, in failure, it had accomplished more

for the colony by virtue of superior means.

The Company founded

New Orleans, named for its patron, the Duke of Orleans, Regent of
France, and established important settlements at Natchez,
Tchoupitoulas, Cannes Brules, Baton Rouge, Manchac, and Pointe
Couple.

In 1717, it began her Louisiana venture with a population

of about 500 whites and twenty Negro slaves and ended it with a
population of 5,000 white settlers and about 2,500 slaves.23
However, for the last ten years, between 1721 and 1751»

white

population had remained static while the Negro population had
increased from about 600 to more than 2,000.24

Here is how

21Perier and Salmon to Maurepas, New Orleans, December 5»
1731, AC, C13A13.

22"M^moire du roi pour servir d'instruction au S. Salmon
comnissaire de la marine, ordonnateur a la Louisiane," Versailles,
May 15, 1751* AM, C7 2S£?; Gayarre, Louisiana. I, ^5^J "Extrait du
registre general des deliberations prises dans les assemblees
generates d'administration," Paris, January 22, 1731» AC, CI3AI3 .
23Gayarre, Louisiana. I, ^5^.
24lbid.

7

Gayarr^ concludes his evaluation of the Company's venture In
Louisiana:
The fact Is, that the financial schemes of John Law
had given to the colonization of Louisiana by a
company, an Impetus which was destined to cease by
the collapse of the bubbles from which the attempt
had originated. Unfortunately, the colonization of
Louisiana had not been a great national enterprise,
undertaken by patriotism and carried on by
enlightened statesmanship. It was a stock-jobbing
operation, a mere money-making speculation, a bait
thrown out to greedy stockholders; and like most
speculations of this kind, it ended in ruin. It
had only the honor of being a splendid deception;
it blazed out like a meteor, only to be soon
swallowed up by obscurity.25
Thus, the money which the Company poured into the colony did not
filterdown to the mass

of colonists.

Perier and Salmon observed

that the Company distributed Negro slaves to farmers of large
plantations but neglected the small farmers, who, nevertheless,
represented the bulk and strength of the colony.

The life of

the small farmer was so difficult that many families would have
left Louisiana for France if Perier and Salmon had not refused
them passage while assuring them of a brighter future.26
Pitch and tar were produced at Mobile.

Salmon appointed

Cremont, the conmander at Mobile, to inquire into the amount
which could be produced yearly.

The "ordonnateur" intended to

send a sample to Rochefort for a possible market .27

As a further

^Ibid.
26Perier and Salmon to Maurepas, New Orleans, December 5> 1731 >
AC, C13A13.

^Ibid.
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attempt to revive the commerce of French Louisiana, Versailles
ordered the governors and lntendants of the French Islands lacking
wood for construction to Induce local merchants and Inhabitants
to prepare ships for commerce In Louisiana wood .28

The governor

and "ordonnateur" assured Versailles that "the merchants of the
French Islands will find a ready supply of construction wood
at the same time, a market

fortheir syrup and rum."

and,

"The

colonists of Louisiana needed only the inducement of a sure
market ."28

Louisiana was not prepared to undertake such a

conmercial venture in 1731» but Salmon hoped that the carpenters
and other artisans of the marine in the service of the king in
Louisiana would incite the inhabitants in ship building for this
enterprise.30

In addition, the two colonial administrators foresaw

a potentially rich commerce in raising horses and grazing cattle
for the French islands.

The colonists of French Louisiana had

totally neglected this source of wealth, making it necessary to
buy horses and cattle from their Spanish neighbors.31
Versailles,

in another move to revive commerce which the

Company's monopoly had all but

destroyed, granted privileges and

commercial advantages to French merchants who would trade with
Louisiana.

The ordinance of September 13, 1731» provided for a

2BIbid.
20Ibid.
°°md.

3lIbid.

9

duty-free trade between France and her colony .32

Gayarr^ comments

on the above ordinance:
This was, at last, taking one step In the right
path, and doing what ought to have been done long
before Instead of allowing to one man, or one
company, In violation of all the rules of common
sense and justice, a monopoly which did not even
benefit the grantees. But as soon as It was
known that the trade with Louisiana was open to
competition, the merchants of St. Malo, of
Bordeaux, of Marseilles, and of Cap Francals
began to make preparations to try this new
market .33
However, Gayarr£ should have realized that France was In no
position to do otherwise In 1712 or 171?•

Besides, as will be

seen in Chapter VI, the crucial element for the development of
commerce in French Louisiana was not necessarily ships, but
Louisiana products.

French merchants were willing to trade

with Louisiana and some French products were available most of
the time; but the colony never seemed to have enough goods for
profitable trade with the colony .34

Besides, the deplorable

32Ibid.: Gayarre, Louisiana. I, k55; «nd Maurepas to Perier,
Versailles, May 22, 1731, AC, B55*

33GayarW, Louisiana. I, ^55"b56.
34Maurepas to Bienville and Salmon, Versailles, September 8,
1733. AC, B59; Maurepas to Bienville and Salmon, Versailles,
September 2, 173^ > AC, B6l; "M^moire du roi aux Srs. Vaudreuil
gouverneur et Salmon coranissaire ordonnateur de la Louisiane,"
Versailles, October 22, 17^2, AC, B7^J Maurepas to Vaudreuil,
Versailles, September JO, 17^7 > AC, B85; Salmon to Maurepas, New
Orleans, March JO, 1732, AC, C13A1U; Bienville and Salmon to Maurepas,
New Orleans, April J, 173b, AC, CI3AI8 ; and Bienville and Salmon to
Maurepas, New Orleans, June 10, 1736* AC, C13A21.
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financial situation was most unattractive to French merchants.

Be

that as it may, Perier and Salmon assured Versailles in 1731 that
"the French merchants will find all the conveniences for the sale
and payment of their cargoes in New Orleans."35
If the prime motive behind French interests in Louisiana was
the development of commerce, the best opportunity existed with the
Spanish colonies of North America.

"Commerce with the Spaniards,"

Maurepas wrote, "is essential for the growth of French comnerce in
Louisiana and for the establishment and growth of the colony."36
Although recognizing the barriers to commerce, Perier and Salmon
were still optimistic:

"The advantages to be gained by trading

with the Spanish colonies will incite the colonists to establish
commercial ties with them,"37 expecially with Pensacola and New
Spain.

For this trade to develop, Perier and Salmon observed,

"Louisiana needed the appropriate merchandise in sufficient
quantity in its warehouses."38
not ready for this in 1731.

Needless to say, the colony was

For example, that very year "the

inhabitants watched with regret the recently arrived supplies
reloaded for a Spanish colony."39

It was difficult for the

35Perier and Salmon to Maurepas, New Orleans, December 5,
1731. AC, C13A13.
3%aurepas to Bienville and Salmon, Versailles, September 2,
173^, AC, b6i.
^Perier and Salmon to Maurepas, New Orleans, Decenfter 5,
1731, AC, C13A13.
38Ibid.
39Ibid.
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colonists to comprehend why these long awaited supplies were being
shipped to a Spanish colony.

Many protested vigorously to Perier

and Salmon, but the administrators admitted "not having any
precise orders to prevent the shipment."40
In the financial realm Salmon Informed Versailles that:
"...he would attempt to economize as much as
possible and would confer with Governor Perier when
extraordinary expenses had to be made. However,
these expenses will be ordered only in absolute
necessity involving the security of the colony and
when the urgent matter cannot wait for the orders
of Versailles."41
In 173^ > Versailles maintained about 800 soldiers for the
defense of the colony.
was insufficient.42
threat.

According to Perier and Salmon the number

They were referring, of course, to the Indian

For one thing, the colony was still tormented by the

Natchez and Chickasaws.

Though dispersed, the latter numbered

about 1,000 warriors while the former about 200.43

The Natchez

held the fort of Natchitoches, commanded by St. Denis, under siege.
On November 2k, Governor Perier sent forty men under Major Louboey
to relieve the fort.

The relief column marched about I50 miles and

was a week from Natchitoches when St. Denis sent word that the

^Ibid.
4lIbid.
42Ibid.; "Observation sur la necessite d'entretenir a la
Louisiane un corps de troupes plus considerable que par le passe,"
anonymous and undated, Louisiana, C13C1; and Salmon to Maurepas,
New Orleans, March 2k,
AC, C13A1^.
43Perier and Salmon to Maurepas, New Orleans, December 5>
1731, AC, C13A13.
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Natchez had dispersed In several bands and fled.44

But the Natchez

threat continued to plague the colony.
One major problem which harassed the governor and
"commissaire ordonnateur" In 1731 was the abuse In trade conducted
at the several posts.

Governor Perier had recognized the existence

of such practices as forcing the colonists to buy supplies at
exorbitant prices for some time, but apparently he had been slow
in taking corrective action.

After receiving many bitter complaints

the French government ordered Perier to act.

Accordingly,

Governor Perier suppressed the objectionable activities and
informed the home government that "in the future no one will be
accorded exclusive trade rights."45

In retrospect, the abuse

was neither eradicated nor diminished.

Instead, it became a

means by which military officers supplemented their meager
salaries.
In December, 1731* there was little construction in the
colony.

Due to slow communication between Mobile and New Orleans

and the threat of Indian attacks, Perier and Salmon could not
inform Versailles on the progress of construction at Mobile.
were still waiting for the plans and progress report.
construction had stopped.

They

At Ballze

Salmon, who inspected the area,

reported that he found the fort of Balize in the same condition
that Duverges, a royal engineer, had left it in upon his return

44Ibid.
45Ibid.

114-

languor, the colonist would despair of not being able to find a
negotiable crop for his subsistence."50

"If this situation

persisted," they continued, "the colonists would be unable to
provide for their own clothing and those of their slaves, much
less for the basic necessities of life ."51

In this light tobacco

was an Indispensable source52 for the economic life of the colony
In 1731.

Without it there would be general despair.53

On the other

hand, the two administrative officials believed that the profit from
tobacco would eventually lead to diversification of agriculture by
providing the inhabitants with the means to cultivate other
profitable crops such as indigo, flax, hemp, and silk, not to
mention the establishment of commerce in cattle and horses.54
Nevertheless, the hopes and optimism of Perier and Salmon
in December, 1731, were misplaced.
Jean-Baptiste Le Moyne de Bienville, to his satisfaction,
was reappointed governor of Louisiana on July 25, 1732.55

There

was great jubilation when he arrived in New Orleans on March 3,

^Ibid.
5lIbid.
52Ibid.
53Ibid.
54Ibid.
55"Memoire du roi pour servir d'instructions au S. Bienville
gouverneur a la Louisiane," Marly, February 2, 1732, AC, B57.
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1733> after an absence of eight years.se

Retrocession, the

resumption of royal administration, and Bienville's return "were
circumstances which gladdened their hearts, and Inspired them with
high hopes of approaching a permanent prosperity."57

On March Id,

1733, Versailles fixed the price at which the French farmers-general
were obliged to buy Louisiana tobacco, 35 livres per hundred pounds.
Thus Versailles assumed the role of sole purchaser of Louisiana
tobacco and the right to pay a price independent of the cost of
production.58
colony.

This had severe economic repercussions on the

Gayarr^ comments, "Such was one of the thousand

absurdities and flagrant injustices of the suicidal system applied
by France to her colonies!"50

In a letter dated April 23, 1733,

Diron D'Artaguiette, chosen to command at Mobile in 1732, described
the situation in which he found that settlement:
I have found on my arrival at this place two
contagious diseases: first, the small-pox, which
has carried off and is still killing, every day, a
considerable number of persons of both sexes and of
every age; and next, a general dearth of provisions,
from which everybody is suffering, and which has
been the result of the destruction of the late crop
by a hurricane. Our planters and mechanics here
are dying of hunger, and those at New Orleans are in

56Gayarr4, Louisiana. I, b$6; and Salmon to Maurepas,
New Orleans, March 6 , 1733* AC, C13A17.
^Gayarre, Louisiana, I, ^57•

^Ibid.
59Ibid.. 457.
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explanation of the languishing state of French Louisiana, one must
look at the material and moral resources of eighteenth century
France, her diplomacy, and colonial policy.

C H A P T E R

II

FRENCH COLONIAL POLICY AND LOUISIANA

Spain did not: take possession of a flourishing colony in
1764.

It is unlikely that France would have been so generous with

a flourishing colony.

Spain did not accept the colony because of

its wealth, but rather, for its strategic location to New Spain
and the Caribbean.

On June J, 176k, Governor D'Abbadie described

the miserable state of the colony in a letter to Versailles:
"I have the honor to submit my observations on
the character and dispositions of the inhabitants of
Louisiana. The disorder long existed in the colony,
and particularly in its finances, proceeds from the
spirit of jobbing which has been prevalent here at
all times, and which has engrossed the attention
and faculties of the colonists. It began in 1737>
not only on the currency of the country, but also
on the bills of exchange, on the merchandise in the
King's warehouses, and on everything which was
susceptible of it. It is to this pursuit that the
inhabitants have been addicted in preference to
cultivating their lands, and to any other occupation,
by which the prosperity of the colony would have
been promoted. I have entirely suppressed the abuse
existing in connection with the King's warehouses,
out of which merchandise was extracted to be sold
to individuals, and frequently to the King himself.
"The old paper currency, not having been
converted by the government into bills of exchange
on the French treasury, has no fixed value, but that
which public confidence assigns to it; and it has
fallen so low, that it loses three hundred per cent
when exchanged for bills of credit on the treasury
at home.
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"If the Inhabitants of Louisiana had turned
their industry to anything else beyond jobbing on
the King's paper and merchandise, they would have
found great resources in the fertility of the land
and the mildness of the climate. But the facility
offered by the country to live on its natural
productions has created habits of laziness. The
Immoderate use of taffia(a kind of rum)has stupified
the whole population. The vice of drunkenness had
even crept into the highest ranks of society, from
which, however, it has lately disappeared.
"Hence the spirit of insubordination and
independence which has manifested itself under
several administrations. I will not relate the
excesses and outrages which occurred under Rochemore
and Kerlerec. Notwithstanding the present
tranquillity, the same spirit of seduction does not
the less exist in the colony. It reappears in the
thoughtless expressions of some madcaps, and in the
anonymous writings scattered among the public. The
uncertainty in which I am, with regard to the
ultimate fate of the colony, has prevented me from
resorting to extreme measures to repress such
license; but it will be necessary to come to it at
last, to reestablish the good order which has been
destroyed, and to regulate the conduct and the
morals of the inhabitants. To reach this object,
what is first to be done is, to make a thorough
reform in the composition of the Superior Council.
I have already had the honor of expressing my
opinion on the members of the council, and parti
cularly on the Attorney-General Lafrenlere.
Subjects chosen in France, to fill the offices of
Councillors and of Attorney-General, would assist
me in the intention I have, to devote myself
exclusively to promoting the welfare of this colony,
which has been ruined by the effects of jobbing,
that first cause of all the evils front which we
suffer here. Three-fourths, at least, of the
inhabitants are in a state of insolvency. But
everything will again be set to rights, and with
some advantage, through the severity which is
required to inforce the observation of the laws
and to maintain good order."1

1Quoted in Gayarre, Louisiana. II, 10U-106.
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supplies furnished by foreign powers; and since England was one of
the main suppliers, Brazil became in reality an English colony,
more beneficial to Great Britain since, without having to care for
the Portuguese colony, she received all the benefits expected
from a colony.
To France, the sole purpose of colonies was to increase
the sale and consumption of French products because the measure
of commerce was one of work.

The measure of work was one of

population and wealth, and the power of a state was but the result
of the number and wealth of its people.
the colonies?

How did this policy affect

Three consequences which embraced the essence of

French colonization resulted from this policy.
The first of these consequences was that the crown did not
consider colonies as provinces of France.

They differed from

the French provinces as the means differed from the end.
were regarded merely as establishments of commerce.

Colonies

The second

consequence was that the more the colonies differed from the parent
state by their products, the more profit they would bring by
commerce.
this.

The French colonies in the Antilles were examples of

They had none of the French commercial objects and had

others which the parent state needed.

It was this fortunate

difference in products which permitted a considerable trade to
develop between the French kingdom and islands.
France was considerable.

The impact on

A multitude of French workers, occupied

in supplying the colonies, lived on the surplus wealth which
consumed the products of the French islands and an even greater
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number existed at the expense of foreigners whom these goods
rendered tributary to France to the value of sixty to eighty
millions yearly.

The third truth which resulted from the

experience of colonies was that they must be held In the greatest
state of wealth possible and under the law of the most austere
prohibition In favor of the patent state:

for without wealth

they were of no use to France; and without prohibition they profited
rival nations.

However, Versailles admitted that there were times

when circumstances arose where wealth and prohibition were Incom
patible and thus the law of prohibition gave way.

These truths

embraced the French theory of colonization.
According to this theory, the colonist was a free planter
on a slave soil.

The revenues of the sugar Islands though real for

the state were but Imaginary for the greater part of the colonists.
All that the colonist derived from his work and what he saved by his
economy and privation was Immediately returned to the land through
the purchase of Negro slaves.
during harvest.
enjoyment.

There was no time for pleasure

Between harvests the necessities of life prohibited

Besides, the work involved before harvest time was

almost always longer than the life of the settler —

the colonist

saw the end of his days before the end of his work.

He lived in

poverty on a soil every day enriched by his work but which was only
beneficial to the parent state.

It was on this soil full of lies

for the one who gave it his sweat and money and a soil even
homicidal on which the French government settled these cultivators.
The colonial administrators were urged to do more:

to incite the

25
but for one reason or another the colony languished.6

In the light

of this, what was the nature of French interest in Louisiana and
New France?
Apparently, Versailles had two main interests in the
retention of Louisiana:

the colony was believed crucial to English

penetration into the Mississippi Valley and to the security of New
France; and it was viewed as a possible base to gain a share of
the Spanish trade.7

Since the middle of the seventeenth century

both France and her rival England were aware of the necessity of
controlling their own colonial trade and the legal and illegal
trade between Spain and her colonies.
crown

In the eyes of the French

the growth of Louisiana depended on the development of a

a"Memoire sur l'etat de la colonie de la Louisiane en ljk6»"
New Orleans, AC, CI3A 3O.
7Maurepas to Salmon, Marly, May 22, 1731» AC, B55» Maurepas
to Bienville and Salmon, Versailles, September 8, 1733* AC, B59*
Maurepas to Bienville and Salmon, Versailles, September 2, 173^> AC,
B6l; "Memoire du roi aux Srs. Vaudreuil gouverneur et Salmon
coomissaire ordonnateur de la Louisiane," Versailles, October 22, 17^2,
AC, B7^; Maurepas to Le Normant, Versailles, May 11, 1 7 ^ » AC, B83;
Maurepas to Vaudreuil, Versailles, September 30, 17^7» AC, B85;
Maurepas to Vaudreuil, Versailles, November U, 17^8* AC, B87; Perier
and Salmon to Maurepas, New Orleans, December 3, 1731» AC, C13A13;
Perier to Maurepas, New Orleans, August 19, 1731* AC, C13A1^;
Bienville and Salmon to Maurepas, New Orleans, May 12, 1733* AC,
CI3AI6 ; Bienville and Salmon to Maurepas, New Orleans, April 3 ,
173^, AC, C13A18; Bienville and Salmon to Maurepas, New Orleans,
April llf, 1735* AC, C13A20; and in most of the instructions to the
governors and "commissaires ordonnateurs".
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substantial commerce with the Spanish colonies.8

This objective

is included in most of the instructions sent to the governors and
"commlssaires ordonnateurs" of Louisiana.

But the hope of

establishing a profitable commerce between Louisiana and the
Spanish colonies, an important French objective in her rapprochement
with Spain under the Family Compact and her designs on Spanish
commerce at Spain's expense,8 never materialized.l°

Spain held

fast to her restrictive policies irrespective of Bourbon ties
and the Family Compact.

Besides, the development of comnerce

was dependent on the ability of the colony to produce goods for
trade which in turn meant the presence of settlers capable of
cultivating the soil.

However, to support the colonization of

Louisiana, "France had neither the material nor the moral resources
which had enabled her to conduct with comparative success the
colonization of Canada and the West Indies ."*1

The War of the

Spanish Succession, which involved Europe shortly after the first
expedition of Iberville, occupied much of France's attention and
dissipated her dwindling material resources.

As early as 1703,

it was obvious that the Ministry of Marine could no longer carry
the financial burden of the new colony.

Because the colonies were

8See references in note 7*
9Allen ChrisLelow, "French Interest in the Spanish Bnpire
During the Ministry of the Due de Choiseul, 1759"1771," HAHR. XXI
(November, 19M), 519-537.
l°See note 7 .
11Marcel Glraud, "France and Louisiana in the Eighteenth
Century," MVHR, XXXVI (1950), 657-
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In 1712, France, too weak and perhaps too indifferent to
support Louisiana, placed the destiny of the colony in the hands
of a private entrepreneur, Antione Crozat.

This experiment in

capitalistic development had been tried elsewhere with discouraging
results.

Yet the French crown was too glad to be rid of the

unprofitable colony to consider the consequences.15

The peace

which came to France after the War of the Spanish Succession and
the Crozat regime in French Louisiana did not bring prosperity
to the struggling colony.

The colony was in dire need of "massive

injections of people, money, and goods and required a quaranteed
market for its products."16

But Crozat supplied none of these.

relinquished his grant to the crown in 1J17-

He

Versailles was then

no better prepared nor any more willing to undertake the
development of the colony than in 1712.

Louisiana was farmed

out again, this time to a joint-stock company.

However, the

Company of the Indies, with its ruinous enterprises and deplorable
administration, was unable to meet the challenge.
far from inproving, was rapidly declining.

The colony,

The French government

showed its disregard of French Louisiana by reducing the military
force from twenty to ten companies.17

Drouot de Valdeterre,

l5N. M. Miller Surrey, The Commerce of Louisiana During the
French Regime. 1699-1765 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1916),
157.
16John G. Clark, New Orleans. 1716-1812: An Economic History
(Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1970)» 9»
l7Gayarre, Louisiana. I, 365"36^.
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former commander at Dauphine Island and Biloxi, gave this
description of the colony in 1726.
"The inhabitants of this country whose establish
ment in it is of such recent date, not being
governed in the name of his majesty, but in that of
the company, have become republicans in their
thoughts, feelings, and manners, and they consider
themselves as free from the allegiance due to a
lawful sovereign. The troops are without
discipline and subordination, without arms and
ammunition, most of the time, without clothing, and
they are frequently obliged to seek for their food
among the Indian tribes. There are no forts for
their protection; no places of refuge for them in
case of attack. The guns and other implements of
war are buried in sand and abandoned; the
warehouses are unroofed; the merchandise, goods, and
provisions are damaged or completely spoiled; the
company as well as the colonists are plundered
without mercy and restraint; revolts and desertions
among the troops are authorized and sanctioned;
incendiaries who, for the purpose of pillage,
commit to the flames whole camps, posts,
settlements, and warehouses, remain unpunished;
prisoners of war are forced to become sailors in
the service of the company, and by culpable
negligence or connivance they are allowed to run
away from ships loaded with merchandise; other
vessels are willfully stranded or wrecked, and their
cargoes are lost to their owners; forgers, robbers,
and murderers are secure of impunity. In short,
this is a country which, to the shame of France
be it said, is without religion, without justice,
without discipline, without order, and without
police ."18
Meanwhile, questions of security and strategy were being
raised at Versailles.

Was it possible to leave Louisiana in such

weak hands while ambitious and jealous neighbors threatened the
mouth of the Mississippi?

The Company was the first to admit it

iaQuoted in ibid., 375“376.

could not contain the English.

Facing the just apprehensions

Initiated by the Natchez revolt and Its inability to protect its
American domain, the general assembly of the Company of the
Indies decided to return the colony to the crown.10
The crown accepted the offer.

In its instructions to

Salmon, the first "commlssaire ordonnateur" after retrocession,
the crown informed him of the situation.

The colony of Louisiana,

situated between Carolina to the east and old and new Mexico on
the west, was discovered in 1683 by Jean-Baptiste de la Salle.
Shortly thereafter, France established a colony along with a
garrison which held the territory during the War of the Spanish
Succession.

However, France was unable to derive all the

advantages which she anticipated from a potentially rich colony
promising wealth and advantageous commerce, for the long
European war interrupted navigation.

Louis XIV, well aware of

the importance of commerce to France, searched for means to
revive it.

Thus, in IJ12 he granted exclusive commercial rights

for a period of fifteen years to Antoine Crozat.
attempt had failed.

But this

The French crown then formed in 171?> the

Company of the West, later known as the Company of the Indies,
and granted it land concessions and exclusive commercial rights

10For the deliberations of the general assembly of the
Company of the Indies see "Extrait du registre general des
deliberations prises dans les assemblees generales d'administration
Paris, January 22, 1731* AC, CI3AI 3; and for the background which 1
up to retrocession see Pierre Heinrich, La Louisiane sous la
compagnie des Indes. 1717*1731 (Paris: E. Guilmoto, I90M ) , Chapter
II, "La retrocession de la Louisiane au gouvcrncmcnt royal."
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To remedy this situation was the task which would tax the ability
and energy of the governor and "commissaire ordonnateur" from
1731 to 176k.

But as seen in D'Abbadie's report of 176ht the

colony had not improved.
The failure of Louisiana to progress between I73I and 1762
was due in the main to the weakness of the French government at
home.

In 1763 France lost the islands of Dominique, Saint-Vincent,

Tobago, Grenade, and Grenadines, New France, the island of
Cap-Breton, the islands of Saint-Lourent, the Ohio Valley, and
the left bank of the Mississippi.22

One must not consider the

end of the French colonial adventure in North America as a stroke
of destiny announced by a trumpet call.

Rather, it was a long

prepared drama of which the English conquest of I76O was the
final episode before the curtain fell.23

At the time the

French crown was indifferent to the fate of the colony.

The

reasons for the French indifference and neglect of Louisiana are
many.

But the all encompassing one stems from the fact that

France, during the last years of Louis XIV's reign, had lost her
momentum at home and in Europe while England quickly stepped in
to fill any vacuum created by France.

Louisiana, born of this

condition, suffered the birthpains of the declining mother

22H. Carre, 1^ regne de Louis XV (1715-177U). VIII, part ?
of Histoire de France depuis les origines iusqu'a la revolution, ed.
by Ernest Lavisse (9 vols; Paris: Hachette, I9OO-I9H ) , ?M7»
2^laurice Filion, "La crise de la marine francaise, d'apres
lc memoire de Maurepas de 17^5 sur la marine et le conmerce," Revue
d 1histoire de l'Am^rique francaise. XXI (September, l'K*Y),
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country.

No other French colony In the New World was born In

similar difficult times nor subjected to a similar painful
growth due to conditions in France.24
In the light of this, the early history of French
Louisiana cannot be described apart from the history of France.
The ragged beginning of the colony symbolized and reflected the
difficulties of the French government and the economic and moral
state of her people.

Thus, to explain the persistent stagnation

of the colony, the desperate situation of France itself must be
examined.25
Within the limits of French bureaucracy of the eighteenth
century, the Ministry of Marine was reasonably efficient.
it lacked was financial and political power.

What

Accordingly, the

crisis of the French navy in the first half of the eighteenth
century throws light on French colonial decline in North America.26
In 1730, French commerce employed 200 ships in Spanish and
Portuguese ports; more than 700 in Italian and commercial ports
of the Levant; and about 600 in the sugar islands of the Antilles.27
The expansion of colonial commerce and the merchant marine was,
however, so great that it became difficult to recruit men for the

24Giraud, "France," 657*
25Ibid.
26Filion, "La crise," 2JP.
Carr6, Louis X V . 106.
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navy.

Thus commerce was ill-protected.

Port officials complained

but the state could not or did not attempt to protect the ports
against English and Dutch smugglers.28

In spite of the revival

initiated by Maurepas, the French navy remained inferior to
that of the English.

While France comnissioned eighty-eight

ships between IjkO and 1750 > England put to sail 226.

Besides,

ic was comnon knowledge in England that the struggle between
France and England would be decided in the New World and India
and by the most powerful navy.

Nevertheless, France appeared

not to be aware of the importance of her navy, for little
consideration was given her navy in comparison to paid her
army .29
Much of this decline must be attributed to the ministers
who followed Colbert.

It is said that the experience of a

century had not enlightened the colonial politics of France and
that the principles of Richelieu and Colbert were forgotten or
ignored at the time Louisiana was established.30

It is true

that Pontchartrain did not compare in ability or as a statesman

28Ibld., 109- 110.
^Ibid., 156.
^Francois-Xavier Garneau, Histoire du Canada (9 vols;
Montreal: Editions de l'Arbre, I9kk~l9k6), IV, 21.

to Colbert.31

However, the evidence of Filion,32 Duch£ne33 and

the content of Choiseul's "mAnoire" of I76534 point to the fact
that Colbert's principles still formed the essence of French
colonial philosophy.
There were other reasons for the decline of the navy:
these were financial and political.

In a 'Wmoire" written at

the end of 17^5» Maurepas demonstrated the necessity of naval
forces to the survival of France, noted the importance of
maritime and colonial commerce in the French economy, and
illustrated the gravity of the present crisis in the French
navy.35

After the death of Cardinal Fleuri, Minister of State

from 1726 to 17^3 , the reduction of the marine was proposed as
it had been in l68l.

It was to show the importance of the navy

and to defend it against his detractors that Maurepas was
prompted to write his important "mAnoire" to Louis XV.36

His

"memoire" of 17^5 reveals a personality unlike the one
discredited by many historians.

The deep perception on the

foundation of French strength, the penetrating recognition
of naval weakness, and the need for sufficient funds reveal

3lGiraud, "France," 67O.
^ S e e note 23.
33See note J>.
34See note 4.
^Filion, "La crise," 230.
36Ibid., 230-231.
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the qualities of a high order.37

In summary, Maurepas demonstrated

the importance of naval forces not only for the security of France
but for her prosperity and strength.

Commerce brought wealth.

Thus, the role of colonial commerce was preponderant, for the
increase of French wealth went hand and hand with the growth
of colonial commerce.

This fact alone, according to Maurepas,

sufficed to show the importance of the colonies.
of French power had no firmer support.

The foundation

Maurepas clearly indicated

the political and economic dependence of France on the colonies
and the imprescriptible role of the navy for its support and
preservation.38

But then, France had lost her momentum.

Accordingly, the crown had lost interest in both the navy and
colonies at the time when English threats redoubled.

Under the

pretext of pacifist policies, the crown sacrificed the navy to
the ambition of England.39
The second role of Louisiana in French colonial policy
was to prevent the establishment of a foreign foothold at the
mouth of the Mississippi.

A rival base at this point would

endanger French exploitation of islands in the Caribbean and
French commerce in the Gulf of Mexico.

The period from the Treaty

of Utrecht in 1713 to the Treaty of Paris in 1763 covered the

^Ibid., 231.

^Ibid.. 241-21+2.
^Ibid., 242.
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death-struggle of New France and opened the golden age of the
French sugar Islands.
In the Antilles.

By far the most prized French colonies were

Sugar was one of the most profitable products

of the French colonies in the New World.

To transport the sugar

to Europe, France employed five to six hundred ships a year.
According to a "memoire" of 1733* sugar was more profitable to
France than all the mines of Peru were to Spain.

Sugar

plantations multiplied in Saint Domingue with the clearing of
the forests.

It was hoped that Negro slaves would permit the

full exploitation of Saint Domingue.40

Accordingly, France

concentrated her attention in the Antilles.

And to protect

her interests in America and Europe, France faced England in
seven major conflicts from 1688 to 1815 totalling sixty years
of war.

French interest in Louisiana and New France must be

viewed within the context of these struggles which preoccupied
France and Europe.

It is true that England was a crucial factor

in the history of Louisiana from its beginning to the final
decision to cede it to Spain.41

French Louisiana, besides

promising economic gains to the mother country served certain
strategic purposes in the general struggle.

It was French

sensivity to English pressures along the St. Laurence River, in

^Carr^, Louis XV, 109.
4lClark, New Orleans, 5"6; Carre, Louis XV, especially
"politique dc 1'Anglcterre," ll’O, "Anglais et Francais dans
1'Anu^rique du Nord," :'J|8, and "la guerre en Amerique," ‘
.'"(h; and
Ronald D. Smith, French Interests in Louisiana: from Choi sen I Lo
Napoleon (Ann Arbor, Michigan: University Microfilm, Inc., I()77i).
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the Hudson Bay area, and to rumors of English plans to gain
control of the lower Mississippi which prompted the expedition
of Pierre Le Moyne d*Iberville in I698.

Versailles'

apprehension of English penetration into and design on New
France and the Mississippi Valley was well founded.

The English

were already trading with the Louisiana Indians when Iberville
founded the French settlement at Biloxi.42

The French strategic

policies for the area were reactions to English threats.

The

conflicting interests and goals of France and England were
clear.

The French were determined to maintain their territory

by keeping the English east of the Alleghanies and holding the
communication between French Louisiana and New France open.43

In

the correspondence of the governors of Louisiana and communication
with Versailles, the English threat was a constant theme.44

One

of the best examples is the letter written to the Minister of

42Clark, New Orleans. 6-7.

43J. H. Schlaraan, Froc Quebec to New Orleans; the Story of
the French in America (Bellville, Illinois:
1929), 1^6-167.

Buechler Publishing Co.,

44Maurepas to Bienville, in code, Versailles, March 5 , 1739>
AC, B68; Maurepas to Bienville, in code, Versail1es, August 12, 1739>
AC, B68; Maurepas to Bienville, in code, Versailles, October 13,
17^1, AC, B72; Minister to^Kerlerec, Versailles, February 17, 1755»
AC, B101; Minister of Kerlerec, Versailles, February 17, 1733? AC,
B101; Minister to Kerlerec, Versailles, January 26, 1756, AC, BiC3;
Kerlerec to the Minister, in code, New Orleans, January 28, 1757 >
AC, C13A1K); and "Observation sur la necessite d'entretenir a la
Louisiane un corps de troupes plus considerable que par le passe,"
New Orleans, undated, AC, C13C1.
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Marine from Cadiz in 1737 by either a merchant or a French
official which unmistakably reveals both the concern over the
English threat and France's inability to respond.
The protection of Florida from English seizure involved
the security of France as well as that of Spain.

For if a

foreign power occupied Florida it would control the Bahama
Channel and consequently be in an excellent position to prey on
Spanish ships returning from the West Indies.

Florida was

without defense other than a small fort of Saint Augustine.
Pensacola was even less defended.

France could not depend on

Spain to hold her settlements, for they were neglected
regardless of their strategic location.

At one time there was

a fort, Sante Marie d'Apalache, which was destroyed in I7O 5 by
the English and their Indian allies.

This settlement was

important because it furnished wheat for all of Havana.
was never resettled by the Spaniards.

But it

The settlement was reduced

to a garrison of twenty-five to thirty men which the Spaniards
called "presidio".

The English with their recent establishment

of "New Georgia" were only thirty-five miles from Saint Augustine.
Besides, the English progressively strengthened their position
with the least friction with Spain.

Consequently, the English

were in a position to take Saint Augustine, Sainte Marie
d'Apalache, anti even Pensacola.

Therefore, it was up to France

because of her interest in protecting the Spanish commerce to
take the necessary measures to prevent English penetration.
France might have halted English progress in the area by

kk

and those of England. Destruction of French power
in the Mississippi Valley would open both Florida
and Mexico to English conquest.55
On the other hand, the English were alarmed by the expansion of
French overseas trade in the 1730'8•

They feared that unless

French commerce was curbed it would pose a threat by driving
English traders out of profitable markets as had already
occurred in the Levant and some of the Spanish colonies.56
The War of the Austrian Succession (17^0-^8) dealt a
damaging blow to French commerce, but not enough to cripple it.
England realized that a war of attrition would have the effect
of crippling French commerce.

Accordingly, England was

determined to renew hostilities as soon as possible but with
a different strategy:

"to reduce its continental commitment

to the minimum and devote itself to gaining maritime supremacy
in order to destroy French overseas trade ."5*
7 Versailles was
aware of the aims of the English and adopted a policy which would
force England to take the defensive.

By attacking Hanover, on

the continent France might force England to disperse her navy.
France hoped that this dispersement of the English navy would
prevent England from both blockading continental ports and

55Ibid., 1^-15.
56Eccles, "Military Establishment,"
57Ibid.

20.

^5
severing ship lanes on the Atlantic.58

While the North American

French colonies were assigned a major role in the execution of
this strategy, New France would be the key area.

A comparatively

small force in New France would pin down a much larger English
force.59

La Galissoniere, former governor general of New France,

had previously suggested this:

force England to dispatch a large

military and naval force to North America.

He was certain that

his hardy Canadians, with some help from Versailles, could
contain the English by exerting strong pressures on the northern
English colonies.60

In the early years of the Seven Years' War,

the strategy was successful; but in the end the French forces
met with defeat and thus enabled the bulk of English military
forces to be available for service elsewhere.

New France had

failed in its mission.61
This failure probably weighed more heavily than any
other in Choiseul's decision to cede Louisiana.62

There was no

further need by France of Louisiana except as a Spanish barrier
against the English threat.

Apparently, the value which

Choiseul attached to Louisiana "had no relation whatsoever to

5SIbid.
59Ibid.
^Ibid.
6lIbid., 21.
62Ibid.
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the colony's physical resources."63

In reality Louisiana had

served the purpose of a check written by Choiseul to serve as
payment for securing the French sugar Islands, "... and the
furtherance of future alliance between the courts of Madrid and
Versailles."64

The minister's main concern was to obtain a peace

settlement as quickly as possible.

France had to recuperate and

rebuild in order to renew the conflict.

All efforts were

centered on strengthening the Family Compact along with both
navies with the ultimate aim of protecting their respective
trade and inevitably to cripple English commerce.65
author of "Anglo-French Relations, 1763“1770:

Ramsey, the

A Study of

Choiseul's Foreign Policy," describes what he calls Choiseul's
real policy toward Spain after the Treaty of Paris:
During the peace, Spain was to provide a fertile
market for French commerce and industry. If war
should break out and should go badly for France,
Spain with her fat colonial empire would certainly
attract more attention in a war of conquest than
lean France. It was probable that in the flurry
and confusion attending a grand attack on the
Spanish colonial system, France might hold on to
her now meager overseas possessions. And since
the Pacte de Famille did not apply to the
colonial world, it was scarcely possible, outside

63Smith, French Interests. 17*
64Ibid.. 31.
65Ibid., 21.
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Europe, to distinguish the ally, Spain, from the
enemy England. Thus Spain was to play a part in
the next wars by reason of her losses.66
Furthermore, Choiseul was confident that his policy of
revenge would be better served with New France and Louisiana in
English and Spanish hands respectively.07

Choiseul foresaw that

the defeat of France and her withdrawal from North America would
lead to revolution in the English colonies and the disruption of
England's commercial empire.

"This is", concludes Eccles, "of

course, exactly what happened, Canada in the hands of the
British finally fulfilled the purpose that France had long before
assigned to it ."68
In summary, France had two main interests in Louisiana:
to prevent a foreign foothold at the mouth of the Mississippi
and to realize commercial gains at Spain's expense.

The latter

did not materialize, but the promise was ever present.
was a financial liability.

Louisiana

This was admitted time and again in

the correspondence between Versailles and her officials in
Louisiana.

The colony received special attention at times.

But

this is explained by the changing diplomatic situation in Europe
with its possible repercussion in the New World.

An example of

66John Frazer Ramsey, "Anglo-French Relations, 1763-1770:
A Study of Choiseul's Foreign Policy," University of California
Publications in History. XVII (Berkeley, California: University of
California Press, 1939)* 150.

67Eccles, "Military Establishment," ?1.
68Ibid.

this is the substantial increase in troops during Vaudreuil's
administration.

France, because of the Bourbon dynasty, the

Family Compact, and the rising threat of her hereditary enemy, was
forced to keep Louisiana.

Louisiana was neglected.

But then,

France could not give what she did not have, what she vitally
needed elsewhere.

It was a matter of priority.

In short,

Louisiana was the victim of the times and a pawn on the
diplomatic chessboard of France.

Louisiana, with the exception

of Mobile, was never conquered by arms.

Thefate of its

population and immense territory was decided
few pen strokes:

in Europe by a

"Union with Spain," said Choiseul, "is more

important to France than Louisiana and many other American
possessions."68

Meanwhile, colonial administrators strove to

implement the designs of the home government.

One of the two

most important administrators was the "commissaire ordonnateur".
Because of his financial responsibilities, he often bore the
brunt of the crown's

failures in the colony.

A look into the

origin and nature of the office will reveal the important
role played by the "commissaire ordonnateur" in the colonial
government.

e9Villiers, du Terrage, Les demieres annees de la
Louisiane francaise (Paris: E. Guilmoto, 1903)> 15^»

C H A P T E R

III

THE OFFICE OF "COffdSSAIRE ORDONNATEUR"

The office of "conmissaire ordonnateur", is an important
one, but is perhaps the least known in the history of French
Louisiana.
research.

This obscurity is not due simply to a lack of
If it were, much of the confusion surrounding the

office would not exist.

In his scholarly work Le grand marquis,

Pierre de Rigaud de Vaudreuil et la Louisiane. Fregault comments
on obstacles to historical knowledge:

"The most formidable

obstacle to historical knowledge is this pretentious mania of
considering resolved problems which are barely understood and
left unquestioned because one imagines to have the answers."1
The historiography of French Louisiana seems to reflect this
mania.

Many authors have translated "ordonnateur" as intendant.

Because of this a series of historians, down to the present, have
used the titles of "commissaire ordonnateur", royal commissioner,
"ordonnateur", first councillor and intendant interchangeably.
The significance that French bureaucracy attached to titles should
suffice to cause one to differentiate an "ordonnateur" from an
intendant.

Authors who equate "commissaire ordonnateur" with

1Fregault, Vaudreuil, hj>.

b9
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intendant are in error.2

These officials were appointed and

comnissioned as "commissaires ordonnateurs" with specific powers
and not as intendant of finance, justice, and police.
The error stems from overlooking and or not understanding
certain basic points in the analysis of the "commissaire
ordonnateur".

1.

"Commissaire de marine" is defined as an

officer who provisioned royal ships and reviewed the troops.
There were different ranks of "commissaire de marine":

"sous

commissaire", "commissaire ordinaire", "commissaire de premiere

2Gayarre, Louisiana. Gayarre always translated the title of
"commissaire ordonnateur" as intendant; Henry Plauch^ Dart in
several articles in the LHQ. However, Dart eventually reached the
conclusion that "ordonnateur" was not synonomous with intendant.
Here are some of his statements: "Originally in France an intendant
was an officer charged with supervision over local government, and
to inquire into, correct and reform abuses therein. A Commissaire
Ordonnateur on the other hand, was one charged with any particular
duty invested with authority to order and perform the same. When
the title Intendant was conferred on an officer in the colonies,
the scope of duty was greatly enlarged and included those just
described for both officers." Dart, "Legal Institutions," 78-79.
In 1956, it seems Dart finally concluded on the matter." Gayarre
always translated the title of Comnissaire Ordonnateur as Intendant
in which he was in error...." "Cabarets in New Orleans in the
French Colonial Period," LHQ, XIX (July, 1936), 578-583; Villiers,
Deraiferes ann^es. ii; D. K. Fieldhouse, The Colonial Bnplres: a
Comparative Survey from the Eighteenth Century (New York: Delacorte
Press, 1967), 37-38; Pierre H. Boulle, "Some Eighteenth-Century
French Views on Louisiana," Frenchmen and French Ways in the
Mississippi Valley, ed. John Francis McDermott (Urbana, Illinois:
University of Illinois Press, 1969), 17; Walter J. Saucier and
Kathrine Wagner Seineke, "Francois Saucier, Engineer of Fort de
Chartres, Illinois," in McDermott cited above, 212; Jerry A. Micelle,
"From Law Court to Local Government: Metamorphosis of the Superior
Council of French Louisiana," LH, IX (Spring, 1968), 99, 102, 103;
Alcee Fortier, A History of Louisiana (New York: Manzi, Joyant and
Co., 190^) and last but not least Norma Ward Caldwell, "The French
in the Mississippi Valley, 17UO-1750," The University of Illinois
Studies in Social Sciences. XXVI (19^0-19^-2).
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classe", "conmi8saire de seconde classe", "commissaire general",
etc..

"Ordonnateur" described certain administrators in charge

of military and marine expenses.3

These definitions make

neither mention of nor reference to judicial functions as first
councillor of the Superior Council.
conclusions follow.

In the light of this certain

Because the colonies were under the direction

of the marine, the minister recruited colonial administrators
from the rank and file of "commissaires" of marine.

However,

and this is a point which many authors fail to see, the position
or title of "commissaire" of marine and "conmissaire ordonnateur"
did not automatically include judicial duties, membership in
the Superior Council, or the position of first councillor in the
Council.

It was upon the receipt of the commission of first

councillor that they were assigned judicial duties.4

On the other

hand, the intendant did not need such a commission; for it was
understood and included in the position of intendant of finance,
justice, and police.

Bescherelle, Dictionnaire national ou grand dictionnaire
class!que de la langue francaise (2 vols.: Paris: Chez Simon, lS4^),
I, 703, II, 712; and Adolphe Hatzfeld et Arsene Darmesteter,
Dictionnaire p^n^ral de la langue francaise. du commencement du XVII
siecle lusqu'a nos 1ours”T 2 vols.; Paris: Librairie CH. Delagrave,

iQ9^9mrrtw

—

^Haurepas to D'Auberville, Versailles, August 14, ljkjf AC,
B85 ; Berryer to Descloseaux, Versailles, August 27, 1759» AC, B109;
"Provisions de premier conseiller au conseil superieur de la
Louisiane pour S. Le Normant," Versailles, April 30, 1 7 ^ , AC, B78;
"Provisions de premier conseiller au conseil superieur de la
Louisiane pour le S. Michel de la Rouvilli&re," Versailles, January,
17^7, AC, D2C3; and "Memoire du roi pour servir d'instruction au S.
Salmon commissaire de la marine, ordonnateur a la Louisiane,"
Versailles, May 15, 1751, AM, C7 299.
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2.

The "conmissaire ordonnateur" was neither as powerful

nor as prestigeous as the intendant.
following example.

This is borne out by the

In the general instructions to both Perier

and Salmon in reference to rank in church and public ceremonies
one finds this statement:

"His Majesty wishes the regulation

made for Canada on April 27> 1716, regulating rank in churches
and public ceremonies to apply to Louisiana also.

Accordingly,

Salmon will enjoy the same rank of the intendant in his absence ."5
However, the regulation for Canada, where the two top officials —
governor general and intendant —

held more prestigious offices,

confused matters when applied to Louisiana with lesser offices.
Thus, to alleviate all further dispute, Maurepas, Minister of
Marine, laid down specific regulations for Louisiana in August,
1734.

In essence, the regulations were similar to those of the

islands and Canada.

Both the governor and "ordonnateur" were

to have a pew reserved in churches in New Orleans and Mobile;
but unlike the governor general and intendant of Canada, they
were not permitted a prie-dieu in the sanctuary.6
one conclude from the regulation of I'jjkl

What can

"Commissaire

ordonnateur" Salmon was at most a subdelegate of the intendant
of New France and, therefore, not an intendant.

5flMemoire du roi aux Srs. Perier gouverneur et Salmon
commissaire ordonnateur," Versailles, May 22, 1731> AC, B55*
6Charles Edward O'Neill, Church and State in French Colonial
Louisiana: Policy and Politics to 1732 ^New Haven, Connecticut:
Yale University Press, 19^6), 2^5.
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Father Charles O'Neill, author of an Important work on
church history In colonial Louisiana, describes an interesting
argument which eventually led to the regulation of 173^ an(* in
the process provides additional proof toward establishing the
fact that the "commissaire ordonnateur" was not an intendant.
The incident occurred when "procureur general" Fleuriau,
political rival of La Chaise, was horrified upon learning that
the "commissaire" was granted a prie-dieu in the sanctuary.
During the dedication of a church in New Orleans in December,
1727, Fleuriau noticed three prie-dieux in the sanctuary, one
of which was for La Chaise.

Infuriated, he stated that La Chaise

was nothing more than the first councillor of the Superior
Council.

He later argued before the Council that since an intendant

is not recognized here, he opposed the assumption of this special
privilege by the first councillor and urged the Council to act
accordingly by ordering the prie-dieu removed from the sanctuary.7
Though the incident stemmed from and was inflamed by a political
feud, it is unlikely Fleuriau would have pursued an argument
against an official commissioned as intendant and registered as
such in the Superior Council.

3.

It was the policy of France to have a governor

general and an intendant administer larger or more important
colonies and a governor and "ordonnateur" in lesser or dependent

7Ibid., 2k2-2k5.

5^

colonies.8

This was the relationship between New France and

Louisiana.

The latter, though only in theory, was under the

authority of the former.

Consequently, New France was

administered by a governor general and an Intendant while
Louisiana by a governor and "ordonnateur".
4.

At most the "commissaire ordonnateur" of Louisiana

was in theory a subdelegate to the intendant of New France.
Sometimes this was explicit in the instructions; but, whether
it was explicit or not, it was always assumed.
5.

By simply reading their commissions and the

correspondence between Versailles and French Louisiana, one
sees that the "commissaires ordonnateurs" were not intendants.
Had those historians who allude to intendants in French
Louisiana have readthese documents, the error would
corrected long ago.

have been

As support for this point, some notes on

the career of the "commissaires ordonnateurs" from 1731 to 1769.
accompanied by their commissions, are in order in the following
paragraphs:
Edme-Gatien Salmon was "commissaire ordonnateur" of
Louisiana from 1731 to 17^ . 9

He was a remarkable man.

Unlike

that of many officials, his correspondence shows little
indication of pettiness, avidity, peevishness or vanity.

This

8See "Guadeloupe," KMC, XII (186M, 7^-106 and 289-330.
9"Do8sier Salmon," AM, C7 299 and for the most part from
Fregault, Vaudreuil, 181-182.
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conscientious official is remembered for his preoccupation to
serve, above all, the interests of the colony and colonists —

a

rare attitude among colonial officials and even less frequent
among civil administrators than among military administrators
because of the prejudice and narrow formalism of the former.
Salmon was not a man of means:

his salary of 8,000 livres made

life difficult, but he made the best of it.

In Louisiana, he

possessed a small farm, "The Providence", worth less than 2,500
livres.

Born to some wealth, Salmon purchased two offices in

the province where he settled, but only to have them suppressed
when Louis XIV died.
dissipated them.

His wife also had means, but the system

Uhen he asked to be recalled from Louisiana,

he only wished some employment which would enable him to finish
his career with some ease.

He received nothing.

the minister sent in the spring of 17^
dismissal.

The leave which

was a pure and simple

Salmon was to receive a salary for the first four

months of the current year.

How can this lack of appreciation

for a dedicated official be explained?

Versailles was at the

time extremely dissatisfied with the bad financial condition
of French Louisiana and the French government and was
consequently searching for scapegoats on whom to place the
blame.

Salmon lacked both influence and patrons at Versailles.

Hence, while others were protected, Salmon faced the brunt of
the home government's anger.

The mission of his successor,

Le Normant, was to investigate the financial affairs of
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him, the summit of which was attained in I7U8 when the Marquise
de Pompadour appointed him assistant to Massiac, the Minister of
Marine.

However, Cardinal of Bernis saw Le Normant as a "mediocre

official with high credentials but possessing no vision."
Perhaps there is no better example of the mechanism of
colonial administration than in the personality and career of
Le Normant.

Not only did he have great influence at Versailles

but he shrewdly employed it to his advantage and advancement.
As early as 17^4, Maurepas treated him with special attention
by giving him the rank of "commissaire general" of the marine
with a choice, once his mission in Louisiana was completed, of
the Intendancy of Saint Domingue or a port position at home .11
He chose the port position at home:

the Intendancy of

Rochefort .12
The case of Le Normant provides an example of both
mistranslation and misinterpretation.

For, it is clear from

the instructions to Le Normant that he received three coranissions:
one for "ordonnateur";13 a second for subdelegate of the intendant
of New France;14 and a third for first councillor to the Superior

11Maurepas to Le Normant, Versailles, April 30, 1 7^> AC, B78.
l2nDossier Le Normant," AC, E 278.
l3"Memoire du roi au S. Le Normant commissaire general de la
marine, ordonnateur a la Louisiane," Versailles, April
17^-* AC,
B78.
141'Commission de subdelegue de 1*intendant de la Nouvelle
France pour le S. Le Normant," ibid.

of marine .1,23 Versailles favorably received his demands —
indication of his influence at Versailles.

an

From 1733 on> the

"conmissaire" held in the Superior Council a seat immediately
following that of the first councillor when the intendant
presided.

If the Intendant could not attend, the "commissaire"

acted as president.
In 1737* Michel attached himself to an illustrious family
by marrying the daughter of Claude-Michel B^gon, who was the king'
lieutenant at Montreal and who succeeded Vaudreuil to the
government of Trois Rivieres in 17^3*

Michel's father-in-law was

the brother of the former intendant of New France with whom the
elder Vaudreuil was far from agreeable.

The Begons were related

to the Count of La Galissoniere, who was acting governor general
during the captivity of La Jonquiere and later became one of the
most listened to advisors of the Minister of Marine.
Mrs. B^gon was infatuated with her son-in-law and wrote
many letters filled with advice on how to comport himself and
to advance his career.
affection.

However, Michel did not return her

A lively man inflated with as much fat as vanity, he

had apparently an abominable character.

The old woman complained

that he wrote insulting letters insinuating he did not need advice
Michel solicited the Secretary of State for the office of
"ordonnateur" with the rank of "conmissaire general" to replace

23Ibld.. 275-
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of Rochemore on April 16, 1738.27

Descloseaux returned to France.

Near the end of 1759» Berryer, the Minister of Marine, ordered
him to return immediately to Louisiana to replace Rochemore as
"ordonnateur".28

However, the recall of Rochemore signed on

August 27, 1759* was blocked by powerful family influence.
Rochemore was finally recalled in 1761 and succeeded by Foucault.
Vincent-Gaspard-Pierre de Rochemore, "commissaire general" of the
marine, was the sixth "ordonnateur" of Louisiana holding the
office from 1758 to 1761.
Rochemore was born in 1713 *20

Tbe third son of the

Marquis de Rochemore, resident of Nimes, he was destined for the
priesthood by his parents and accordingly received the proper
training.

He changed his mind at the last minute before joining

a religious order, thus showing his repugnance for the
ecclesiastical state.

It was the custom of the time to approach

the minister in order to obtain positions for members of
influential families.

Maurepas, who thought it necessary to

bring military and civil officials into a narrow unity, held the
idea that when positions were solicited for members of the same

^Villiers, Dernieres annees. 76 and 1^0-1^1; and "M&noire
pour servir d'instruction & M.Bobe-Descloseaux commissaire de la
marine faisant fonctions d 'ordonnateur & la Louisiane," Versailles,
October, 1759, AC, C13B1; Berryer to Descloseaux, Versailles, August
27, 1759, AC, B109; and Berryer to Descloseaux, Versailles, August 1,
1759, AM, C7 33.

28Villiers, Dernieres annees. 126.
^ S e e ibid., 126- 128.
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family, the older should be appointed as a scribe and the other
a marine guard.

Thus, Rochemore was appointed scribe in 1731.

In 1732, after two assignments in the commercial port of the
Levant, he was promoted to ordinary scribe and in I738 to
principal scribe.

That same year he graduated from the University

of Avignon, tantamount to becoming "ordonnateur".
From 1731 to 17*40 he worked in several offices in the port
of Toulon and during this interval participated in four sea
campaigns.

In 17*40, he was in the office of colonies at

Rochefort, chief at the main warehouse for hospital supplies and
provisions in 17*4-2, on board the Elephant for Louisiana in 17*4-5 >
chief at the main warehouse for construction and batteries in
17*4-7, at the office of troops in 1750* "commissaire ordonnateur"
in 1751, and in the office of funds and at the Intendancy of
Rochefort in 175*4-*
He requested in 1757 the position of "ordonnateur" at
Marseille.

However, he was appointed "ordonnateur" of Louisiana

the following year and was promoted to "commissaire general".30
With the exception of Le Normant, former "ordonnateur" of
Louisiana, his superiors never gave him outstanding recommendations.
Even Le Normant*s recommendation is subject to qualification.
"Rochemore," said Le Normant, "has much uprightness and probity,

^"Memoire du roi pour servir d'instructions aux Srs.
Kerlerec gouverneur et de Rochemore commissaire de la marine
ordonnateur de la Louisiane," Versailles, 1758, AC, C13A*40.
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enjoys work, has depth and reason, and is the right man to analyze
a situation and put it in order.

Yet he is not fully trained in

this but will become a very capable subject to the service of the
colonies."31

On the other hand, the evaluations by other superiors

are far from flattering.

"He has," De Givry thought in 1751»

"enough intelligence to be capable, but having neglected to apply
himself to his work, he is today too old to learn and consequently,
will never be anything but an uninformed fconmissaire'.',32 de Ruis'
evaluation is slightly more optimistic:
Rochemore entered His Majesty's service with high
birth and some finesse, capable of reasoning, and
action but it seems that up to now he fails to
apply this which leads me to believe, he will never
advance. It's a pity that a man of high birth,
common sense, intelligence, and worthy of
consideration is stagnating in inferior positions
and renders no service to the king. Undoubtedly,
the fault is his but his superiors must also bare
the blame. If we had wished to utilize him
appropriately, we would have profited from his
talents; thus, most of the time the best plants
bear no fruits which results in a considerable
loss to His Majesty's service. However, it is a
question of repairing the wrong. I will hold him
responsible for the minor details, insist on their
exact execution, and thus make him worthy of
advancement, unless he shows bad will which I do
not expect.33
These reports are borne out by the trouble Rochemore caused
Kerlerec, a topic which is the subject of Chapter IV.

31Quoted in Villiers, Dernieres annees. 127.

3aIbid.
33Ibid.. 127- 128.
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The seventh "commissaire ordonnateur" of Louisiana was
Jean Jacques D'Abbadie.34

D'Abbadie was born in 1726, at which

time his father held the position of principal "conmis" of
marine.

In a note, in his own handwriting, D'Abbadie stated that

he completed his studies at the College of Harcourt in July, 1742.
From there he went to Rochefort, where he entered the marine as a
scribe.

He was promoted to principal scribe in the main office at

Rochefort in 1743 and in 1744 worked in the masts workshops.

In

1745 he was on the expedition in the Antilles under the command of
the Count of Gue.

A year later the English captured him while

serving in the squadron of the Marquis of la Jonquiere.

In 1756

D'Abbadie, with the rank of "commissaire" of marine, was on an
expedition to Canada.

Appointed "commissaire general" of the

marine and "ordonnateur" of Louisiana on December 29» I76I ,35 he
left Bordeaux for the colony in February, 1762.

However, after

two days at sea, he was captured by the English and taken prisoner
to Barbados.

Upon his release three months later, in August,

1762, D'Abbadie returned to France.

On March 16, 1763* Versailles

appointed him comptroller at New Orleans.
Denis-Nicolas Foucault was the last "commissaire
ordonnateur" of Louisiana serving from May, 1762 to June, 1763,

34See ibid., I67-I68.
^"Manoire du roi pour servir d'instruction au S. D'Abbadie
commissaire general de la marine ordonnateur a la Louisiane,"
Versailles, January 18, 17&2, AC, Bll4.
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and February, 1765 to August, 1769.36

The son of Francois Foucault,

president of the Superior Council of Quebec, he was b o m on December
15, 1723* at Quebec.

At fifteen, in 1738* he entered the office of

marine in Canada and served under Hocquart.

In 17^2, by orders of

Maurepas, Foucault, then scribe, returned to France on board "The
Canada" —

a ship constructed at Quebec.

In 1 7 ^ , Foucault was a

student on board "La Gironde" for the campaign of lie Royale and
Quebec.

After the campaign Foucault returned to Rochefort where

he received another assignment.

Maurepas ordered him to go to

Brest to serve as scribe on a frigate of forty-eight cannons for
the campaign to relieve lie Royale commanded by Perier de Salver.
Alter the campaign, the intendant of Brest sent Foucault as scribe
to the Orient.

In 17^7, Foucault was promoted to royal scribe.

Four years later the minister ordered him to Rochefort for the
campaign of Canada.

From 1732 to I76I Foucault was at Rochefort

under the command of Le Normant de Gevry and de Ruis where he
worked in different offices.

In 1762 Foucault was sent to

Louisiana as "commissaire ordonnateur" at Mobile under D'Abbadie,
"commissaire ordonnateur" of Louisiana.

However, the latter was

captured by the English, whereby Foucault, as ordered by Versailles,
became "ordonnateur" of Louisiana.37

When D'Abbadie returned to

Louisiana in June, 1763, Foucault was appointed comptroller of

^"Dossier Foucault," AC, E190.
^Choiseul to Foucault, Versailles, January 10, I762, AC, B114.
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New Orleans.

With the death of D'Abbadie In February, 1765,

Foucault assumed the functions of "ordonnateur" and remained until
Aubry arrested him on August 23» 1769 tor leading the revolt
against the Spanish.38

After his trial, Foucault continued his

career serving as "ordonnateur" of Pondrechery in 1772,
"commissaire general", "ordonnateur" and acting intendant of H e de
France and Bourbon in 1776.
In stannary, the personal data and especially the language
of the commissions show that none of the fiscal officials described
above was appointed as intendant of finance, justice, and police.
However, since much has been said on this point, a brief description
of the office of "ordonnateur" and the scope of its duties and power
is appropriate.

These functions will be explained in detail in

later chapters.
The government of French Louisiana had undergone some
changes during the period from the Treaty of Utrecht in 1713 to
1731.

The relatively simple structure of administration was adopted

to the embryonic state of the colony.38
a number of innovations:

The year of 1 7 1 2 introduced

a Superior Council was established; the

colony was ceded to Antoine Crozat —

a sudden change in policy for

Versailles had abandoned the idea of companies in I7IO ;40 and the

^"Dossier Foucault."

Paris:

38Marcel Giraud, Histoire de la Louisiane francaise (3 vols.;
Presses Universitaires de France, 1953"1966), I, 2794°Ibid.. 229.
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The move had little result; for the dual authority which had been
a constant source of conflicts between Bienville and La Salle gave
way to the same, if not more inflamed, quarrels under the
administration of La Mothe and Duclos.47

Human nature being what

it is, there were too many common functions and subordination
of one type or another.
What about Duclos?

Was he typical of the "consnissaires

ordonnateurs" who followed him?

Duclos served as "commissaire"

of marine at Dunkerque prior to his promotion of "commissaire
general" and "ordonnateur" of Louisiana in 1712.48

Pontchartrain

gave him the mission of putting an end to administrative abuses.48
But Duclos was young and without colonial experience.

Furthermore,

the contentions which caused him to oppose the governor and
Crozat's agents rendered his mission fruitless.50

His troubled

administration and the course of his career seem typical of the
other "ordonnateurs" who followed.
At the end of 1715» Crozat solicited the Count of Toulouse
to recall both La Mothe and Duclos.51
historian, explains this as follows:

Delanglez, the Jesuit
"In the margin of one of

47Ibid.. 280.
^ H e n r y Plauch^ Dart (introduction) and Albert G. Sanders
(translation), "Documents Concerning the Crozat Regime in Louisiana,
1712-1717." LHQ. XV (October, 1952), 589-609.
^Giraud, Louisiane francaise. I, 231.
50Ibid.
5 lIbid.. II, 71.
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the first memoirs written on Louisiana shortly after the council
took charge is the following annotation:

'Above all M M de Lamothe

and Duclos(conmissaire ordonnateur)must be replaced by more capable
administrators.'"52
"ordonnateur".53
of Duclos.

Marc-Antoine Hubert replaced Duclos as

However, this did not mean the disgrace and end

Though he would have preferred a post at home, he was

appointed "commissaire ordonnateur" at Saint Domingue in 1718 and
remained in office until 1726.

That same year, as "commissaire

general", Duclos performed the functions of intendant.

Finally,

he held the title of full intendant from 1729 to 1735*54
The "ordonnateurs" from Duclos to Salmon, with the
exception of de la Chaise, were mediocre officials notorious for
their disagreements with the governor.

Hubert, for example, was

an inauspicious character who set the bad example of systematic
disagreement with the governor which unfortunately for the growth
and tranquility of the colony was followed by almost all of his
successors.55
matters.

The Company of the Indies further complicated

The colonial council, its administrative arm in

Louisiana, formed in April, 1718, and composed of the directors,

52Jean Delanglez, "Louisiana in 1717*" RHAF. Ill (June, 19^9),
9^.
5 a 'M4noire du roi pour servir d'instruction au S. Hubert
commissaire de la marine ordonnateur a la Louisiane," Versailles,
October 20, 1716, AC, B 38.
54Giraud, Louisiane francaise. II, 80; Dart and Sanders,
"Crozat Regime," 591.
55Villiers, Dernieres annees. 17.

72

royal lieutenants, and other high officials of Louisiana, paralyzed
the action of Bienville, the commander general.56

Besides, by

acting as a superior court of justice, it abused rather than
rendered justice.

Yet in September, 1720, the Company sent

Duvergier as "commissaire ordonnateur" with a program of reform.57
However, this act was to no avail.

The system quickly reduced

the "ordonnateur" to powerlessness.
It was not until Jacques de la Chaise took over as
"ordonnateur" in 1725 that the long awaited reforms were
attempted and some abuses corrected,

de la Chaise was the only

"ordonnateur" prior to Salmon who devoted his time and energy
to the interests of the colony and colonists instead of vying
with the governor for influence.58

As the nephew of Louis XIV's

confessor, he had influence at Versailles.

But, this honest

and energetic man wanted to have more order and justice and
soon came to grips with everyone.58

Be that as it may,

de la Chaise was the most powerful man in Louisiana of his
time.

More will be said on this subject in Chapter IV.

56Emile Lauvrifcre, Histolre de la Louisiane francaise:
1675-1939. (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 19^0), Jlk;
and Giraud, Louisiane francaise. Ill, 287-296.
^"M&aoire pour M. Duvergier dlrecteur ordonnateur de la
colonie de la Louisiane concernant les differentes operations qu'il
est charge de faire pour fectionner les etablissements de la colonie,"
Paris, September 15, 1720, AC, B^2.
58Villiers, Dernieres annees. 23.
58Lauvriere, Louisiane francaise. Jlk.
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The "ordonnateurs" differ in character and ability, but
the attributes of the office show constancy.

Each "ordonnateur"

received from Versailles a commission of appointment which
explained his duties and powers and which was presented to and
registered in the Superior Council.

The comnissions differ

somewhat one from another, but taken together they reveal
uniformity.60
The "ordonnateurs" of French Louisiana were not appointed
for any definite term; they held office at the discretion of
Versailles.

Thus, the terms varied.61

Apparently, there was no

desire to fix the length of the term; for the policy of the time
was to hold the administrative officers, both at home and in the
colonies, in complete dependence on Versailles.

During the period

of thirty-eight years (I73I-I769), eight "ordonnateurs" assumed
the duties of the office in French Louisiana with an average
tenure of almost five years.
longer had he so desired.

Salmon might have remained in office

But, he was the exception.

Others were

recalled by Versailles because of dissatisfaction with their work,
especially in the realm of finances, or bitter quarrels with the
governor.

^ T h e format for the attributes of the office comes from
W. B. Munro, "The Office of Intendant in New France," AHR, XII (1906),
15-27.
6lTaking the "ordonnateurs" from 1731 to 1769* Salmon held
office for thirteen years; Le Normant and Michel for four each;
D'Aubervllle for only one during his first term and five during his
second; Descloseaux for two years; Rochemore for three; and Foucault
for one year during his first term and four during his second.

7^

In all cases the "ordonnateur" was sent from France.
Indications are that the office was not regarded as lucrative; the
salary was minimal compared to the high prices and cost of living
in New Orleans and to the heavy responsibility of the office.

In

fact most "ordonnateurs" politely complained of their salary.62
Host of the "ordonnateurs" looked however, upon the office
as a stepping-stone to a better or higher position in France or in
a more important colony.

Consequently, the more politically

oriented and career-minded strove to conduct themselves so as to
gain or retain the favor of Versailles.

Besides, the colony

provided means of gaining wealth by engaging in conmercial
activities.

Those who served well and had family influence at

Versailles were rewarded by advancing to more prestigious and
lucrative positions.

For instance, Le Normant was promoted to

the Intendancy of Rochefort.
The wide scope of the duties and powers of the "ordonnateur"
is somewhat narrowed when placed under the heading of two main
groups:

those us a member of the Superior Council and those as an

independent official.

It was pointed out that the "ordonnateur",

by virtue of a commission of first councillor, presided at the

62The salary of the "ordonnateur" was about 8,000 livres
per year which was small compared to 16,000 livres for the intendant.
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sessions of the Superior Council.

Though possessing a single vote

in the Council, the "ordonnateur", depending on his ability and
political acumen, had considerable power over the Council; for
its members were usually divided into two factions.

It was up

to the "ordonnateur" to gain control of one against the other
which was military oriented and as such led by the governor.

This

was important, for the support of councillors made for a favorable
position.
More important, however, were the duties and powers of
the "ordonnateur" as an independent administrative and judicial
official; for in this realm he was not a subordinate of the
governor nor were his actions subject to review by the Superior
Council.

His sole responsibility was to Versailles.

Furthermore,

his correspondence and reports were not scrutinized by the
governor —

a privilege which Versailles considered important in

its system of checks and balances, but it permitted quarrelling
governor and "ordonnateur" to unmercifully denounce each other
in their correspondence to Versailles.

While all the "memoires"

and instructions emanating from Versailles stressed harmony and
union between the governor and "ordonnateur" as essential to the
progress and tranquility of the colony, complete harmony was
neither expected nor looked upon as desirable.
It was the policy of Versailles to have the "ordonnateur",
who frequently united with the governor, report on the general
state of affairs of French Louisiana.

These reports, sometimes
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more than thirty closely written pages, covered almost every aspect
of colonial life.

However, as the colony grew in population,

shorter and more frequent reports on particular aspects of
colonial life were sent when the opportunity arrived.
Besides his duty of keeping Versailles informed on matters
of interest in the colony, the "ordonnateur" as an independent
official was charged with administration, financial, and judicial
duties, which will be covered in Chapters IV, VII, and VIII
respectively.
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adjoining the gallery of mlrrora.

The aeveral ministers, making

their way through the crowd of courtiers, entered in turns to
see the king.

Each minister received his instructions from the

king after pulling out of his large portfolio the small papers
drawn up by the "commis".

Whereas Louis XIV saw his ministers

several times a week, his successor, Louis XV, a man bored by
administrative matters, saw them very infrequently.

Consequently,

Louis XV viewed only the major questions, and all details were
left to the ministers and particularly to the "commis".

It could

not be otherwise in a kingdom of nineteen million people in the
seventeenth century and twenty-five in the eighteenth.

It must

be admitted that under these conditions absolutism was not
exercised often.
Because Canada and Louisiana were part of the French
kingdom during the reigns of Louis XIV and XV, it is important to
know who these officials were and which role each played in the
administration of the colonies.

It is therefore the Ministry of

Marine and its officials which must be studied in order to
understand the management of French Louisiana.
The ministry began with the nomination of Clausse de
Marchaumont, who received the title of Secretary of State to
the Marine in 15^7.

The marine was at that time responsible

to the Admiral of France, Henri de Montmorency.

After the death

of the Admiral, Cardinal Richelieu, under the title of Grand
Master, Chief and Superintendent of Navigation and Comnerce,

79

directed the marine and the colonies.

With the passing of

Richelieu, the charge of Admiral of France was reestablished in
favor of the Duke of Beaufort.

But, it was Lyonne who signed

and gave the orders, as Beaufort was but a bureaucrat.

However,

the actual direction of the marine and colonies was in the hands
of "commis", for Lyonne, Secretary of State to Foreign Affairs,
knew next to nothing about the marine.

This explains why all

was done by the "commis".

Consequently, their reign dates from

the infancy of Louis XIV.

However, it is impossible to know

their names since they left no trace of their stay in office.
It is only with Colbert that the officials of the marine begin
to spring out of the shadow of the minister.
Colbert began to contrive for the control of the marine
as early as 1665.
monarch.
—

First, he wanted it under the control of the

In fact, for a long time, all the sovereign rights

nomination of officers, maintenance of the fleet, etc. —

were executed by the admiral.

Accordingly, Colbert persuaded

Louis XIV to appoint the Duke of Vermandois Admiral of France.
Colbert would have no trouble with this prince since the latter
was a two year old child.2

It was obvious then that the

nomination was a move by Colbert to gain control of the marine.
In 1669 Louis XIV created the office of Secretary of State at
the Marine and as expected appointed Colbert as its titular

2The bastard son of Louis XIV and Mademoiselle de la Valliere.
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head.

This was the origin of the Ministry of Marine.

Henceforth,

there would be an Admiral of France, but he would have limited
powers and no control over the ministry, the entire control of
which would be in the hands of the minister and his "commis".
At first, Colbert had three "commis", of whom is known
only Clalrambault.

However, Colbert, who assumed the direction

of commerce, consulate and colonies in addition to the marine,
soon had many officials under him.

At his death in 1683, Colbert

had raised the number of "commis" serving under him to nine.
The reign of the first "commis" who became important
figures begins with Seignelay, the son and successor of Colbert.
Later, under the ministers of Louis XV, they will become figures
of considerable Importance.

Under the ministry of Seignelay the

two first "commis" were Valocieres and Morel-Boistiroux.
Henceforth, the post of first "commis" was occupied by high
officials with important ranks in the administration of marine,
commerce and colonies.
With Pontchartrain the ministry was directed by two first
"commis":

La Touche and Salaberry.

The number of "commis"

increased proportionately to the Importance of the boards of the
marine.

In 1715, there were four first "commis" and in 1729 there

were five first "conmis" under whom there were nine second "commis"
in charge of details.

In 17**0, there were eight first "commis" and

an increasing number of second and third "commis" and secretaries.
By the middle of the eighteenth century, the ministry was composed
of eight boards with a personnel of sixty-five "commis".

81
Some of the first "commis" served terms of long duration
and were thus assured dictatorial power over the administration of
the marine and colonies.

For example, Fontanieu was first "commis"

from 1710 to 1725; Forcade from 1725 to 1738* ai*d Arnaud de La Porte
from 1738 to 1758.
The title of "commis", which seems modest in modern
terminology, was not so in the language of the administration of
the Old Regime.

It is comparable to the term of "civil servant"

as retained by the English.

Further, the men who held this post

were recruited from the nobility and high bourgeoisie.
Certain first "commis" were the masters of both their
department and minister.

As experienced officials, they conducted

their department and made the decisions.

Arnaud de La Porte at

the Marine and Ticquet at Foreign Affairs were dictators.
observes that all the first "commis" of the Old Regime —
Porte, Forcade, Dubuc, to name a f e w —

DuchSne
La

were important men.

Because of their functions, they had an official role, a public
charge, and were often sub-ministers.3

The first "commis" had in

their hands the political direction at the ministries of Foreign
Affairs, War, and Marine.

They held the strings of colonial

politics.4

3Duchene, Politique coloniale. quoted in La Roque de
Roquebrune, "Direction," 1*77.
4Ibld.
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In general, the first "commis" were well obeyed.

At

Foreign Affairs, Le Dran was a constant inspiration to both
ministers and king through his historical and diplomatic
"memoires".

At the Marine; Raudot, the younger, inspired the

colonial politics of Louis XIV and of Pontchartrain.

It was

Raudot who pointed out to the king the strategic importance of
"lie Royale" for the defense of Canada.

When the minister was

incompetent, the "commis" directed all the affairs.
swayed Jerome Pontchartrain.

Fontanieu

Arnaud de La Porte was master at

the marine and colonies for twenty years.

The power of these

officials lay in their remaining at a post while ministers
changed.

When the Regent replaced the Minister of Marine by a

Council of Marine under the direction of the Count of Toulouse
and the Marchal of Estrees in 1715 Fontanieu stayed on as first
"coranis".
neglected.

At that time the navy was in ruin; the colonies
The Count of Toulouse reacted by severely criticizing

Pontchartrain, who attempted to justify his position by the lack
of funds.

Pontchartrain was reduced to a subordinate of the

Council of Marine.
1725.

Fontanieu remained as first "commis" until

Under Maurepas, who was Minister of Marine for twenty

years, the "commis" Forcade and Arnaud de La Porte controlled
everything.
The high position of the "conanis" was further enhanced by
the nobility of some, the considerable wealth of others, and the
influence of their families.
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Sometimes a "commls" succeeded his father or uncle; thus
there were dynasties of "commls" as there were dynasties of
ministers.

Three Phelypeaux were ministers of marine; two

Pontchartralns, and one Maurepas.

Two Clairambaults were

"commls" of marine, two Pellerln<i, and three La Portes.

Some

often owed their position to other "commls", their patrons.

The

families of "commls" were sometimes connected through marriage.
Certain "commls" were guilty of Irregularities.
"commls" of marine Araaud de La Porte Is an example.

First

He used

his position for business gains In the colonies where the
lntendants were at his disposal.

He protected Bigot, Intendant

of New France from 17^8 to 1760, and even associated himself with
him while making sure that denunciations never reached the
minister.

La Porte was eventually dismissed but with a substantial

pension.
The construction of ships, armaments, and supplies of all
kinds provided many temptations for personal gain.

The following

bitter reflections are expressed in an anonymous "memoire" which,
most likely, was written by a naval officer:
"The state can no longer pay its debts; the
crews are no longer paid. The king is robbed. His
funds are never usefully employed. What an
individual would do for 60,000 livres must have a
zero added to Its price when it concerns the king.
But the evil worsens when instead of good bread
along with other provisions which cost the king
dearly, the sailors and soldiers find a mixture of
dirt, gravel and flour."5

5Quoted in ibid., 1*87.
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To find the source of this corruption, it was necessary to
investigate the bureau of marine.
this task.

But no one dared to undertake

The loss of Canada exposed the scandal and malfeasance

of Intendant Bigot.

Berryer accused him of having lost Canada;

however, no one dared accuse first "commis" La Porte, who had
protected his associate Bigot.

Living comfortably in retirement

at the time of Bigot's trial, La Porte remained rich and honored.
But, in general, the "commis" were honest men.
From Versailles, where they lived near the king and the
ministers, the powerful "commis" sent out "memoires" and
dispatches for Canada and Louisiana and received the numerous
letters from colonial officials.
generale" into "r^sum^s" —
Roi" —

They condensed the "correspondance

"Feuilles au Mimistre" and "Feuilles au

which Seignelay, Pontchartrain, Count of Toulouse, Maurepas,

Berryer, and Choiseul used to inform Louis XIV and XV on colonial
affairs.
The above "expos^" is important.

For La Roque de

Roquebrune shows that the minister of marine or the king did not
always dictate colonial policies.

From 1725 to 1758 two men

occupied the post of first "commis" of marine:
de La Porte.

Forcade and Arnaud

Louisiana was under the thumb of these two officials

during the reign of Louis XV.

This is all the more important as

historians have often accused the king for the neglect and final
loss of Louisiana.

The fact is that historians have attached too

much importance to the word absolutism.

The mechanism of
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governor the management of the colony.

The "commissaire

ordonnateur", as a legal and financial officer, was entrusted
with public expenditures, exercised certain judicial functions,
presided over the Superior Council, and, like the governor,
reported confidential matters to the Minister of Marine.
It can be seen from their instructions that the governor
and "commissaire ordonnateur" each acted as a check upon the
other.

The system of checks and balances seemed to have been a

contrivance to control the officials.

However, this type of

system naturally fostered friction between the men concerning
their respective spheres of power, and from time to time the
minister had to settle problems of that nature.

The constant

bickering between the governor and "conmissaire ordonnateur"
disastrously weakened the government of French Louisiana and was
a reflection of the general condition among the officials of the
bureaucracy.7
The colony of French Louisiana was divided into nine
military districts, of which New Orleans, Mobile, and Illinois
were the main ones.8

Mobile came to control the districts of

Alabama and Tombechb^e; Illinois, those of Arkansas and
Natchitoches; and New Orleans, those of Pointe Couple and Natchez.
In the Illinois and Mobile posts, we see the development
of subdelegates to the "commissaire ordonnateur" and governor.

7Caldwell, "The French," 10.
aIbld.. 12.
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Usually a "commissaire de la marine" acted as a subdelegate to
the "commissaire ordonnateur", while the highest ranking military
officer acted as a deputy to the governor.8
The army was the main force of the governor for the
defense of Louisiana and the maintenance of the administration.
number of troops was not large.

The

The "m&noire" of 17^6 on Louisiana

has the number of troops at 900 *1,0 The most Louisiana had at one
time was about 2,000 which occurred between 17^0 and 175^*

On

February 1 J , 1 7 5 0 , the Minister informed Governor Vandreuil and
"commissaire ordonnateur" Michel of an increase in troops.
Twenty-four new companies would leave France in July, 1750 to join
the thirteen already in Louisiana, totalling thirty-seven.11
Since each company was composed of 50 soldiers and four officers12
the number of French troops in Louisiana would be increased to
about 2 , 0 0 0 .

This number along with the 1 5 0 Swiss troops would

give a grand total of about 2 , 1 5 0 men.

However, the new emphasis

on the defense of Louisiana was ephemeral.

One company was

suppressed in 175^13 and another in 1759*14

9Ibid.
l0"M^molre sur l'etat de la colonie de la Loulsiane en 17^6,"
New Orleans, AC, C13A30.
Iln0rdonnance du roi portant augmentation dans les troupes de
la Loulsiane," Versailles, September 2 0 , 1 7 5 0 , AC, B91; and Rouille
to Vaudreuil and Michel, Versailles, February 13, 1750* AC, B91.
l2Ibid.
l3"0vdonnance pour la suppression d'une des 57 compagnies
francalses entretenues a la Loulsiane," Versailles, January 30, 175^,
AC, B99-
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What was the reason for this increase?

Fregault and

Gayarre attribute it to the influence of Vaudreuil at Versailles.
An official's influence, or his lack of it, can throw light on the
colonial mechanism both at Versailles and in French Louisiana.
More will be said on this subject later.

But, returning to the

reason for this new emphasis, here is how Gayarr^ explains it:
During the year 1751» the colony found Itself in
a better state of protection that it had ever been.
This evidently proves the power of the Marquis at
court; for more had been done for him than for any
of his predecessors. His salary was greater than
that of any preceding governors; and he had under
his orders two thousand regulars....
This increase of troops and expenses was
received as a demonstration that the French govern
ment intended to push on the work of colonization
with more energy than it bad previously done, and
with the expectation of better results. But it
was a mere transient effort; that it had not
originated in any deep laid and settled plan, or
any firm resolve in a perservering course of
action; and that it was, either the offspring of
accidental and ephemeral determination from those
in power, or of personal consideration and
favoritism. Whatever may have been the cause of
this unusual grant of protection to Louisiana, the
events which followed in a few years, prove it to
have been one of those fitful, apparent revivals
of strength and health, which frequently precede
the last agonies of death.15
The increase in troops, though substantial, should not
overshadow the fact that the thirteen companies already in
Louisiana were in need of replacements.

In addition, sickness

l4"0rdonnance du roi portant la suppression d'une des 56
compagnies francaise entretenues a la Loulsiane," Versailles, November
1, 1759, AC, B109.
l5Gayarr4, Louisiana. II, 55"56.
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and desertions took their tolls.10
The military officers were appointed by the king, usually
upon the recommendation of the governor.17

Whether it was to

increase his "coterie" of supporters in the colony or to gain the
support of some influential family, the motivation was for
personnal advancement.

However, in most cases officers were

recommended upon the solicitation of influential family members.
In this area as in others of the colonial administration, politics
was the norm.18

Consequently, promotions were not always regular

nor were they necessarily based on seniority and merit.10
In addition to regular soldiers, the colony had a militia
officered by men commissioned by the governor.

It included all

the able-bodied men of the colony, but in general was poorly
equipped and trained.

There were never enough arms and powder

for the regular troops, much less for the militia.

Most of the

dispatches from Louisiana to Versailles include a plea for
additional arms, powder, and uniforms.20

In a letter dated

December 1, 1751, "commissaire" Salmon complained that the

ieThe dispatches from Louisiana contain many references to
desertions.
l7Caldwell, "The French," 12.
l8Ibid.
l9Ibid.
^Innumerable examples of this could be cited from Series
C13A.
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soldiers were naked.21

Though an exaggeration, his complaint was

constantly made throughout the French period.
On the whole the morale and discipline of the troops were
deplorable.

Although there were many reasons underlying this

problem, the main one rested in the type and source of the men
sent to Louisiana as recruits.

One must conclude from reading

the letters of the governors and "comnissaires ordonnateurs" from
1731 to 1763 that Versailles sent convicts and rejects from
France and her other colonies to Louisiana.

Bienville was

critical of the troops sent to serve under his command:

"Troops?

Instead of soldiers we have deplorable recruits, dwarfs, thieves,
useless mouths dependent on the care of the colony who will
render nothing in return."22

"Ordonnateur11 Michel will add:

"People picked up in the streets and, more often than not,
bandits."23

Governor Perier reluctantly confessed that his troops

usually fled at the first shot from an Indian gun.24

He suggested

that, if Negroes were not such a valuable property, it would be
better to have them on the battlefield as soldiers, for they, at
least, were brave men.25

Salmon and Perier writing in common

2lSalmon to Maurepas, New Orleans, December 1, 1731, AC,
C13A13.
^Quoted in Fr^gault, Vaudreuil. 11(0; and Bienville to
Maurepas, New Orleans, June 28, 1736, AC, Moreau de Saint M^ry, F3 2k.
23Quoted in Fr^gault, Vaudreuil. 140; Michel to Rouill^, New
Orleans, May 20, 1751* AC, C13A35* *nd Gayarr^, Louisiana. II, 72.
g4Ibid.
^Ibid.
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alluded to Bienville's comaents.

They pointed out that many of the

men sent to Louisiana were too weak to serve as soldiers on the
battlefield and could only serve as patients in the hospital.

The

money spent for their transport was wasted and so was the cost of
their substanance in Louisiana.28

In 1755 Governor Kerl&rec wrote

despairingly that his troops, besides nunbering only 1,229 French
and 164 Swiss, had been recruited for several years from soldiers
rejected by the governors of Saint Domingue and Martinique.27
It is no wonder the colonists constantly and bitterly
complained of the lack of discipline of the troops.

The officers

were accused of living on their plantations; their subordinates
had taverns and the others spent the day in small "cafes" and the
night at gambling.28
Governor Kerlerec wrote on October 28, 1757. that "the
increase of twenty-four companies which the king sent to this
colony, being composed of deserters and vicious characters, have
done more harm than good.

A part deserted, another lives in

debauchery, and the rest, which is fortunately a small number, is
today more dangerous to the colony than the enemy."29

26Perier and Salmon to Maurepas, New Orleans, December 7,
1731. AC, C13A13.
^Villiers, Dernleres ann^es. 69.
28Fr4gault, Vaudreuil. 140.
^Quoted in Villiers, Dernieres ann^es. 78.
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The number of desertions Increased constantly, especially
In the remote posts.30

However, lack of supplies, food, regular

pay, bad living conditions and the prevailing practice of
quartering troops with the colonists led to many Irregularities
and contributed much to the problems of morale and discipline.
Almost innumerable examples such as these could be cited and
supported by letters, dispatches and "m&noires"; but suffice it
to conclude that discipline was deplorable In French Louisiana and
the main cause lay in the types of recruits sent to serve in the
army.

Probably, there is no better example of French neglect of

Louisiana, whether through lack of concern and interest or
incapability.

Some reforms were attempted.

In I7M 1 Governor

Vaudreuil suggested shifting the posts' garrison yearly.
this was considered too expensive to execute.

But,

Another attempt

was made in 17^6 to minimize abuse in payments of the troops
especially in the more distant posts.31
The actual rulers of the colony, except when interferred
with from Versailles, were the governor and "conanissaire
ordonnateur".

However, to assist them in the administration of

the colony, the crown created a Superior Council32 the nature
and development of which is interesting in view of the many

3°Maurepa8 to Vaudreuil, Versailles, April 26, 17^5, AC, B8l;
Kerl^rec to the Minister, New Orleans, January 28, 1797* AC, Cl^A^O.
3lCaldwell, "The French," 14.
^'Copie des lettres patentee pour l'^tablissement d'un conseil
superieur a la Loulsiane pendant trois ans," Versailles, December 23,
1712, AC, A22; and Dart, "Legal Institutions," 7^-78.

93
contradictions surrounding it and the assumptions by historians
concerning its duties and importance.
The Superior Council, the legal arm of the administration
of French Louisiana, was created in 1712 for a period of three
years.

This marked the beginning of civil government in French

Louisiana in contrast to the purely military rule of the preceding
period.33

The Council was made permanent in 1716,34 was

reorganized in I7I9

to acconanondate the Company

of the West,35

and was reorganized

once again in 1751- based on

the

Edictof

1716.36

Therefore,

the Edicts of 1716 and 1731

*re

basictothe

structural study of

this institution and except

for

the

provision of four councillors instead of two in the Edict of
1731 and the addition of assessors to the Council in August 17^2,
the form established by the Edict of 1716 remained until the end
of French rule in Louisiana.

It is by analysing the period from

1731 to 1763 that a true picture of the duties and functions of
the Superior Council comes to light; for the functions which it
exercised prior to 1731* especially under the control of the

33James D. Hardy, Jr., "The Superior Council in Colonial
Louisiana," in McDermott, Frenchmen. 87*
34Dart, "Legal Institutions," 82.
35Ibid.. 86.
36"Projet de lettre patente en forme d'edit concernant
1 'etablissement du conseil superieur de la Loulsiane," Versailles,
October 1, 1731, AC, C13A13* This document includes a stannary of the
Edicts of 1712, 1716, and 1719*

9^
Company of the West, are not indicative of its true purpose and
functions.

This will be brought out below.

The Superior Council was composed of resident councillors
appointed by Versailles by virtue of a commission, sometimes for
life, upon the nomination of the governor and "commissaire
ordonnateur".37

Usually chosen from leading colonists, the

councillors were rich by the standards of colonial Louisiana and
"were friends of the local administration.,,3e

However, in August,

17^2, Versailles issued a general edict permitting the governor
and intendant or "ordonnateur" of the French colonies to appoint
assessors to assist the superior councils.

Henceforth, these

officials served as judges in certain cases and were permitted to
vote on some decisions in case of a tie .30

37ks stated in the general instructions to the governors and
"ordonnateurs". For more specific references see "Memolre du roi aux
Srs. Vaudreuil gouverneur et Salmon commissaire ordonnateur de la
Loulsiane," Versailles, October 22, 17^2, AC, B7^J Perier and Salmon
to Maurepas, New Orleans, December 5* 1731» AC, C13A13* Bienville
and Salmon to Maurepas, New Orleans, September 15, 1733* AC, CI3AI 6 ;
and Henry Plauche Dart, ed., "Appointment of Members of the Superior
Council of Louisiana in 1762," LHO. XXI (July, 1938). 669-670.
38Hardy, "Superior Council," 8 7 * note U.
38Henry Plauch^ Dart, "The Office of Councillor*Assessor in
the Superior Council of Louisiana in the French Regime," LHQ. XV
(January, 1932)* 117-119* As early as 1733 Bienville and Salmon
had recommended assessors to help in handling the work of the Superior
Council. See Bienville and Salmon to Maurepas, New Orleans, October
15, 1733, AC, C13A16; and Caldwell, "The French," 15.
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The "commissaire ordonnateur" preaided over the Council
by virtue of his commission of first councillor, or presiding
judge.40

The above point Is Important.

The comnission of

"commissaire ordonnateur" did not automatically Include the title
of first councillor; he needed a commission for this position or
title.

The "coomlssaire ordonnateur" or any other official

commissioned as first councillor ruled cases of first instance,
but not of appeal.

The latter appeared before the Council.41

It was in such cases on which the councillors voted.

"By

stipulating," an author asserts, "that the First Councillor was
not to issue judgments in the last resort, the king made it
possible for the people of Louisiana to appeal the decisions of
the Superior Council to a higher court In Canada or France."42
This statement is not born out by the instructions to colonial
administrators.

The Superior Council judged cases of appeal,

and its judgments were final.
Associated with the Council was a lawyer, the "procureur
general",43 and a clerk, "greffier", who was also a notary.
had a vote in the Council.44

Neither

Sometimes other officials participated

^Dart, "Appointment," 117.
4lGiraud, Loulsiane francaise. I, 280.
4%Iicelle, "Superior Council," 93* note 25*
^Attorney general.
^'Projet de lettre patente...l'etablissement du conseil
superieur," Versailles, October 1, (?), 1731* AC, C13A13* and Dart,
"Legal Institutions," 82-83*
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in the sessions of the Council, such as the sheriff and his
deputies, attorneys for vacant estates, agents for the Company of the
Indies, the keeper of the king's warehouse, subdelegates of the
"comnissaire ordonnateur", and post officers.45
Because it is important historically and is basic to the
understanding of the

structure, purpose, and mechanism of

the

Superior Council and

invariably to dispel some errors surrounding

it, the Edict of September 18, 1716, is reproduced:
We have by our letters patent of December 18,

1712, for the reasons therein stated, established
a Superior Council in our Province of Louisiana to
administer Justice to our subjects during the
period of three years, commencing from the day of
the first session, and as we have judged that it
was conducive to the good of our service and to
the interest of said Colony, we... have ordered
and decreed that the Superior Council established
in our said Province of Louisiana shall in the
future perform the same functions as it has in the
past, and accordingly we have created and
established, and do by this edict perpetually and
irrevocably establish and create the same in
conformity to those of the others of our Colonies.
It shall be composed of the Govemor(our
Lieutenant General)of New France, of the Intendant
of Justice, Police and Finance to said country, of
the Particular Governor of the said Province of
Louisiana, our first councillor, our Lieutenant,
and two of our Councillors, a Procureur General
and a Clerk, granting power to the said Council to
judge in the last resort all suits and differences,
civil as well as criminal, instituted or to be
instituted, between our subjects in said Province,
and this without costs. They shall assemble
themselves on certain days and hours, at such place

45See "Records of the Superior Council" in LHQ.
4eTran8lated by Henry Plauch^ Dart in "Legal Institutions,"
82 -81*.
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as shall be deemed by them most convenient, at
least once a month, and all judgments rendered by
said judges shall be executed In the same manner
as the decrees of our courts and Superior Councils;
provided that the same shall be rendered by not
less than three judges in civil matters and
prohibiting them from judging criminal matters
except by five judges.
Our said Council is permitted in case of absence
or legitimate excuse of the judges established by
these presents, to call in their lieu and stead
such persons as they shall believe the most
capable of performing the functions of judge,
provided that the requirement as to three judges
in civil matters and five judges in criminal
matters shall always be observed in order to
give effect to the judgments.
Our Governor Lieutenant General in New France
shall preside over said Council, and in his absence
the Intendant of Justice, Police and Finance, and
in the same order the particular Governor of the
said Province of Louisiana, the first Councillor;
our Lieutenant and the two councillors shall
preside in case of absence of the others.
Nevertheless, the Intendant of Justice, Police
and Finance, of New France, even though the
Governor Lieutenant General be present at the
Council and presiding over the same shall assemble
the opinions, receive the vote of those present and
pronounce the judgment, and he shall have the same
advantages and perform the same functions as the
First President of our Courts; in case of the
absence of the Intendant, our First Councillor
shall exercise the same right, notwithstanding it
be presided over by our said Governor, conferring
upon our said First Councillor the functions of
judge of first instance, such as the fixing and
breaking of seals, inventories, and other
provisional matters. In the absence of the
Intendant and of the First Councillor, the oldest
in point of service of our said Councillors shall
perform the same functions that we have conferred
on the said First Councillor.
Our Procureur General to the said Council shall
have power to perform, without exception, all the
other functions of our other Procureurs General(s)
in our Courts and Councils and the said Clerk shall
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keep a register of all judgments rendered by our
said Council and of all that shall be done and
ordered by our said First Councillor in his
capacity as first judge. Done at Paris, Sept.

18, 1716.
The subordination of the governor, "commissaire ordonnateur",
and Superior Council to the authorities of New France, as seen in
the edict, had no practical effect.

The distance separating the

two colonies guaranteed their independence.47
The specific duties of the Superior Council were judicial.
It was empowered "to judge in the last resort all suits and
differences, civil as well as criminal, between the subjects of
the colony."48
functions.

As a court, the Superior Council performed several

Its spectacular side, the administration of civil and

criminal justice in the first instance and on appeal, was brought
out in the above edict.

Its silent and all pervading side was

that it was charged with notarial and registry functions.48

The

notaries50 of the Superior Council were required to file or
register marriage contracts, deeds, mortgages, wills, property
transfers, and other documents, papers and agreements necessary

47Giraud, Loulsiane francaise. I, 280.
^"Projet de lettre patente...l'etablissement du conseil
sup^rieur;" and Dart, "Legal Institutions," 83.
^ H e n r y Plauch^ Dart, "A Criminal Trial Before the Superior
Council of Louisiana, May, 1747," LHQ, XIII (July, 1930), 367.
5°See W. K. Dart, "Ordinance of 1717 Governing Notaries in
Louisiana During the French Colonial Period," LHQ. X (January, 1927),
82-85; and Dart, "Legal Institutions," 84-85.
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to establish rights and protect property.51

Any contract, whatever

its nature, when registered in the Council "made the beginning of
proof of the same under the rule of evidence prevailing at that
time."52

Moreover, all decrees, ordinances, edicts, commissions,

and letters of patent from Versailles had to be registered.

Thus,

the Superior Council, through its notaries, became the center of
civic activities in French Louisiana.53
That the Superior Council exercised judicial and
administrative functions cannot be questioned; what is
questionable, however, is its legislative function alluded to
by some authors.54

The Records of the Superior Council seem to

indicate that the local or police regulations were initiated by
the "commissaire ordonnateur", the "procureur general", and the
governor through the Superior Council which had to register these
regulations.
In an article, Plauch^ Dart explains that at first,
particularly after 1719> "the Superior Council exercised

5lDart, "Criminal Trial," 367.
52Ibid.
53Ibid.
54Hardy, "Superior Council," 87-101, does not specifically
assign legislative functions to the Superior Council. This is not the
case with Micelle, "Superior Council," 85-IO7 . However, "It does not
appear," Dart wrote in 1919» "that the power of legislating was
conferred on these Councils, and it is not specified in our Edict of
1712, nor in any of the subsequent amendments. They had the power and
exercised it to make local or polic regulations, but the Edicts and
orders emanating from France not infrequently trenched(sic)on this
also." See Dart, "Legal Institutions," 80.
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administrative and legislative powers to a considerable extent,
but was at all times predominantly a judicial body...."55
Dart is correct, but fails to explain why.

Plauch^

As it was stated above,

the functions which the Superior Council exercised prior to 1731*
especially under the control of the Company of the West, are not
indicative of its true purpose and functions.

The Council was

organized to accommodate the Company's representatives who did
legislate through the Council.

Furthermore, the Company of the

West was granted the political and commercial direction of
Louisiana.

In fact, quoting an author, "in return for the

Company's financing of the large debt of the monarchy, the king
conceded for a period of twenty-five years the ownership of all
the lands of Louisiana together with the whole administrative
system of the colony, even control of the military establishment."56
It is no wonder then that the Superior Council exercised legislative
powers.

However, with retrocession in 1731 the Council reverted to

its true purpose and functions.57

Micelle does not agree; he

insists that the Council continued to exercise legislative
functions.

Chambers, in his multi-volume history of Louisiana

concluded that the Superior Council was not a lawmaking institution;

55Dart, "Assessors," 117-119*
5^lichelle, "Superior Council," Qfi,
^ T h i s point is often overlooked.
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it was "a purely judicial body".58

One author dismisses Chambers'

conclusion by stating that "•■%*? acceptance of Chambers' conclusion
has prevented historians of Louisiana from realizing the true
significance of the Superior Council in the history of the colony."59
Some authors have failed to realize the import of pertinent
factors:

(l) that the mere registration of ordinances and

regulations is not a sign of legislative power; (2) that the local
or police regulations were initiated by the governor, "commissaire
ordonnateur" as first councillor, and the "procureur general";60
(3) that the word "suffrage" (vote) in the instructions to the
governor and or "commissaire ordonnateur" with reference to the
Superior Council refers to justice and not to legislature; and
(1*-) the sources of the laws for Louisiana.

The main sources of

the laws for both New France and Louisiana stemmed from the same
family.61

In New France, they were the following:

(a) the edicts

and declarations from Versailles; (b) the ordinances and regulations
from the governor, lieutenant general and intendant through the
Superior Council and registered by the latter; (c) the "Coutumes
de Paris"; and (d) the judgments of the Parliament of Paris on
questions arising from the "Coutumes de Paris" and the decisions

58Henry E. Chambers, A History of Louisiana (3 vols.:
and New York; The American Historical Society, 1925), I, 122.
59Micelle, "Superior Council," 86.
^ S e e "Records of the Superior Council" and the general
correspondence between New Orleans and Versailles.
6lDart, "Assessors," 117-119*
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of the Superior Council of New France and judgments of the Council
of State in France on colonial questions.

These legal sources may
I
be applied to Louisiana but with some variations. The legislative
power of the governor and "commissaire ordonnateur" of Louisiana
was very limited.

While these officials could issue ordinances,

French Louisiana remained fairly free from local legislation of
the nature which afflicted New France.62
However, because of the constant bickering between the two
ambitious officials, the Superior Council came to perform another
function —

one which had not been prescribed nor intended.

It

came to play a role in the system of checks and balances.
Before assuming the roles of governor and "commissaire
ordonnateur", officials were informed of the situation and their
respective duties and functions.

The instructions show very few

differences throughout the colonial period.

In fact, the

instructions dispatched to French Louisiana from Versailles differ
little from those dispatched to the top officials charged with
administration in any of the other colonies.
embraced five principal areas:
military, and Indians.

The instructions

religion, justice, police,

In the light of this, the "M^moire du roi

pour servir d'instruction aux Srs. Vaudreuil gouverneur et Michel
commissaire general de la marine, ordonnateur a la Loulsiane"

62Ibid.
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is singled out as indicative of all the others sent to Louisiana.
Because the "m&Bolre" is necessary to understand the mechanism of
the administrative system, it is presented below.
His Majesty has resolved to explain to Vaudreuil
and Michel his intentions on the principal parts of
the colonial administration entrusted to their
care. However, before entering into details, His
Majesty is pleased to observe that they must concur
reciprocally in order to maintain unity and live in
harmony, persuaded that nothing is more vital to
the good of His Majesty's service, than the growth
of the colony, and the peace and tranquility of the
settlers.
The division which has reigned from time to
time between the chiefs of the colony is sufficient
proof of this necessity. His Majesty knows that,
with the zeal and prudence of Vaudreuil and
Michel, he will be satisfied with their attention
on this matter.
Difference of opinion must not cause any
dispute between them. When they will not agree on
a matter, His Majesty wants a report of their
respective reasons. However, if the disputed
matter is urgent and cannot wait for His Majesty's
orders, the governor's will shall prevail.
Since the undertakings on their conmon and
particular functions can occasion arguments between
them, His Majesty has judged it appropriate to
explain their particular and conmon functions and
strongly recomnends exact conformity.
All which regards the military and the dignity
of command is the sole concern of the governor.
The governor will order the troops and militia and
see to their discipline and readiness when called
upon to serve. For this effect, he must be kept
informed by the officers of the condition of their
troops and even enter into details with them over
their responsibility in maintaining strict
discipline. Furthermore, he must see to it that
the officers commit no injustice, such as with
holding flour and pay, against their soldiers; and
if an officer is found guilty of such, the governor
must punish that offender independently of the
restitution ordered by the "ordonnateur".
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His Majesty maintains In the colony a total of
800 men: thirteen French companies of fifty men
each and I50 Swiss soldiers of Karrer Regiment.
As to the French troops, His Majesty provides for
the necessary recruits. These recruits have been
considerable up to now and His Majesty hopes that
Vaudreuil will pay particular attention to reduce
the number of them as much as possible. For this
he must prevent abuses in connection with the
military discharge which he will grant to sergeants
and soldiers of his troops. He may grant a military
discharge to those only who are unfit for service
or who desire to settle in the colony. However, in
connection with the latter, a discharge will be
accorded to only those sergeants and soldiers, who
by their talents and conduct, have the potential
of becoming good farmers and contributing to the
growth of the colony by actually settling in the
colony rather than using their discharge as a way
out of it. But, in order not to weaken the
companies, His Majesty has fixed the number of
discharges at two per company each year. This
will add per year twenty-six settlers who
successively will strengthen the colony and
increase production. His Majesty commands
Vaudreuil not to exceed this number. In addition,
His Majesty has made appropriate arrangements for
the quartering of soldiers and commands Vaudreuil
and Michel to carry out these arrangements.
All the details connected with the militia
concern the governor, who is informed of His
Majesty's intentions on this subject.
The governing of the Indians is also the
particular concern of Vaudreuil and requires a
singular attention on his part, especially in the
face of the present contingencies.
Fortification, when it involves projects, is
another particular concern of the governor. But,
when His Majesty will have approved them
[fortifications] the execution will be the common
endeavor of the governor and "ordonnateur".
Such is also the case with artillery, which is
the particular concern of the governor when it
comes to destination and destribution; however,
the measures taken for its maintenance and
conservation is a joint endeavor of the governor
and "ordonnateur".

These then are, in general, the parts which
particularly concern the governor. His Majesty
will explain his intentions on those which are of
special interest to the "ordonnateur" before going
into details on what concerns them in common.
The administration of capital, supplies,
ammunition, and generally all which pertains to the
warehouses and treasury of the colony are the sole
concern of the "conmissalre ordonnateur". No
payment, sale, nor consumption will be made without
the consent of the "ordonnateur". If however,
Vaudreuil decides on an extraordinary expense for
the service of the colony, His Majesty commands
Michel to order it; but he commands Vaudreuil to
make such expense only in case of absolute
necessity and to report on his motives.
Michel must in addition provide Vaudreuil, upon
request, with an inventory of supplies and
ammunition in the warehouses along with the docket
of the treasury in order to keep the governor
informed of such matters. It is also the duty of
Michel to render an account to the attorneys of
vacant estates and to all those who may be charged
with recovery in the colony. Vaudreuil must not
interfere unless requested by Michel.
The administration of justice is the particular
concern of the "commissaire ordonnateur". Vaudreuil
must not interfere with the administration of
justice except when his aid is needed in executing
its judgments. However, the governor must at all
times give all the necessary assistance in this
area as expressly ordered by His Majesty.
Concerning the officers of justice, Vaudreuil
and Michel will jointly render an account of their
conduct and submit names for replacements in case
of death or resignation. But, what concerns
Vaudreuil in particular is to see to it that the
administrative military officers give the judicial
officers the respect due their office and to have
the settlers maintain the same. Futhermore, His
Majesty wishes that the councillors in the Superior
Council of New Orleans have complete freedom in
their suffrage. However, this council must not
interfere directly or indirectly in the governing
and general administration of the colony, His
Majesty having entrusted it as part of his
authority only to render justice to his subjects.
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The land concessions along with the
contestations which can arise on limits, size,
location and boundaries are the joint concern of
the governor and "ordonnateur".
The administration of the colony concerns the
governor and "ordonnateur" in conmon. It embraces
three principal domains: the increase in popu
lation, the cultivation of the soil and the
carrying on of commerce.83
From the above "m^moire", it would seem that Versailles
dispatched very detailed Instructions in order to avert all
unforeseen disputes between the governor and "commissaire
ordonnateur".64

However clear these instructions were, they

seldom improved the relationship between the two top officials
because these instructions were too precise, too detailed, and
subordinated the governor to the "commissaire ordonnateur" or
vice versa even for the least of matters.85

This, along with

slow communication and personal ambition, seems to be the key
which explains the constant quarrels between the two.

For

example, in the instructions above, fortification is the
particular concern of the governor when it involves projects.
However, after royal approval the execution is a joint endeavor
between the governor and "conmissaire ordonnateur".

One sees a

83"M^moire du roi aux Srs. de Vaudreuil gouverneur et Michel
de la Rouvilliere commissaire general de la marine ordonnateur de la
Loulsiane," Versailles, December 23, 17^*8» AC, b 8T64Villiers, Dernleres annees. 88.

85Ibid.. 89.
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similar arrangement with regard to artillery.

These are only two

examples of many that could be cited.
The drawbacks of this system of dual authority in
governing colonies were common knowledge to officials in Versailles.
An anonymous undated "m^molre" concerning the government of Saint
Domingue and most likely written in the 1750's, seems to describe

the situation of Louisiana.

For that matter, it seems descriptive

of the colonial administration as a whole:
" ...The present government of the colonies is
one of dual authority. It is defective by nature.
Here are the drawbacks which necessarily ensue
from its nature. The most striking is the diversity
of ideas in the authority entrusted in two persons.
If they do not agree, everything is in abeyance and
authority becomes useless. Anarchy reigns.
Versailles foresaw this and by fault allowed that
in case of a difference of opinion, the governor's
will shall prevail. The cure is as bad as the evil.
To avoid anarchy despotism is allowed. In fact , to
become the sole arbiter of the colonial government,
he must always oppose the Intendant. This system
of government is defective to the point of selfdestruction. ..
" ...If the governor dominates the intendant, the
government is military; if, to the contrary, the
intendant dominates, it is financial — equal evils
which bring about the ruin or stagnation of
colonies. The worst disorder, not realized as
such because it appears as good, occurs when the
two top colonial officials yield to the will of one
or the other. Then, all is lost; guided by their
personal interests, they open a wide area for the
satisfaction of their cupidity, sacrificing their
enemies while rewarding their supporters... ,,ee

66Ibid., for both the comnent and "m^moire".
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There Is no better evaluation of the situation.

For it

was impossible to have at the same time and in the same colony
two equally honest and capable administrators.67
especially true in Louisiana.

This is

Some authors attribute the

stagnation of Louisiana to lack of stable institutions and a
coherent administration.68

Rather, the answer is found in the

colonial system itself.60
Conflict of personalities played a very disruptive role
in French Louisiana because it was ever present between military
and civilian officials whom the French government had invested
with twin powers.70

The reason for this conflict lies not in

French Louisiana but, rather in Versailles, in the mechanism of
the colonial administration and its effects on colonial officials
in the New World.

This mechanism comes to light when the position

of the governor in colonial days is examined.
A governor ran into problems with each administrative
move, and contradiction awaited him at every turn.
was a part of a complicated mechanism —
administration —

The governor

the colonial

the wheels of which adjusted themselves into a

^Ibid.
eaMicelle, "Superior Council," 87.
^ I t must also be pointed out that the poor quality of settlers
in Louisiana certainly contributed to the stagnation of the colony.
70Fr^gault, Vaudreuil. 202; and in many 'Wmoires" and
instructions sent to colonial administrators.
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totality of influences, more or less secret, of personal
faithfulness, and of carefully maintained opposition.

At the summit

of this mechanism stood the Minister of Marine, generally reached
only through the intermediary of the first "commis" to the colonies.
It was essential for the governor to court both, giving the former
unlimited submission which included the long explanations and
eloquent justifications and showing the latter a zealous respect
which confirms reciprocal services.

The bureaucratic system

enforced by the Minister of Marine required colonial officials to
keep constantly in touch with him through "m&noires", reports, and
censuses.

For it was the policy of the time to keep the two top

colonial officials independent in their own spheres and when
disagreement occurred, as it often did, the matter was settled
at Versailles; and when it persisted, the usual remedy was
recall —

the only recourse dictated by the poor and slow

communication of the time.

Below the governor, worried

subordinates struggled to maintain or enhance their position.
This situation made it necessary to watch over their conduct
while retaining their allegiance and dealing tactfully with their
patrons.

Everywhere present, always captious and often hostile

loomed the intendant, or "conmissaire ordonnateur" —

civilians

who would not have reached these offices without considerable
support.71

Villiers, who apologizes for belaboring the point,

7lSee Fr^gault, Vaudreuil. 271*
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explains that the constant Impulse of the "ordonnateur" to
counteract the governor was an absolute system.72

This will be

brought out below In the relationship between the governor and
"commissaire ordonnateur".

At any rate, everything led the high

magistrate (intendant or "commlssalre ordonnateur") to oppose
the action of the governor.

This fact, more than any other, Is

what shaped the colonial government and gave It Its character.
The motives behind the nominations, conflicts, cliques, successes,
failures, and advancements of and even the relationship between
the governor and "commlssalre ordonnateur" were conditioned and
as such explained, to a great extent, by the characteristics of
this mechanism.

If a study on colonial administration ignores

this point, it leaves much to be desired.
All the top colonial administrators found themselves at
one time or another in the predicament of defending their
position:

the "commlssalre ordonnateur" because he manipulated

large sums and directed an army of subordinates who often used
their position to profit from commercial activities; the governor
because he possessed many powers and nominated commanders to posts
where trade was carried on by the military officers.

Each accused

the other of malfeasance and corruption and was suspected of
complacency because esprit de corps caused them to protect their
subordinates.73

However, with family Influence at Versailles

72Villiers, Demiferes ann^ds, 2k.
73Pr4gault, Vaudreuil. 205.
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and political acumen In the colony, a governor or "commlssalre
ordonnateur" survived and advanced In the system.

A similar

mechanism existed In the respective colonies but on a much
smaller scale.

The factions In the Superior Council created

by the governor and "ordonnateur" were effects of this mechanism.
That the system of dual authority by a military governor and a
"commlssalre ordonnateur" should have worked can only be ascribed
to the mechanism of the colonial administration.
That the colony of Louisiana was governed from Versailles,
there is no doubt.

The New World influenced the old and affected

the diplomacy and dictates of Versailles.

But when all is said

and done, the rigidity of the colonial system, once established,
developed a momentum of its own; and the colonial administrators
who would not play the role of puppets did not advance far in
the bureaucracy.

Some played their role well, others did not.

Some were adept in the use of their personal diplomacy in the
colony and their influence at Versailles, others were not.
Although the nature of the relationship of the two
officials has been outlined, a detailed examination of this
aspect of the colonial regime should be undertaken.

Accordingly,

the relationship between the "comnissaire ordonnateur" and the
governor.during the administration of Governor Vaudreuil, 17^3
to 1732, is singled out for the following reasons:

first, it

was the most prosperous administration; second, in terms of
relationship it was average when compared to both extremes,
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Salmon and Perler and Rocheoore and Kerl&rec; third, it provides
a clear picture of the workings of the colonial system; fourth,
the issues which were seemingly constant bones of contention were
accentuated with Michel and Vaudreuil; and fifth, both the governor
and "commlssaire ordonnateur" had influential family ties at home.

C H A P T E R

V

AH EXAMP IE OF THE REIATIONSHIP BETWEEN
THE "COMMISSAIRE ORDONNATEUR" AND THE GOVERNOR

Governor Vaudreuil did not agree with his "ordonnateurs"
any better than his predecessors had.

The administrative history

of his government was marked by sterile disputes and unjust
reproaches carried on successively by Salmon, Le Normant, and
Michel.1

At any rate, perhaps as an indication of his political

acumen, Vaudreuil was appointed governor general of New France
in 1752 after a stormy period in Louisiana.2
"Ordonnateur" Le Normant and Vaudreuil disagreed in the
worst possible manner.

They disagreed on almost all the matters

which required joint collaboration and denounced each other
vigorously.3

Le Normant, who had much more experience than

Vaudreuil, adopted the irritating but effective system:

"Let

others do what they may without desisting from your rights and
go your own way whatever may be said."4

Here was the secret of

1Villier8, Dernleres ann^es, 2J>-2k.
2 Ibid., 27.
^r^gault, Vaudreuil. 272; and Vaudreuil to Maurepas,
New Orleans, October 30, 17^5* AC, C1JA29.
Quoted in Fr4gault, Vaudreuil. 272.
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his strength.

Yet the two men kept at all times a polite

attitude though lacking cordiality in their relations.5
However with Michel, commissioned "ordonnateur" and
first councillor in January, 17^7, to succeed Le Normant, even
this cold urbanity disappeared.
the "scuffle" soon erupted.

As Michel frankly admitted,

This time Vaudreuil emerged

victorious, the more skilful.6
At first Michel and Vaudreuil cooperated.

However,

within a few weeks Michel began his harangues against Vaudreuil.
What had happened?

There were no quarrels since two parties

are required for a dispute and Vaudreuil chose to remain silent.
What vexed Michel the most was his Inability to give grandiose
receptions as Vaudreuil did:7

"Vaudreuil, who receives more

than I from the king, would hardly survive if the war had not
provided him the means to develop a considerable holding which
permits a comfortable living."8
of misappropriation.

He did not yet accuse Vaudreuil

This will come later and with anger.

For

the moment, Michel contented himself with Imitating the
governor.

He worked a small farm but without success.9

His

5Ibid.
°lbid.; and Michel to Rouilll, New Orleans, September 15
171*9, AC, C13A3h.
7Fr^gault, Vaudreuil. 278.
aIbid.; and Michel to Rouill^, New Orleans, September 18
17^9, AC, C13A31*.
^r^gault, Vaudreuil. 278.
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mother-in-law, aware of hla fallings, had foreseen it.

"It Is

perhaps, dear son, that you lack as much managerial ability in
Louisiana as you did in New France, for the one who replaced
you is very successful while you could only spend."10
reminded him on another occasion:

She

"Know, dear son, that we

placed you where you are now to set your affairs in order and
not to reform the governor."11
The first major area of friction involved Membrede, a
prot^g^ of Governor Vaudreuil.

Membrede was appointed major of

New Orleans on the recommendation of Vaudreuil.
him a seat in the Superior Council.

The post gave

According to Michel, the

major took over the police of New Orleans and instilled a
great fear among the colonists of the capital city.12

The

"ordonnateur" accused him of imprisoning and holding inhabitants
in jail for weeks and assuming despotic authority.

Furthermore,

Michel complained to the Minister of Marine that Membrede and
Vaudreuil dominated to the point of rendering an "ordonnateur"
useless in the colony.13

However, the "ordonnateur" soon

dropped his feud with Membrede and concentrated on bigger
game —

the governor.

Michel accused him of keeping the

"ordonnateur" in the dark on administrative matters, claiming

10Quoted in ibid.
11Ibid.
laMichel to Rouill£, New Orleans, September 15, 17^9>
AC, C13A51*.
1 3Ibld.: and Fr^gault, Vaudreuil. 280 and 282.

that he should play a role In the governing of the Indians and
therefore, should attend the Indian assemblies convened by the
governor.

Desperate, Michel wrote the Minister In 17^9 that he

felt the most exasperating part of the whole situation to be
the lack of attention given the "commlssalre gindral" and the
attempt to deprive him of his functions and rights granted by
the crown.14

In order that he might correct this slight to

himself and to the king, Michel asked for additional power,
which would leave no doubt as to his authority and functions.15
Early in 1751* Michel was once again at odd with
Membrede whom he accused of venality and with Vaudreuil whom
he again reproached for not consulting him on the governing
of the Indians.16

In addition, the "ordonnateur" attacked

Captain Tisserant who commanded the Illinois convoy in 17^6•
It seems that while en route, Tisserant had mysterious
expenses and delivered less rum than had been boarded on his
bateaux.17

It is not known whether or not these accusations

were well founded.

However, in 17^9, Tisserant was again

givea the command of the convoy.

The convoy was retarded

and to justify himself, Tisserant insisted that unforseen

l4Ibid.
l5Michel to Rouill^, New Orleans, September 15, 171*9,
AC, C13A54.
l0Michel to Rouill4, New Orleans, January 17, 1750,
AC, C13A31*; and Fr^gault, Vaudreuil. 282-283.
l7Ibid.
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obstacles Impeded his march.

Michel disagreed.

The main

obstacles, according to Michel, were the constant drinking
bouts engaged In by the commander, his soldiers and the
colonists who accompanied him.
not ignored.

This time the accusation was

The Minister assured Michel his accusations

would not jeopardize his position and ordered Vaudreuil to
punish Tisserant.

To his surprise, the governor declared the

"ordonnateur" was the only one who complained of Tisserant.18
What is curious and perhaps an indication of his insecurity is
that Michel joined Vaudreuil in defending the captain.18
At any rate, Versailles received Michel's denunciations
in the usual manner.

At that time, Rouill£, having succeeded

Maurepas who was exiled on April 2ht 17^9> was Minister of
Marine.

Vaudreuil had always enjoyed the protection of

Maurepas.20

Roullll was anxious to show the governor that the

marine was in new hands and therefore severely reproached
Vaudreuil for the lack of discipline of his troops and the
abuses by post officers, matters which Michel had often called
to the attention of Versailles.

Rouill^ blocked the advancement

of Membrede, whom Vaudreuil had proposed to command at Illinois.

laFr^gault, Vaudreuil. 283-28U; Michel to Rouill^,
New Orleans, January 22, 1750, AC, C13A3**-; Rouilld to Michel,
Versailles, September 26, 1750, AC, B91; and Surrey, Commerce,
295-296.
18Vaudreuil and Michel to Rouill^, New Orleans, May 19,
1751, AC, C13A35.
2°Fr^gault, Vaudreuil. 28U-285.
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At the same time Michel was reprimanded for defending Tisserant
after having exposed him.21

Michel, who had complained about

the lack of honors which the governor allowed the troops to
give him, was told by Roulll^ that these honors were nevertheless
superior to those normally due an "ordonnateur".22

As to

Michel's quarrel with Membrede, the Minister remarked that if
the "ordonnateur" had acted in a different manner, the governor
would have put Membrede in his place.23

Finally, to Michel's

insistence on sharing the government of the Indians, the
Minister answered in a biting tone:

"You must know better

than any one else that in colonies with an Indian population,
the governors alone govern them...

You have no right to be

present at the councils which the governor holds with the
Indians.1,24
These rebuttals did not stop Michel.

He continued

his attacks on Membrede and Vaudreuil while initiating others.

21Ibid., 285; Vaudreuil to Rouilld, New Orleans,
September 28, 17^9 > AC, C13A33; and Rouill^ to Vaudreuil,
Versailles, June 11, 1750, AC, B91.
22Fr^gault, Vaudreuil. 286; Rouill4 to Michel,
Versailles, November 23, 1750, AC, B91; and Rouilld to Michel,
Versailles, September 26, 1750, ibid. However, Michel continued
to complain about the lack of honor due his office. See for
example Michel to the Minister, New Orleans, May 22 and 29,
1751, AC, C13A35.
23Rouill^ to Michel, Versailles, September 26, 1750,
AC, B91.
24Ibid.
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His hostility toward Vaudreuil became systematic.25
blame for this hostility?

Who was to

In the final analysis it can be said

that both must bear the fault, but Michel's was the greater.
At times, each had acted alone in matters which demanded joint
action.

Michel demanded powers which were not prescribed to

"conmissaires ordonnateurs".
his lack of tact.

However, his main liability was

In the end Vaudreuil maintained his position,

and was even promoted to a higher office.

Vaudreuil, as it

was pointed out above, had influential support at Versailles
and knew how to use it advantageously in dealing with his
opposition.

Michel had similar influence at Versailles but

gambled it away by constantly making blunders and petty
accusations.

In ignoring the first accusations of Michel,

Vaudreuil showed ability, an ability which he probably learned
through his contact with Le Normant.

On many occasions,

Madame B^gon, who knew the interests of her son-in-law, advised
him to gain the friendship of Vaudreuil and, if need be,
sacrifice something to gain it.20

Living at Rochefort permitted

her to stay abreast of the politics in the "bureaux" of the
navy.

She had great designs for the future of Michel's

children who lived with her at Rochefort.

But the foolishness

of her son-in-law threatened all and she warned him that this

25Fr^gault, Vaudreuil. 289.
2 aIbid.. 291.
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lack of wisdom could ruin him along with others.27
bitterly complain about trifles...

"You

I preach nothing less than

to sacrifice everything in order to get along with Vaudreuil
whose influence is greater than ever."20
Madame B^gon even confided in Le Normant, former
"commissaire ordonnateur", who sympathized with Michel; however,
he too, advised prudence especially in letters to Versailles at
a time when fusses about trifles were less tolerated.

Le

Normant even tried to influence the Minister in favor of his
successor.

In addition, the Influential Rostan, a top naval

official at Bordeaux, promised Madame Bdgon as much.29
All this advice and these efforts in his behalf
Irritated Michel to the point of accusing his mother-in-law of
siding with Vaudreuil's family.

He retorted that the governor

was not as powerful as he appeared.
support was La Porte.

After all, his only

As if this was not enough.

La Porte

was the powerful first "comnis" of the Ministry of Marine and
directed the administration of French colonies in the New World.30
At this opportune moment Vaudreuil decided it was time
to defend himself.

He chose the first occasion to break his

27Ibid.
2aQuoted in ibid.
^Ibid., 292.
30Ibid.; and La Roque de Roquebrune, "La direction,"

blO-kQ8.
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silence.

The occasion Is admirable for It shows Vaudreuil's

political acumen.3(1

The governor declared to Rouilll on

May 8 , 1751» that he had not encroached on the powers of the
"ordonnateur".

To the contrary, desiring to please and for

the sake of peace, Vaudreuil allowed the "ordonnateur" to
encroach on the functions of the governor to the point of
reproach from the home government.

For example, on February 1,

1750, Vaudreuil signed In concert with Michel an ordinance
on the emission of treasury notes.

As expected, the crown

expressed Its displeasure when It learned that the colonial
administration had resorted to an expedient which, not long
before, had plunged the finances In disarray and the colony In
a state of uneasiness.

But, protested the governor, "the notes

were already made and ready to circulate In the public, a fact
which I could not ignore."32

Worse still, the "ordonnateur"

had already drawn up his ordinance and when the governor
objected, he was told that it would be posted with or without
the governor's signature.

In consideration for Michel and in

order to prevent a general public mistrust in a paper money not
validated by the governor, Vaudreuil lent himself to an operation
of which he disapproved.33

"It Is not my intention," Vaudreuil

^Frdgault, Vaudreuil. 293* and Rouill^ to Vaudreuil
and Michel, Versailles, November 23, 1750* AC, B91.
^Fr^gault, Vaudreuil. 293» Vaudreuil to Rouill^, New
Orleans, May 8 , 1751* AC, C13A35; and Surrey, Commerce. 138-lto.
^Ibld.
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added, "to write a litany of complaints against Michel;
however, it Is my duty to inform you that the 'ordonnateur'
wants his will done in all matters and sole authority...."34
Vaudreuil then refuted Michel's accusation.

He

affirmed that he had informed the "ordonnateur" of the
expedition to Santa Fe before its departure.

Far from

objecting then, Michel recognized its utility.35
Vaudreuil attacked in his turn.

This said,

Michel's negligence in

supplying the posts provoked desertions, and his bad will
complicated the governing of the Indians.

On the information

furnished by Michel, the home government had reproached
Vaudreuil for having allowed some officials to run into debt
to the amount of to,000 livres.

The Minister, accordingly,

ordered the governor to force these officers to make
restitution or be thrown in jail.
Vaudreuil.

"Very well," answered

"But, who made these advances?

It was not the

governor, for he did not have the right nor did he assume it.
The irregularity was committed without his knowledge."

It

seemed that Michel and his subordinates attempted to gain
popularity and support by giving these advances.36

34Vaudreuil to Rouill^, New Orleans, May 8, 1751» AC,
C13&35; and Fr^gault, Vaudreuil. 293-29to
35Rouill^ to Michel, Versailles, October 2, 1750, AC,
B91; Rouill^ to Vaudreuil, ibid.; and Vaudreuil to Rouill^, New
Orleans, May 8, 1751, AC, C13A3530Fr^gault, Vaudreuil. 29to295» and Vaudreuil to Rouilll,
New Orleans, May 11 and 12, 1751, AC, C13A35*
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Yet quarrels went on.

Vaudreuil had assigned Duplessy

to command at the English Turn.
the keeper of the warehouse.
the store-keeper Carrifere.

The officer quarrelled with

Duplessy, being drunk, Ill-treated
Michel Immediately sided with Carri^re,

his subordinate; and of course, Vaudreuil defended his own
appointee.37

The disagreement which this incident occasioned

not only pitted the two top officials one against the other,
but also set the civil establishment against the military.
Michel raged while Vaudreuil remained silent:
is the golden calf adored by all."38

"The governor

Michel attacked everybody,

even his colleagues in the Superior Council, whom he branded as
ignorant.

Here was an example of the role played by cliques in

the administrative system.

Worse still, according to the

"ordonnateur", the military dominated the Superior Council
through the governor, the major and the governor's favorites.39
To Michel, the root of all abuse in the posts was Vaudreuil and
his wife:

"There is no doubt that the governor has a third of

[Tombecb^] to his profit in addition to all the other [[posts].
No one doubts this here..."40

Michel claimed that the posts

^Fr^gault, Vaudreuil. 297; Michel to Rouilli, New
Orleans, May 15 and July 15, 1751* AC, C13A35* and Gayarr4,
Louisiana. II, 57.
38Michel to Rouill£, New Orleans, July 15, 1751* AC,
C13A35.
39Ibid.; and Gayarr£, Louisiana. II, 57.
4°Fr4gault, Vaudreuil. 302-303* Gayarr^, Louisiana. II,
57-61; and Michel to Rouill^, New Orleans, July 15, 1751* AC,
C13A35.
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commanders were either Canadian supporters, relatives, or allies
of the governor.41
his adversary?

Vaudreuil did not deny this.

But what about

Was Michel an eye witness to this?

That the

"ordonnateur" was deeply hostile to the governor Is difficult to
deny.42

Frigault's description of Michel Is interesting:
Extremely vain, bulging with superficial
importance, jealous of the power, prestige and
well being of Vaudreuil, imbued with a civilian
prejudice against the military, moved by a
sickly ambition, extremely suspicious and
driven by his first denunciations, he
desperately had to cast grievances and more
violent accusations in order to secure his
situation.43

Michel seemed never to lack motives in his endeavors to discredit,
expose, and disgrace his colleague.44

In the process, the

"ordonnateur" jeopardized his career.

Fleuriau, the powerful

"procureur g^n^ral", denounced Michel's pride:

"I believe that

his pride is an incurable sickness and makes him forever furious."45
When Kerl&rec became governor of Louisiana in 1752, he commented
on Vaudreuil's patience:

"It was only for the sake of peace,"

41 Ibid.
42Fr^gault, Vaudreuil. *Pk.
43Ibld.. 501+-505.
44Ibld.. 305.
45Fleuriau to Roulll£, New Orleans, February 1, 1752,
AC, C13A36.
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Kerl&rec confided to Rouill^, "that kept you uninformed about
matters which you should have known."46
Where It Is possible to verify Michel's assertions, one
finds that his only source was gossip picked up from the streets
of New Orleans.47
alleged.

At any rate, no one confirmed what Michel

This suffices for one to abstain from placing too much

emphasis on Michel's testimony.

This Is Villlers conclusion.

The long harangues of Michel were but "unjust reproaches" and
"sterile disputes".46
Vaudreuil:

What then of Michel's accusations of

the doubtful honesty of the post commanders; the

lack of discipline of the troops, and the favoritism toward the
Canadians in Louisiana?
did not hide it.48

Vaudreuil was a Canadian patriot and

As to the lack of discipline among the troops

and their officers, the governor knew of its existence and
regretted it.

If he did not succeed in eliminating this problem

any more than his predecessors had, it was undoubtedly because
it was an inherent part of the administrative structure of French
Louisiana, a sparsely populated colony in which the military
element represented an excessive force.

In considering this

4eKerl^rec to Roulll^, New Orleans, March 8, 1753» AC,
C13A37; and Fr^gault, Vaudreuil. 305*
47Ibid.
^^r^gault, Vaudreuil. 306-307; an<* Villiers, Dernleres
armies, 2k.
46Fr^gault, Vaudreuil. 307.

lamentable situation and Vaudreuilfs handling of It, the type
of recruits supplied to French Louisiana cannot be Ignored.

As

mentioned previously, the recruits, far from being the pick
of the army, were often the dregs.

It Is true that post

commanders abused their position.

This was so, before and

after Vaudreuil, in Louisiana as well as in New France.50
Caught In an impossible situation Michel was the
object of an imperial mechanism which functioned but whose
inefficiency was clear.31

When compared to that of his

antagonist, the stature of Vaudreuil rose above the system.
The man, in the end, is worth more than the system of which he
is a product.52

Vaudreuil left his mark on French Louisiana.

Though exaggerated, the following is Gayarrl's review of Vaudreuil1
administration.
The administration of the Marquis of Vaudreuil
was long and fondly remembered in Louisiana, as
an epoch of unusual brilliancy, but which was
followed up by corresponding gloom. His
administration, if small things may be compared
with great ones, was for Louisiana with regard
to splendor, luxury, military display, and
expenses of every kind, what the reign of
Louis XIV had been for France. He was a man
of patrician birth and high breeding, who
liked to live in a manner worthy of his rank.
Remarkable for his personal graces and
comeliness, for the dignity of his bearing and
the fascination of his address, he was fond of
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poop, show and pleasure. Surrounded by a host
of brilliant officers, of whom he was the Idol,
he loved to keep up a miniature court, In
distant Imitation of that of Versailles; and
long after he had departed, old people were
fond of talking of the exquisitely refined
manners, the magnificent balls, the splendidly
uniformed troops, the high-born young officers,
and many other unparalleled things they had
seen In the days of the Great Marquis. 3
Though the governor and "commlssalre ordonnateur" were often
at odds, they did agree on certain matters such as those connected with
public administration.

s^Gayarr^, Louisiana. II, 66.

C H A P T E R

VI

THE "COMMISSAIRE ORDONNATEUR" AND PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION

The French crown considered agriculture and commerce the two
most Important features of colonial administration.1

But above all,

commerce preoccupied France at the beginning of the eighteenth
century.

It was the surest means for the growth of a colony since

only commerce could interest France in the colonial task.2

However,

Louisiana or any other colony could not play a role in the French
imperial design without constant care from the mother country.3
As a "commlssalre ordonnateur" explained in a "m£molre" on
Louisiana, "colonies should be considered according to their
service to the state but exploitation proceeds from their firm
establishment, the number and industry of the settlers, crops and
production and should be to the mutual advantage of the state and
colonies."4

The French government understood this but only

1See for example "Mdmoire du roi aux Srs. Perier gouverneur
et Salmon commlssalre ordonnateur a la Louislane," Marly,
May 22, 1731, AC, B55.
2Fr^gault, Vaudreuil. I38 ; and Maurepas to Bienville and
Salmon, Versailles, September 2, 173^» AC, B6l.
^r^gault, Vaudreuil. 138 .
Quoted in ibid.
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to the point of choosing between immediate and long range
Interests.5
Upon resuming control of Louisiana in 1731> the French crown
was unable to send enough ships to trade with the colony.

Hence,

it planned to attract merchants by offering gratifications of
forty livres per ton for the shipment of certain goods but eventually
reduced this amount to twenty.6

The government made other attempts

to induce French merchants to trade with the colony; and on
August k, 1731, the French crown exempted for a period of six
years merchant ships from transporting troops and weapons and
declared the commerce of Louisiana open to all French subjects.7
However, the desire to establish a profitable commerce was not
enough.

Other elements were needed to make commerce with Louisiana

profitable.

The colony needed settlers to engage in agriculture

and Negro laborers to cultivate the soil.

The French government

realized this and believed that by providing the colonies with
enough settlers and Negro slaves, commerce might be augmented to
the volume of engaging 1,000 ships for carrying the American trade.
"Such was the spirit of France when Iouisiana, for a second time,
became a crown colony."8

The crown reflected this optimism in

5Ibjd.. 138-139.
Surrey, Commerce, 77.
7Frigault, Vaudreuil, 139* and Maurepas to Perier,
Versailles, January JO, 1731* AC, B55*
8Surrey, Commerce, 169.
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its Instructions to Governor Bienville and "commlssalre ordonnateur"
Salmon in 1752«0
In the vocabulary of eighteenth century France, "police
g4n4rale" signified general administration of the colony which was
the joint concern of the governor and "commlssalre ordonnateur"
and embraced three principal areas:
commerce.10

population, agriculture and

Since Louisiana attracted few settlers, there was

not much which could be done to increase the population of the
colony except by releasing soldiers desirous of becoming settlers
and by keeping those already in the colony.

Accordingly, the

Minister of Marine urged Governor Bienville to treat the colonists
humanely and to protect them against any vexation from military
officers and soldiers.

Turning to "commlssalre ordonnateur"

Salmon, Maurepas expected his fiscal and judicial officer to minister
to the needs of the inhabitants, facilitate their settlements, and
most importantly, protect the weak from exploitation by the
powerful and prevent the officers of the Superior Council from
abusing their authority.11
The soil of Louisiana was suitable for the growth of several
crops.

Unlike that of New France, whose soil yielded no product

e"M^moire du rol pour servir d'instructions aux Srs.
Bienville gouveroeur et Salmon commlssalre ordonnateur a la
Louisiane," Marly, February 2, 1732, AC, B57.
10See for example ibid.
11Ibid.
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which could not be grown In France, Louisiana offered goods which
the mother country needed.12

Therefore, the French crown oriented

the agriculture of Louisiana not only toward a subsistence economy
but toward exports.

For in Louisiana, agriculture meant commerce.

1A

The cultivation of sugar had yet to succeed in the colony by 1732,
"perhaps," wrote the Minister, "because of the choice of land or
the climate is unfavorable.

Be that as it may, the soil can

yield other crops capable of as much profit when in sufficient
quantity for export."1'* Indigo for one was of high quality but,
unfortunately, the settlers had abandoned its cultivation.

The

Minister strongly recommended to Bienville and Salmon to revive
indigo production while he waited lnqpatiently for their report
on the progress of the settlers to whom Salmon had distributed
indigo seeds.15

Rice grew bountifully in French Louisiana.

1732, it was part of the diet of the colonists.

In

The Minister

noted that rice could be of great assistance in times of crisis
and when flour from France was found wanting.

138.

In view of this,

l2DuchSne, Politique colonlale. 92; and Frigault, Vaudreuil.

1 ^r^gault, Vaudreuil. 138•
14"M^moire du roi pour servir d'instructions aux Srs.
Bienville gouverneur et Salmon commlssalre ordonnateur & la
Louisiane," Marly, February 2, 1732, AC, B57; and "M^moire du
roi aux Srs. Vaudreuil gouverneur et Salmon commlssalre ordonnateur
de la Louisiane," Versailles, October 22, 17^2, AC, B7^-«
l5Ibid.

Maurepas urged Bienville and Salmon to continue its cultivation.16
This was not the case with wheat, whose cultivation failed in
lower Louisiana.

Accordingly, the French crown discouraged its

being planted in lower Louisiana.

Besides, the inhabitants could

be supplied by the Illinois province where wheat was a considerable
success.17

Versailles regarded cotton and silk production as

potentially important articles of trade and recommended the governor
and "commlssalre ordonnateur" to give more attention to these two
as the population increased.18

Because flax and hemp grew very

well in Louisiana, the Minister noted that they "may be equally
profitable both to the colony and commerce" and hoped that "the
result of the test made on hemp and flax will motivate the settlers
to develop this industry."19
The French government was pleased with the pitch production
at Mobile.

Salmon had taken steps to estimate the quantity which

might be produced yearly.

While the Minister waited for the

"ordonnateur's" report, he ordered Bienville and Salmon "to impress
upon the colonists the commercial importance of this industry."20
To test its quality and in view of a market, Salmon shipped two
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hundred barrels of pitch to Rochefort.

As France had an interest

in developing the industry of Xouisiana as well, Maurepas
instructed the colonial administrators to urge the settlers to
exploit the Louisiana forests where timber for construction of
ships and houses was plentiful.

"This enterprise is all the more

important," the Minister added, "since it could develop into a
coastal trade between Louisiana and the French islands."21
As described in Chapter I, tobacco was both the main
article of trade and a barrier in the way of the diversification
of crops.

The French crown recognized this:

"Since His Majesty

realizes that the colonists have devoted their energy to the
tobacco crop with great success and at the present regard it as
the only source of livelihood, he has decided to favor it."22
Thus, the crown fixed the price at which the farmers-general were
to purchase Louisiana tobacco:

thirty-five livres per 100 pounds

during 1732-1733; thirty livres during 173^-35; twenty-seven
livres, ten sous during 1736-37; and twenty-five livres during
1738*

Needless to say, Versailles ordered Bienville and Salmon

to send only good quality tobacco to France.23

21Ibid.; and
mo ire du roi aux Srs. Perier gouverneur
et Salmon cotmnissaire ordonnateur & la Louisiane," Marly, May 22,
1731, AC, B5522"M£moire du roi pour servir d'instruction aux Srs.
Bienville gouverneur et Salmon commlssalre ordonnateur a la
Louisiane," Marly, February 2, 1732, AC, B57.
23Ibid.
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The third main area of colonial administration was commerce,
an area the French government felt was essential to the growth of
French Louisiana.24

The French crown took many steps to revive

commerce In 1731-32 and expended considerable energy to promote
the growth of the colony.25

The Minister reasoned that the

duty-free comnerce between France and Louisiana, the gratifications
and bounties, the profitable trade venture of the first ship
which returned to the colony, and the assured tobacco market would
make It feasible for other French merchants to supply the colony's
needs.26

To attract French merchants to Louisiana, Maurepas

instructed Bienville and Salmon to protect their commercial
activities and provide all the facilities for the sale and pay
ment of their wares.27

24See for example ibid.; "Mdmoire du roi aux Srs. Perier
gouverneur et Salmon commlssaire ordonnateur & la Loulsiane,"
Marly, May 22, 1731> AC, B55; Maurepas to Bienville and Salmon,
Versailles, September 2, 173^> AC, B6l; "Mlmoire du roi aux
Srs. Vaudreuil gouverneur et Salmon commlssaire ordonnateur
de la Loulsiane," Versailles, October 22, 17^2, AC, B71*;
and Maurepas to Vaudreuil, Versailles, November k, 17^8,
AC, B87.
2 ^Surrey, Commerce. 176.
2a"M£moire du roi pour servir d'instruction aux Srs.
Bienville gouverneur et Salmon commlssaire ordonnateur a la
Loulsiane," Marly, February 2, 1732, AC, B57; Surrey, Commerce,
177; Fr^gault, Vaudreuil. 138-139; Gayarr^, Louisiana. II. 62;
and "M^moire du roi aux Srs. Perier gouverneur et Salmon
commlssaire ordonnateur & la Loulsiane," Marly, May 22, 1731>
AC, B55.
27"Mimoire du roi pour servir d'instruction aux Srs.
Bienville gouverneur et Salmon commlssaire ordonnateur & la
Loulsiane," Marly, February 2, 1732, AC, B37.
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In its endeavor to attract French merchants to Louisiana,
the French government foresaw no better inducement than the
development of commerce with the Spanish colonies, for this under
taking would be equally advantageous to both French merchants and
colonists because of the considerable amount of money which this
trade would involve.28

Though Louisiana was seldom in a position

to do so, it supplied Pensacola, when possible, with merchandise
and even with food until the agents of the Conpany of the Indies
drove the Spanish from Louisiana.20

Among the many tasks of

Governor Bienville and "ordonnateur" Salmon was the one of
reestablishing trade between Pensacola and Louisiana.

It appeared

that in 1732, the governor of Pensacola was inclined to renew
trade with the French colony since he had recently dispatched a
ship to Mobile for provisions.30

"Bienville and Salmon" advised

the Minister, "must take advantage of this and other opportunities
for the purpose of renewing commerce."31
French commercial design went beyond Pensacola.

It was

Maurepas*s intention that the colonial administrators "must not
limit their plans to commerce with Pensacola, but must also eye
the different ports of New Spain and Havana."32

28Ibld.

^Ibid.
30Ibid.
31Ibid.

^Ibid.

The Minister was
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aware of Bienville's former contacts at Havana and Vera Cruz and
was convinced "that the Spanish would send ships if Louisiana
would designate a place for them to load speedily the desired
supplies without publicity."

The French crown knew full well that

the Spanish would not take it upon themselves to trade at
New Orleans.33

The belief was that corruption among Spanish

officials would facilitate commerce with New Spain in spite of
the legal restrictions.34

However, Maurepas warned that French

merchants would not ship to Louisiana any goods suitable for the
Spanish trade unless they were assured of a market.
What was the state of commerce between Louisiana and the
French Islands?

For one thing, Versailles envisioned a coastal

trade between the two.33

For the realization of this enterprise,

Louisiana needed to build ships to trade in lumber with the

^Ibid.
34Surrey, Commerce. 588; and Maurepas to Bienville and
Salmon, Versailles, September 8, 1753* AC, B59»
35,,M^moire du roi pour servir d'instructions aux Srs.
Bienville gouverneur et Salmon commlssaire ordonnateur & la
Loulsiane," Marly, February 2, 1732, AC, B57.
33"Mdmoire du roi aux Srs. Perier gouverneur et Salmon
commlssaire ordonnateur a la Loulsiane," Marly, May 22, 1732,
AC, B55, Maurepas to Salmon, Marly, May 22, 1731, AC, B55,
Maurepas to Salmon, Versailles, August 21, 1731, AC, B55»
Maurepas to Bienville and Salmon, Versailles, September 8, 1733,
AC, B59; "Mdmoire du roi pour servir d'instruction au S. Salmon
commlssaire de la marine ordonnateur & la Loulsiane," Marly,
May 19, 1731, AC, B55, and "M^molre du roi aux Srs. Vaudreuil
gouverneur et Salmon commlssaire ordonnateur de la Loulsiane,"
Versailles, October 22, 17^2, AC, B7^«
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French islands.

This would be of great advantage to the colony,

for lumber could be exchanged for syrups, sugar, rum and other
goods.37

The Minister believed that "if the colonists of

Louisiana undertook this venture, the French islands would
reciprocate and soon the commercial Interchange would benefit
both."38

The French envisaged a still more lucrative trade in

livestock, horses and mules which brought a dear price in the
Antilles in 1731*30

However, the crown realized that the

colony was not disposed for such an adventure in 1732; but
Maurepas explained, "Louisiana has extensive prairies for
grazing, and it is probable that the colonists will undertake
it after Bienville and Salmon itqpress upon them its potential."40
However, the ensuing years, except for the short period of
prosperity during Vaudreuil's administration, revealed that the
optimistic plans of the French crown in 1732 and the energy applied
by the governors and "commissalres ordonnateurs" did not
materialize as expected.

In 17^, Louisiana was near starvation;

^"M^moire du roi pour servir d'Instructions aux Srs.
Bienville gouverneur et Salmon comnissaire ordonnateur a la
Loulsiane," Marly, February 2, 1732, AC, B57.
^Ibid.
30Ibid.; and "M^moire du roi aux Srs. Perier gouverneur
et Salmon commlssaire ordonnateur & la Loulsiane," Marly, May 22,
1731, AC, B55^"M^molre du roi pour servir d' instruct ions aux Srs.
Bienville gouverneur et Salmon commissalre ordonnateur & la
Loulsiane," Marly, February 2, 1732 , AC, B57.
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flour was sold for as much as 565 llvres a barrel and at times
could not be bought at any price.41

If "ordonnateur" Le Normant

had not found rice in 17^5> the government would have been unable
to feed the troops.42

The farmers totally neglected their land

which yielded some tobacco and even less indigo of poor quality.43
The colonists were discouraged for lack of trade.
without stable markets, was withering away.

The colony,

The economy of

Louisiana, based on exotic goods, had to have exports.44
had to find markets to survive.

Louisiana

Rightly so, the French crown,

in a move to ease the situation somewhat, thought of opening the
French market to such Louisianaproducts as flax, hemp, and
pitch but at lower prices.

The home government also agreed to

receive tobacco, indigo and rice.45

However, Maurepas hoped that

French ship owners would organize the commerce or still that
Louisiana would construct its own merchant marine, for France was
on the verge of war.46

The colonial administrators of Louisiana

^Fr^gault, Vaudreuil. 585* Le Normant to Maurepas, New
Orleans, December 26, 17^-, AC, C15A28; and Maurepas to Vaudreuil,
Versailles, April 26, 17^5, AC, B8l.
4SFr^gault, Vaudreuil. 586.
43Ibld.
44Ibld.
45Ibid.
4e"M^moire du roi aux Srs. Vaudreuil gouverneur et Salmon
commissaire ordonnateur de la Loulsiane," Versailles, October 22,
17te, AC, B7^.
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were left to fend for themselves in rebuilding the ruined colony
in I7M 1. First of all, Governor Vaudreuil and "conmlssaire
ordonnateur" Le Normant had to relnstill in the colonists the
will to work.

However, it was not enough to energize the

colonists; they needed an orientation.47

The governor and

"conmlssaire ordonnateur" pointed to agriculture, industry and
commerce.

But, the lack of tools and capital quickly dampened

their industrial hopes such as mining.

However, the timber

industry was more or less successful;46 for, although the samples
shipped to Rochefort were of low quality and high price, France
continued its purchases due to the demands of the royal shipyards.48
From 17^5 to 17^6, Louisiana exported more than 18,000 livres
worth of wood and more than 20,000 livres of pitch and tar.60

In

spite of this partial success, colonial industry remained
secondary; and the colony was forced to depend on its agriculture.
Because indigo was profitable, the governor and "ordonnateur"
encouraged the large planters to increase its production.

In 17^,

Vaudreuil boasted that because of his efforts, many colonists
were intent on doubling their production.61

Le Normant, who opposed

47Ibid.
4aHenry Plauch4 Dart, "The Career of Dubreull in French
Louisiana," L H &, XVIII (April, 1935), 279; and Fr^gault,
Vaudreuil.
48Maurepas to Vaudreuil and Salmon, October 22, 17^2, AC, B7^»
^^r^gault, Vaudreuil. 589*
^Vaudreuil to Maurepas, New Orleans, December 29, 17Mf,
AC, C13A28.
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Vaudreuil on many points, wrote in 17^9 that indigo cultivation,
begun at the time of the couq>any of the Indies, abandoned and
taken up many times thereafter, has been for the past four or
five years seriously cultivated.52

In 17^, a hurricane destroyed

part of the crop; but the subsequent good seasons rewarded the
efforts of the colonists:

the quality improved, the yield

increased, and the selling price doubled between 17^3 an<* 1750 .53
The demand for Indigo became such that the English attempted to
gain a share of the Louisiana source.

In 17^8, the British

Parliament granted the Carolina merchants a substantial bounty
for each pound of indigo transported to England.

The French

crown feared less that the measure would develop the Indigo
industry of Carolina than that it would increase contraband be
tween the English and French colonies.54
except France:

Everybody would profit

the colonists of Louisiana by access to an

excellent market; the Carolinians by a bounty for shipping Indigo
to England; and England by acquiring the product without going
through France, the latter losing both clients and profit .55

5aFr4gault, Vaudreuil. 389"390*
53Ibld.: Villiers, Demleres ann^es. 23; and Gayarr^,
Louisiana. II, 19*

54Fr£gault, Vaudreuil. 390; and Maurepas to Vaudreuil and
Michel, Versailles, January 2, 17^9, AC, B89.
5^?r£gault, Vaudreuil. 390*
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Rouilll, who succeeded Maurepas as Minister of Marine,
convinced of the English economic design, alerted the colonial
administrators of Louisiana to guard against the English.56
While the large planters Increased their Indigo crop, the
small ones engaged in the more general but less profitable tobacco
crop and experienced astonishing results.
demand for tobacco decreased In the 17to(s.

Unfortunately, the
Consequently, by

17^7 the warehouses of New Orleans and Pointe Couple were bulging
with bales of tobacco which could not be sold In France.57

The

majority of the farmers, discouraged by this situation, thought
of curtailing production.

Vaudreuil and Le Normant persuaded the

colonists not to despair but to continue as usual the cultivation
of tobacco with the promise of relief from France.

The governor

and "commlssaire ordonnateur", in their report on the conditions
in Louisiana, persuaded the Minister to order the ship captains
destined for Louisiana to load tobacco in preference to the other
local products for their return voyage to France.58
What was the relative ltqportance of Louisiana products of
the period?

From 17^3 to 17^6, the colony shipped each year about

170,000 pounds of tobacco, valued at 30,000 francs.

This profit

56Rouill! to Vaudreuil and Michel, Versailles, September 26,
1750, AC, B91.
57Frlgault, Vaudreuil. 391*
58Vaudreuil to Maurepas, New Orleans, May 10, 17^7, AC,
C13A31; Frlgault, Vaudreuil, 391; and Surrey, Commerce. 209.
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was modest compared to the returns of Indigo, whose yearly
shipment of six thousand pounds brought In 18,000 francs.

However,

the most rewarding commerce was In furs even though the article
did not bring high prices —

only thirty sous per pound.

But

during good or bad years, no less than 55,000 pounds, valued at
82,500 francs, were collected.59

Le Normant denounced the short

sightedness of Vaudreuil to Maurepas, the "ordonnateur's" prot4g^,
accusing the governor of paying too much attention to the pelt
industry.

Nevertheless, Lhe trade in pelts comprised more than

a third of the annual commerce of Louisiana and Involved about
1,600 colonists.60

In 17^3, a colonist of Louisiana assessed the

agricultural and industrial capacity of the colony as follows:

203.000 pounds of tobacco; 300,000 of rice; 70,000 of pelts;
50.000 of lead; 30,000 of salted meat; enough wood to fill a
300 ton capacity ship; and cotton, wax and vegetables besides.61
But, in spite of its potential and the efforts of the governors
and "commissaires ordonnateurs", Louisiana never realized its full
potential in agriculture and Industry; for it lacked stable markets
in France and the French colonies.

Thus the problem of production

58Fr4gault, Vaudreuil. 391-392; and Surrey, Commerce,
Chapter XIX, "The Fur Trade of Louisiana, 1699-1763," 355- 366.
^Ibid.
^Quoted in G. Devron, ed., "A Chapter in Colonial
History," L H <£» VI (October, 1923), 56^; and Fr^gault,
Vaudreuil. 392.
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was exportation.

Vaudreuil who had attempted to resolve the

first, now attacked the second.62
The governor and "commlssaire ordonnateur" first turned
their attention to the Antilles.

Interested as Versailles was in

promoting trade with the French islands, few of the Louisiana
colonists had been able to afford the financial prerequisite.
However, some ships of the West Indies came to Louisiana.

In

17^3» Bienville reported that twelve ships of the French islands
had visited Louisiana ports in 17U2.63

Two years later, Vaudreuil

counted twenty which exchanged rum and other wares for lumber,
vegetables and Spanish piastres.64
Orleans than entered.

Still, more money left New

However, this situation was soon to change.

The war of Austrian Succession (17^-17^8) "brought about a
condition that made it possible to augment the supply of Spanish
money in Louisiana to such an extent that from 17^5 to 17^8 the
expenses of the colony were paid entirely in this medium."65
French merchants trading with Cuba and fearing interception by
English ships, had accumulated a considerable amount of the
desired Spanish money at Havana.

Since they were informed that

^Frdgault, Vaudreuil. 392.
63Bienville to Maurepas, New Orleans, February
AC, C13A28.

17^3*

64Fr4gault, Vaudreuil, 392; Vaudreuil to Maurepas, New
Orleans, May 10, 17Mf, AC, C13A28.
65Surrey, Commerce. 106.
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the English did not patrol the Gulf of Mexico, they decided to
transport their silver to Louisiana, where it could be exchanged
for bills of exchange drawn on the French treasury.66

The colony

welcomed the Spanish silver as an act of Providence, for it
temporarily eased Louisiana's monetary crisis and activated her
commerce.67

Thus, beginning with 17*4*4, the traffic with the French

islands grew considerably;68 and from 17*4*4 to 1750, one million
piastres flowed yearly to New Orleans.68
This occurred at a time when France maintained practically
no direct contact with French Louisiana.

The governor and

"commlssaire ordonnateur" complained to Versailles.

In 17**8,

Vaudreuil informed the Minister that French merchants had not
provisioned the colony for two years.70

By 17*47, war in Europe

between England and France brought to a standstill the communication
between Louisiana and the parent state.

There remained the

Spanish trade.
It was to the credit of Vaudreuil and his "ordonnateurs"
that at a time when Louisiana lost markets in France the

66Ibld.; Frlgault,
Loulsiane," BN, Collection

Vaudreuil. 393»
Joly de Fleury,

67"Mlmoires sur la Loulsiane," BN,
Fleury,
1726 and Fr^gault, Vaudreuil. 393*

and "Mlmo iressur la
1726.
CollectionJolyde

^Surrey, Commerce. 381.
^Ibid., 107.
7°Vaudreuil to Maurepas, New Orleans, March 20, 17*40, AC,
C13A32; and Frdgault, Vaudreuil. 393*
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neighboring Spanish colonies filled the vacuum.

In the aftermath

of the war of 1719“1721 between French Louisiana and Spanish
Pensacola during which the latter changed hands three times,
her officials distrusted her neighbors at Mobile and New Orleans.71
However, the French court, bent on gaining a share of the Spanish
trade, consistently advised its governors and "commissaires
ordonnateurs" to remove any suspicion the Spanish officials might
have toward Louisiana.72

However, since 1739* the relationship

between France and Spain had improved.

War with England forced

Spain into a rapprochement with France in view of assuring the
provisioning of their New World possessions.

Many Mexican ships

anchored at Louisiana ports in 17^1; however, the warehouses
being depleted, the ships returned home empty .73

This is not to

say that the easing of trade restrictions in the Spanish colonies
toward French merchants worked to the advantage of Louisiana.
Because of the facility with which French merchant ships
entered Mexican and Cuban ports between 17kO and 17**3» these
colonies no longer needed provisions from Louisiana.74

However,

^Fr^gault, Vaudreuil. 39^» and Heinrich, Loulsiane.
53-80.

72Smith, French Interests. 1^-15* Maurepas to Perier,
Versailles, June 11, 1729, AC, C13A121 ; "M&noire du roi aux Srs.
Perier gouverneur et Salmon commlssaire ordonnateur a la
Loulsiane," Marly, May 22, 1731> AC, B55; and Maurepas to
Vaudreuil, Versailles, September JO, 17^7, AC, B85«

73Fr4gault, Vaudreuil. 39^-»
7*Ibid., 39^-395
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without warning, the Spanish officials at Vera Cruz and Havana
reimpo8ed the rigid trade restrictions.75
encountered many difficulties.

French merchants thus

Some no longer found markets for

their cargoes, others were not able to take the money from their
sales out of Spanish ports.

The few Louisiana merchants who

conducted trade in Spanish ports were ruined by the bribes they
were forced to pay in order to trade.76

The governor and

"commlssaire ordonnateur" were not too alarmed, for as Vaudreuil
explained to Maurepas, "when the French merchants can no longer
trade with the Spanish they will come to Louisiana."77

The

merchants of Mobile faced similar restrictions and even
confiscation of goods at Pensacola.

Vaudreuil and Salmon,

complying with Versailles's instruction not to antagonize
Spanish officials in any way, prohibited Louisiana merchants
from trading with the Spanish colonies until commercial policies
changed and simultaneously assured Maurepas that the Spanish would
eventually return for provisions .78

Le Normant, who succeeded

Salmon in 17^, and Vaudreuil seemed to attach little importance
to coumerce with Florida and New Mexico.

They were eying bigger

75Le Normant to Maurepas, on board the Elephant. October 9»
17^7, AC, C13A28; and Fr^gault, Vaudreuil. 395.

76Ibld.; and Vaudreuil to Maurepas, New Orleans, July 26,
17^3, AC, C13A28.
77Vaudreuil to Maurepas, New Orleans, July 26, 17^3> AC,
C13A28.

78Ibjd.: Maurepas to Vaudreuil and Salmon, Versailles,
January 7, 17^, AC, C13A28; and Fr^gault, Vaudreuil. 395*
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gains:

the rich markets of New Spain and Cuba .78

Vaudreuil,

who had good relations with the governor of Cuba, inquired into
the complaints of the French merchants.

According to the Spanish

administrator, the French merchants were to blame by insisting on
trading prohibited articles.

The Spanish governor assured his

Louisiana colleague that the merchants would experience no
difficulty if they observed the ordinances and even provided a
U s t of goods which would enter without difficulty.80
Le Normant, "commlssaire ordonnateur" from 1 7 ^ to 17^8,
wrote an interesting letter on the French trade at Havana.

During

his stay at Havana, Le Normant said that he was well received by
the governor of Cuba and by other Spanish officials.

"The

Spanish," he informed the Minister of Marine, "depend on French
flour, wines, and several other products which they now permit
to enter and are the object of a considerable commerce.

But

most French merchants pose a threat to this commerce by
introducing articles which are either prohibited or of poor
quality."81

The "ordonnateur" urged strict compliance with

the Spanish ordinances and further pointed out that France

78For importance attached to this trade see "Mrfmoire
du roi aux Srs. Vaudreuil gouverneur et Salmon commlssaire
ordonnateur de la Loulsiane," Versailles, October 22, 17**2,
AC, WTk; and Fr^gault, Vaudreuil. 396.
aoVaudreuil to Maurepas, New Orleans, December 29>
17^, AC, C13A28; and Frlgault, Vaudreuil. 396.
81Le Normant to Maurepas, on board the Elephant.
October 10, 17Wf, AC, C13A28.

1UQ

had all the more reason not to offend Spanish authorities
because France, with her commercial designs on Spain and her
colonies, attempted to establish a consul at Havana.82

To

the surprise of the governor and "commlssaire ordonnateur," the
merchants who conformed to the Spanish regulations found easy
access and, their sale completed, easy egress from the ports.
But In 17^6, as a result of orders from Madrid but more Importantly
as a result of the gross Irregularities perpetrated by the French
merchants, the governor of Cuba ordered the cargoes of French
ships confiscated.

However, confiscation became rare with time83

because Vaudreuil and Le Normant were able to establish and
maintain good relationships with their colleagues in Cuba and
New Spain .84

Their efforts did not go unrewarded.

Ships from

Campeche, Vera Cruz, and Tampico destined for Havana stopped at
Belize, where they exchanged part of their cargoes of precious
wood, cochineal, cocoa, sarsaparilla, and vanilla for Louisiana
products and French goods which the Spanish In Cuba were In the
habit of buying.

In Cuba Spanish merchants exchanged French goods

for sugar, rum, and molasses, which they In turn traded at Belize

“ ibid.

83Fr^gault, Vaudreuil. 597.
a4Ibid.; Maurepas to Vaudreuil, Versailles, April 15,
17^6, AC, B85; Maurepas to Vaudreuil, Versailles, August 15,
17^7, AC, B85; Maurepas to Le Normant, Versailles, May 11,
17^6, AC, B85; and Maurepas to Vaudreuil, Versailles,
November U, 171»8, AC, B87.
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for other goods before returning to Mexican ports .85

As far as

Louisiana was concerned, this was contraband trade.
For a while, the economic life of Louisiana expanded as it
had never before.

The colonists thought only of commerce; they

abandoned the soil and transformed themselves into merchants.86
Even the affluent planters neglected their plantations in favor
of commerce.
prosperity.
nature .87

Some amassed quick fortunes.

But it was an artificial

Those involved in it were too busy to ponder its
It should have been realized that the end of the War

of the Austrian Succession and the resuoqption of normal
communication with Europe would bring an abrupt change to the
prosperity of Louisiana.

Immediately after the war, the Spanish

authorities at Havana announced once again their intention of
confiscating foreign ships entering the port .88

Le Normant feared

the repercussion on the economy of French Louisiana.

"Attesting

to establish a permanent commerce with the Spanish colonies,"
wrote Le Normant, "is like chasing a ghost ."88

Vaudreuil and

85Fr^gault, Vaudreuil. 598-399* and Surrey, Commerce.
"Trade with Mexico," 388-Ul7 and "Trade with Cuba," hJl-kkZ.
8^r4gault, Vaudreuil. kOO; and N.M.M. Surrey, "The
Development of Industries in Louisiana During the French Regime,
1673-1763," H V H R , IX (1922), 234.
87Ibid.
88Frdgault, Vaudreuil, 1*00.
^"M&nolre sur l'adminlstration de la Loulsiane,"
New Orleans, 17^9* AC, C13A33.
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acting "commlssaire ordonnateur" D'Aubevllle explained:

"We

believed that trade with the Spanish had been firmly established."80
The restrictive policies of the Spanish authorities were
bad enough, but what was worse was the excessive Indulgence of
the colonists in the trade.

Accordingly, the commercial activities

of Louisiana slowed down to a dangerous pace in the aftermath of
the Peace cf Alx-la-Chapelle.81
However, one must not place the whole blame on the
recalcitrant attitude of the Spanish; the appearance of several
French ships in allied waters played a part.
and New Spain had become saturated.82

The ports of Havana

Vaudreuil and Michel, who

succeeded Le Normant, hoped that the Spanish authorities would
now enforce the trade restrictions unrelentingly.83

Fortunately

for Louisiana, the restrictions became more rigid with the result
that merchants of Havana and New Spain, unable to trade at home,
dispatched four or five ships to the Mississippi —

a modest

beginning which rapidly developed into a substantial commerce.84
Once again, the Spanish of Florida came to Louisiana for their

8°Vaudreuil and D'Aubervllle to Maurepas, New Orleans,
May k, 17U9, AC, C13A33*
^Fr^gault, Vaudreuil. 1*00; and Villiers, Dernleres
ann^es. 79~80.
0aFrdgault, Vaudreuil. 1*00-1*01.
8 3Ibld.. 1*00; and Vaudreuil to Roullli, New Orleans,
January 31, 1750, AC, C13A3^.
84Vaudreuil to Roulll^, New Orleans, September 2kt
1750, AC, CI 3A 3U.
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provisions.

Old habits reappeared.

Mobile on their way to Pensacola.
progress again.

Mexican ships stopped at
The contraband trade was in

By the spring of 1751 the commerce was already

worth one million livres.95
However, commerce between France and Louisiana did not
resume so rapidly after the war, for French ship owners refused
to transport Louisiana products to Europe.

But, because of the

difficulty encountered with the Spanish trade, by 17l*9 ships
from France, in addition to those from Martinique and Saint
Dominque, anchored in Louisiana ports.96

In January, 1750,

Vaudreuil and Michel reported that because many ships visited
Louisiana in 17l*9» the colonists now possessed a new spirit of
optimism.97

"Since the close of the war," the governor wrote in

June, 1750, "close to 100 ships have unloaded an abundance of all
kinds of supplies."98
and Saint Domingue.

Most of the ships were from Martinique

High prices paid for wood, indigo, wax,

tobacco, hemp, flax, and pelts induced the colonists to greater
production.

Between 1750 and 1753* trade with France, the French

islands and Spanish ports surpassed the two million livres mark.

95Vaudreuil to Rouill4, New Orleans, May 2, 1751* AC,
C13A35; and Frigault, Vaudreuil. 1*01.
96Vaudreuil to Maurepas, New Orleans, March 3> 171*9»
AC, C13A33; and Fr^gault, Vaudreuil. 1*02.
97Vaudreuil to Roullll, New Orleans, January 31f 1750,
AC, C13A31*-; Michel to Roullll, New Orleans, January 22, 1750,
ibid.; and Fr^gault, Vaudreuil. 1*02-1*03.
"Vaudreuil to Rouill^, New Orleans, June 2l*, 1750,
AC, CI3A 3I*.
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Louisiana sold lflOt(XX) livres worth of indigo; 180,000 of
construction wood; 250,000 of pelts; 36,000 of tobacco; 30,000
of pitch and tar; and 25*000 of wax and oil.

In addition, traders

brought the equivalent of 300*000 livres in Spanish silver."
The colony of Louisiana owed its prosperity to Governor
Vaudreuil.

However, it is difficult to measure to what extent.

Circumstances probably helped the governor; but there is little
doubt that Vaudreuil made astute use of them.

For Instance, he

knew how to take advantage of such circumstances as the war of

17^ , which erupted at a time when the colony was under duress.
His success may be explained in terms of his personal qualities:
realism, perception, the gift of being able to define problems
and the ability to apply solutions.

But Vaudreuil had more.

In

the final analysis, his success stemmed from the fact that he
was a colonial; he understood the nature of a colony.

He

conceived the nature of a colonial economy; he knew its needs and
the attention it must receive from the mother country; and more
importantly, he knew what to substitute when these needs were not
fulfilled.

During a period of misery and armed conflict, he gave

Louisiana security and affluence and a certain prestige.

It is

no wonder that Louisiana reached its apogee during Vaudreuil's
administration.100

It was followed by a corresponding gloom.

"Fr^gault, Vaudreuil. U03-1|0^; and Surrey, Commerce.

217-218.

100Fr£gault, Vaudreuil. Ul^.
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From 1753 to 1764, there was gradual disintegration in agriculture
and commerce as well as in the moral fiber of the colony.

The

administration of Governor Kerl^rec was probably the most
critical in terms of neglect, miseries, external threats at the
hands of the English, and internal quarrels.
exposed on all sides.

The colony was

From the beginning of the Seven Years' War

in 175^, it was deprived of all the basic necessities.101
Commerce with the Spanish colonies was drastically reduced in
1755» and in November of that year, Kerl&rec received orders
announcing that French merchants would no longer be received in
Spanish ports .102

In 1761, the Spanish ports were still closed

to French ships .103

The colony was reduced to the state described

by Governor D'Abbadie in 1764.
The history of the commerce of French Louisiana is in
general a tragic one.

The growth of the colony depended on the

development of a stable trade with France, the French Islands, and
especially with the Spanish colonies.

But there was always an

ingredient lacking for the realization of stable commercial activities.
When ships from France and the Spanish colonies were available,
there were either no products or not enough to trade.

Conversely,

i°1"TableaU des dlsordres et des malheurs qui agitent
et m£nacent la Loulsiane avec les moyens provislonnels d'y
rem&ier," Louisiana, undated and anonymous, AC, C13C1.
loaVilliers, Dernlferes annles. 70.
1Q3Ibid.. 119.
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when Louisiana products were available, war or commercial
restrictions hampered trade.
financial problem:

But at all times there was the

lack of silver and inflation, a subject which

is the topic of the next chapter.

It seems that without the

contraband trade with the Spanish colonies, Louisiana would not
have enjoyed even those few periods of prosperity which she had.
That the colony prospered for a while is due to the ability of
Vaudreuil both at Versailles and in Louisiana.

Governor Vaudreuil

was able to put together, although only for a while, the
necessary ingredients for prosperity.

The remark of "commlssaire

ordonnateur" Duclos in 1715 on the state of agriculture might
also be said of commerce:
three of sterility."104

"For one year of abundance there were
One must not forget also that it was a

declining France which attempted to colonize Louisiana.

The

colonial administrators could not perform miracles.
The general administration of the colony occasioned little
disagreement between the governor and "conmlssaire ordonnateur".
The policies were formulated from the beginning by Versailles
and remained constant throughout the French period.

However,

the major bone of contention was in the implementation of some
of these policies.

Since implementation involved finance, the

"commlssaire ordonnateur" played a major role in this area.
Since his reputation and advancement depended on his ability in

104Glraud, Loulsiane francalse. I, 299.
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this field, the "ordonnateur" closely guarded his financial
powers.

From this stemmed some of the bitter quarrels between

the governor and "commissaire ordonnateur".

C H A P T E R

VI I

THE "COMMISSAIRE ORDONNATEUR" AND FINANCE

After retrocession in 1731* the French crown attempted to
place the colony's finances on a specie basis by sending silver
and supplies to meet the annual expenses.

When this did not

succeed it was then done with merchandise alone.1

But the several

efforts to devise a plan for the approximate yearly expenses
failed.

Furthermore, these attempts did not keep silver money

in circulation.2

The silver immediately returned to France,

leaving the colony with no money for internal commerce since
there were no other species with the exception of some Spanish
piastres drawn from Pensacola but which French merchants also
took to France as soon as they appeared in the colony.3

The

French government was forced to resort once again to the use of
bills of exchange in order to retain specie in the colony .4

1Surrey, Commerce. 123; and "M^moire sur les finances de
la Loulsiane," New Orleans, March, 17^-, AC, C13A28.
Surrey, Commerce, 123.
a,M&moire sur les finances de la Loulsiane," New Orleans,
March, 17^ , AC, C13A28.
^Surrey, Commerce. 123.
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There was not enough hard currency in the treasury to meet
the government's expenses for the first six months of 1753*5

In

May of that year, Governor Bienville and "ordonnateur" Salmon
recommended the use of bills of exchange to move the tobacco crop .0
The shortage of specie in Louisiana became so critical
that the crown suggested on September 13, 1733. the issuence of
card money similar to that already in use in New France with one
exception:

the cards would be considered at par with silver and

bills of exchange at the royal warehouses.

By this the French

government hoped that the new medium would stabilize the price of
merchandise and supplies.7

However, the home government, cautious

not to further confuse the financial situation, ordered Bienville
and Salmon to ascertain how the colonists would accept the new
currency.

About seven months later, on April 3» 1734, the

colonial administrators reported that after examining conditions
in the colony, they saw no reason why card money could not be
issued.

However, they recommended a delay of two to three years

before putting the new currency into circulation for two reasons.

sIbld., 123-124; and Salmon to Maurepas, New Orleans,
February T57”1733, AC, C13A17.
°Surrey, Commerce. 124; and Bienville and Salmon to
Maurepas, New Orleans, May 12, 1735, AC, CI 3AI6 .

7Surrey, Commerce. 124; Maurepas to Bienville and
Salmon, Versailles, September 13, 1733, AC, B59, Bienville
and Salmon to Maurepas, New Orleans, April 3, 1734, AC,
C13A18; and Dunbar Rowland and A. G. Sanders, eds.,
Mississippi Provincial Archives (3 vols.; Jackson, Mississippi:
Press of the Mississippi Department of Archives and History,
1927), III, 646-61*9.
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First, the colonists still remembered the Company's paper which
had greatly depreciated.

Second, the administrators wanted to

allow some of the colonists to become more prosperous.8

But,

if the crown decided on immediate Issuance, Bienville and
Salmon proposed that it issue only 300*000 livres along with an
equal amount of silver for circulation in 1735 and the other
half the following year.

In this way the colonists would be

gradually accustomed to the new currency.8

On August 17, 173^*

Versailles replied that since card money had been to the benefit
of New France since 1729, it had no doubt that it would
produce a similar effect on Louisiana.10
Meanwhile specie continued to flow to France.

At the end

of fiscal year 173^, Salmon had drawn for payment to merchants
118,^76 livres in bills of exchange in addition to 104,lH0 and
2,210 livres payable in 1735 and 1736 respectively.

Thus

between April, 1732 and July, 173^* Salmon had drawn a total of
391»607 livres in bills of exchange.11

The crown, disturbed

by such a large emission, ordered Salmon on August 29, 1735* to

Surrey, Commerce, 12^-125; Bienville and Salmon to
Maurepas, New Orleans, April 3* 173^-* AC, C13A18; and Rowland
and Sanders, Archives. Ill, 6k6-6k9 .
9Ibld.
10Surrey, Commerce. 123; Maurepas to Bienville and
Salmon, Versailles, August 17* 173^* AC, B6l; and "Mdmoire sur
les finances de la Loulsiane," New Orleans, March, 17^, AC,
C13A28.
11Surrey, Commerce. 123.
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reduce the amount in the future.18

But this was to no avail for

at the end of 1735, 327,38V livres in bills of exchange were
drawn, whereupon the French government decided to fix the annual
amount at 150,000 livres.13

A month later, the crown finally

called for 200,000 livres in card money to circulate in
Louisiana.

The new currency would be written and signed by the

comptroller at New Orleans and signed by the governor and
"ordonnateur"
The year 1738 dawned with the colony's finances in a
poor condition.

While there was only 53,07V livres left of the

150,000 allowance, there was a debt of 105,385 livres occasioned
by the Natchez and Chickasaw War and the merchants were
demanding bills of exchange from the treasury.

To meet the

government's obligations, Salmon drew large quantities of
treasury notes and borrowed 69,878 livres on the allowance of
the current year, 80,122 livres on that of 1737, and 31,202
on 1738.

Thus at the end of 1738, 350,000 livres in paper

circulated in Louisiana.15
The financial disorder of the colony gradually worsened.
In 1737, because of the demands of foreign merchants for bills

18Kaurepas to Bienville and Salmon, Versailles,
August 29, 1735, AC, B63.

1Surrey, Commerce, 126.
14Ibld.. 126-127; and Bienville and Salmon to Maurepas,
New Orleans, June 26, 1738, AC, C13A21.
1 Surrey, Commerce. 127.

l6o

of exchange and the war debt, Salmon thought It necessary to
Increase the amount of paper In circulation by 150,000 livres,
totalling about 500,000 livres of paper money by the end of
1737*

Since retrocession, public expenditures increased with

no provision to meet them.18
From 1739 to 1763, except for the years 17te-1750,
paper money was practically the only form of currency In the
colony .17

In 1739* Salmon resorted once again to the use of

large amounts of treasury notes to meet the increasing demands
of the merchants for bills of exchange and the current expenses.
Although the "ordonnateur" drew in excess of 50,000 livres
of the amount fixed by the crown and borrowed from the allowance
of 17^*0, the colonial administrators were unable to redeem
card money with silver or bills of exchange.18

The end result

was further depreciation in treasury notes and card money.
Salmon proposed to the Minister of Marine an additional 200,000
livres in card money to retire all the treasury notes which the
"ordonnateur" was forced to redeem in bills of exchange.

What

happened was that the colonists had almost withdrawn all the
cards from circulation.19

1 eIbld.. 128.
l 7Ibld.. 129.
l 8Ibid.

19Ibld., 130.

It seemed that no matter what

l6l

device the "ordonnateur" used, each year the finances of
Louisiana became more confused.

At the end of 17**0 there were

900,000 livres In all sorts of paper In the colony.20
The financial situation was bad enough In 17^1, but to
make matters worse, Bienville and Salmon were at odds:

the

dispute originated In lack of cooperation In finances.

Bienville

claimed that Salmon no longer consulted him .21

Besides, the

governor was confused by letters from Versailles written to
both him and to Salmon In which the Minister Informed them
of the crown's policies on financial matters particularly In
regard to the emission of bills of exchange.

He wondered

whether or not this meant he too had financial duties.

If so,

the governor asked for Instructions prescribing joint action on
the Issuance of bills of exchange and power to end the abuse
In their distribution and Jobbing.22

Governor Bienville

learned of the extent of jobbing upon his return from his last
campaign against the Chickasaw.

Apparently, several colonists

speculated In bills of exchange for the purpose of exchanging
them with merchants for cards or paper at a ^0 to 60$ profit.
Salmon must not have been aware of this, otherwise he would
surely have stopped It, for the abuse had severe consequences

20Ibid.; and "M&nolre sur les finances de la Loulslane,"
New Orleans, March, 17Ml> AC, C13A28.
21Blenvllle to Maurepas, New Orleans, March 8 , 17^1,
AC, C13A26.
^ I b l d .: and Surrey, Commerce. 130-131*
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on the colony.

Cards and treasury notes depreciated to half

their value and generally all the goods from Prance or the
French Islands were sold at exorbitant prices.

But probably

the worst effect was the financial ruin of three of the most
prosperous colonists and the exodus of several families to
France.23
Because of the continual depreciation of cards and
treasury notes, Maurepas suggested the Immediate retirement of
all paper money.

Bur first, Maurepas ordered Salmon to estimate

the amount of paper in circulation.

The "ordonnateur", unable

to estimate the outstanding amount and without waiting for
further orders from the home government, issued on May 13,
17^1, an ordinance calling in all notes to his office under
penalty of invalidation.

For whatever reason the ordinance

failed to bring in the paper .24

On October 13, 17^1, Maurepas

strongly reprimanded Salmon for his most unsatisfactory
financial report and strongly condemned some of his recent
actions.

The crown, probably acting on Bienville's letter of

March 8 , 17^1, regarded the liberal issuance of paper money
the cause of depreciation.

Accordingly, it ordered Salmon first

to estimate the amount in the colony and then to call in the

23Blenville to Maurepas, New Orleans, March 8 , 17^1,
AC, C13A26; and Maurepas to Bienville, Versailles, October 8 ,
17^1, AC, B72.

24Surrey, Commerce, 131; and "M&noire sur les finances
de la Louisiana," New Orleans, March, 17^, AC, C13A28.
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paper for redemption In bills of exchange.29

However, before

the orders reached New Orleans. Salmon drew 119.112 livres on
the allowance of 17**2.26

This last act angered the home

government.
In 17*12. conditions worsened.

The salaried officials

paid In colonial paper were In a financial straights, unable to
purchase their basic necessities.

Moreover, while there were

few colonists with sufficient means to engage In Spanish commerce
which was drastically reduced, the French merchants accepted
only sliver or bills of exchange for their goods .27

In an

attempt to bring relief to the colony. Governor Bienville
suggested the crown pay half of the salaried officials In bills
of exchange.

According to the governor, this "would Improve

the condition of men who had nothing to sell and everything to
buy" and would check the continual Increase In amount of treasury
notes which resulted In proportionate depreciation of all
paper money .28

The crown Ignored the suggestion.

As a result,

Salmon, though ordered by Versailles not to exceed the limit of

2 sMaurepa8 to Salmon, Versailles, October 13, 17*H,
AC, B72; and Frdgault, Vaudreull. 183.
2eSurrey, Commerce, 132.
27Ibid.
2aIbld.. 132-133.

200,000 livres, was forced to draw 236,620 livres worth of bills
of exchange to meet the most urgent obligations of the colony .28
As Indicated above, the ordinance of May 13, 17^1,
failed.

The second decreed on January 13, 17^1 allowed the

colonists a month to bring their treasury notes to New Orleans
for conversion into new money.

Those not registered within the

allotted time would be Invalidated.
better results.

The second ordinance had

Soon after its enactment, most of the 45^,620

livres in circulation were turned in and converted into fresh
currency.30
By 17^3, the crown was disgusted with the financial
situation of Louisiana and Salmon's administration.

Some

colonists along with officials in France blamed the "ordonnateur's
maladministration for the financial chaos of the colony.31
Salmon, who had requested his recall in 17^2 was finally replaced
in 17^U by Le Normant, the favorite of Maurepas who had served
the crown well at Cap Francais .32

The charges against Salmon

^Ibid.. 133.
301bid.; and "M^moire sur les finances de la Louislane,"
New Orleans, March, 17^ , AC, C13A28.
^Fr^gault, Vaudreull. 187; Maurepas to Salmon, Versailles
October 22, 17*t2, AC, B7^-J Maurepas to Vaudreull, Versailles,
April 3* 17^, AC, B78; Maurepas to Salmon, Versailles, April 30,
17^, AC, B78; and Surrey, Commerce. 133-13**-*
32Maurepas to Le Normant, Versailles, April 30, 17^*-, AC,
B78; Maurepas to Vaudreull, Ibid.; and "M£molre du rol au S.
Le Normant commissaire gdndral de la marine, ordonnateur A la
Louislane," ibid.
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were Investigated by both the new governor and "commissalre
ordonnateur" In 17*44.

Vaudreull, a very Influential man at

Versailles, reported to the crown that the accusations were
unfounded and flatly stated that he found nothing to
substantiate the accusations and that, under similar
circumstances, no other fiscal official could have administered
the finances better or more profitably than Salmon.33

The

governor's opinion was supported by Le Normant, commissioned as
"commissaire ordonnateur" on April JO, 1744.

In his financial

report on Louisiana, the new "ordonnateur" criticized few of
Salmon's methods.

Salmon should not be blamed for the

financial disorder; rather, the main cause for the disorder
since retrocession stemmed from inadequate annual funding to
meet colonial expenses and the manner in which French merchants
carried on trade in the colony.34
At the end of 1744, there were about 1,050,000 livres of
paper money in circulation.

Le Normant who entered upon his

duties In October, 1744, began to collect royal debts and used
the money to redeem demands on the treasury.

Thus, by the

beginning of 1745, the paper in circulation had been reduced to

33Surrey, Commerce, 134; Vaudreull to Maurepas, New
Orleans, August 25, 17*0, AC, C1JA28; Fr4gault, Vaudreull. 188;
and Vaudreull to Maurepas, New Orleans, January 6, 17^5* AC,
C13A29.
34Surrey, Commerce, 134; and "M^molre sur les finances
de la Louislane," New Orleans, March, 1744, AC, C13A28.
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8k7,*05 livres.35

However, Le Normant's experiments with the

different types of currency brought no immediate relief.

While

the general opinion was favorable to retirement, there was no
agreement on the method of withdrawal.

The two administrators,

Vaudreull and Le Normant, suggested that If the crown would
ship supplies or Negro slaves to the colony for exchange In
paper at a fixed value with silver, the home government could
easily retire the undesirable currency.

Versailles rejected

the suggestion, considering It too slow for the immediate
results which it sought.

Moreover, the crown reasoned that

since a large quantity of the paper money was In the hands of
speculators and traders, the latter would buy the supplies and
slaves and resell them to the colonists at prices which would
further Injure the colony*s finances.3®
In view of this, Governor Vaudreull and "ordonnateur"
Le Normant pondered whether all types of paper money should be
withdrawn on the same basis.

Surrey states the problem:

"Since

cards had always been preferred to other kinds of colonial
currency, some were inclined to give them an advantage in the
rate of exchange, at least over the treasury notes which had
contributed most fc the cause of depreciation."37

This plan was

35Surrey, Coamerce. I3U-I35; and "Mlmolre sur les finances
de la Louislane," New Orleans, March, 17^, AC, C13A28.

3®Ibld.
^Ibld.
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also rejected by the home government on the grounds that It
would also be beneficial only to speculators who In the past
had been instrumental in depreciating paper money.30

Since the

crown considered all forms of colonial paper equally good, it
decided to fix the retirement ratio at five to two, the rate of
depreciation based on silver agreed on August, 17^3*30

Part of

the paper would be retired in 17^5 and the rest in 17k6 by use
of silver and bills of exchange.

Accordingly, Le Normant

proceeded to call in the paper which was registered, checked
and finally burned.

By this means, 838,11*8 livres were

cancelled by October 2h t 17^5.40

It must be pointed out that

this was made possible by the flow of silver from the Spanish
colonies, particularly Cuba, occasioned by the War of the
Austrian Succession.
It seemed that by the end of 17l*5» Le Normant had gone
far in solving the problem of depreciation.

But the next

problem was to determine the nature and type of the new currency.
The "ordonnateur" was against paper money of any type.

Since it

was impossible for the "ordonnateur" or the governor to limit
the amount of paper drawn on the treasury by post commanders,
whose bills, took a year or eighteen months to arrive at New Orleans,

^Ibid.
^Surrey, Commerce. 135-136; and "M&molre sur les
finances de la Louislane," New Orleans, March, 17^» AC, C13A28.
^Surrey, Commerce. 136.
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to estimate the amount needed for Indian affairs, to depend
on royal ships which made It necessary at times to buy supplies
at high prices from private merchants, and to sell the
merchandise at an advantageous price when several ships
anchored at New Orleans at the same time.41

For these reasons

and others It was Impossible to estimate the amount of paper
required for a fiscal year or the bills of exchange to redeem
it.

A paper currency Issued under these conditions, would

depreciate and result once again In financial disorder and
confusion.

Even the slightest depreciation would be dangerous

to the economic health of the colony, for the colonists would
engage in speculation.

As Le Normant and others remarked,

speculation was one of the main occupations of the colonists.
It was the "ordonnateur's" belief that card money could provide
temporary relief; but after a year it would be difficult to
maintain it.

Instead of paper money, Le Normant proposed the

use of Spanish piastres with an assigned value greater than Its
real value In order to keep it in the colony and to Induce the
colonists to greater production of local products which could
be exchanged for foreign goods.

This would eliminate the need

of other types of currency for foreign trade.42

41Ibid.; and "M^moire sur les finances de la Louislane,"
New Orleans, March, 17^ , AC, C13A28.
^ I b i d .: and Gayarr£, Louisiana. II, 56-37.
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However, it was demonstrated since 1731 that silver
could not be kept in the colony; while the experience of New
France with card money led many to believe that there was no
better system available for Louisiana.
difficulty occasioned by card money?

But what was the
Those in favor of cards

argued that they had maintained their value for two years and
depreciated only because of the extraordinary expense occasioned
by the war against the Natchez and Chickasaw and Salmon's
preference for treasury notes.

Therefore, they pointed out,

with supplies in the warehouses along with bills of exchange
drawn on the French treasury as security, card money would
stabilize the finances of the colony.43

The crown approved the

use of card money and proposed on April 30> 17^-, the Issuance
of cards on the five to two basis for circulation in Louisiana.
However, the crown waited because of the increased trade
between Louisiana and the French islands and because of War in
Europe which brought an abundant flow of Spanish silver to
New Orleans .44

Owing to circumstance, Le Normant had difficulty

in drawing bills of exchange.

The entire allowance of 17^6 was

exchanged for Spanish silver which was spent for strengthening
fortifications at New Orleans and Mobile .45

43Surrey, Commerce, 137.
**Ibid., 138.

45Ibld.

In 17^8, Vaudreull

and Le Normant Informed Versailles that the local expenses were
paid by means of bills of exchange and silver obtained from
sales of supplies from the warehouses .40
The successor to Le Normant, Michel, soon after his
arrival In 17^*8, was convinced that the colony needed more
money.

Accordingly, and without consulting Vaudreull, Michel

presented his plan to the governor for his signature.

Vaudreull

refused to sign on the grounds of Its Irregularity and
doubtful legality.

But Michel was determined to have his way,

whereupon he Informed Vaudreull that regardless of his
signature, additional money would be Issued.

The governor

signed the ordinance which went Into effect on February 1, 1750.
About 108,000 livres were Issued and put Into circulation; but
the amount soon Increased considerably, causing public
uneasiness.

Michel, who kept the governor uninformed about the

quantity of notes, assured him there was no reason for fear .48
The French government strongly reprimanded the two
officials In their action since only the crown had the right to
create or alter the money of the kingdom.

This right It shared

40Ibld.; and Vaudreull and Le Normant to Maurepas,
New Orleans, December 9> 17^8, AC, C13A32.

47Fr4gault, Vaudreull. 293; Surrey, Commerce. 138-139»
Michel to Roulll£, New Orleans, September 29, 1750, AC, C13A3^;
and Vaudreull to Rouill£, New Orleans, May 8 , 1751, AC, C13A35*
^Surrey, Commerce. 139*
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with no one.

Michel had exceeded his power without the slightest

justification.

If the colony was In need of money, the

"ordonnateur" should have used bills of exchange and money from
the sale of supplies from the warehouses.

Roullltf, the Minister of

Marine, informed Michel the records showed that for the past two
years the warehouses were amply supplied.

Even though there

had been no other recourse, the financial situation did not warrant
such an act, especially since the financial situation was recovering
from the excessive amount of paper money.

Finally, the crown

ordered Michel to withdraw the notes he had placed in circulation
by bills of exchange borrowed from future allowances.48

To clear

himself, Vaudreull was forced to make an explanation to Roullle
for his acquiescence In this financial policy.

"The notes were

already to circulate in the public, a fact which I could not
ignore."90

So in consideration for Michel and In order to prevent

a public mistrust In a paper money not validated by the governor,
Vaudreull lent himself to an operation of which he disapproved.91
The damage was done.

Before the notes were retired,

counterfeits began to circulate and public discontent increased.52
In order to restore confidence in the paper money, the colonial
government attested to bring the offenders to justice,

However,

481bid.. 139-11*0; And Rouill^ to Vaudreull and Michel,
Versailles, October 23, 1750* AC, B91.
90Vaudreull to Roullle, New Orleans, May 8, 1751» AC, C13A35;
and Frlgault, Vaudreull. 293~29^»

91Ibid.
^Surrey, Commerce. 1^*0.
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too many Important colonists were Involved.

The prosecution ended

In a farce, with one conviction, that of a mulatto slave who was
whipped, branded and sold In Saint Domingue.53
On January JO, 1752, Michel sent to Versailles his last
financial report before leaving office.

It can be seen from this

report that lack of Spanish commerce made It necessary to draw
yearly a large sum of bills of exchange:

kjj,k08 livres in 17**9 >

500,000 livres in 1750; 700,000 livres in 1751; and only 535*000
livres in 1752.

The reduction in 1752 is explained by the

reinforcement of the strict Spanish commercial restrictions after
the war of 17^-17^8*

In addition, Michel's report revealed that

the crown had initiated better provision for paying the expenses
of Louisiana.

Furthermore, near the end of 1752, there remained

555*023 livres in the treasury which indicated that for the period
between 17^9 to 1751* there was no need to issue additional paper
money .54
D'Aubervllle replaced Michel as "commissaire ordonnateur"
in 1752 and Kerl&rec succeeded Governor Vaudreull who was promoted
to governor general of New France.

Unfortunately, lnsplte of

Versailles' opposition, the "ordonnateurs" who succeeded Michel
followed his example of issuing notes redeemable in bills of
exchange.55

The financial and commercial health of Louisiana was

53Ibid.
54Ibld.. lUO-1^1; and Michel to Roullle, New Orleans, January
30, 1752, AC, C13A36.
55Surrey, Commerce, l*H-lU2.
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stimulated by silver, especially Spanish.

However, the war which

erupted once again between France and England in 1736 made the
risk of sending silver to the colony too great .50

To compensate

for this, the crown Instructed the colonial officials to issue
special notes drawn on the local treasury, payable in three months
and redeemable in bills of exchange at New Orleans.

Because of

the war the governor and "ordonnateur'* granted similar power to
post commanders so that they might meet their obligations.

To

the surprise of none, the debts which the administrators contracted
with merchants and colonists grew out of proportion because of
abuses of the privilege.57

Consequently, owing to lack of silver,

the old habits which had disrupted colonial finance reappeared.
The "ordonnateurs" from 1732 to 1738 contributed nothing new to
financial management.

They continued to issue large quantities

of paper money of different forms.58
In 1738, with Rochemore as "commlssalre ordonnateur",
a general state of chaos existed in the colony from which it never
recovered.50

Besides the sad state of colonial finance, Rochemore

was involved in a systematic opposition to Governor Kerlerec.

The

colony experienced its worst controversy which contributed to

goIbld.
^Ibld.
“ Ibid., 1U3.
“ Rochemore to the Minister, New Orleans, August 17, 1738,
AC, C13AlfO; and Surrey, Commerce. lkj.
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economic stagnation.00

On entering office on August 17» 1758,

Rochemore reported to Versailles that he found the office of
comptroller of New Orleans vacant, the treasury without specie
and more than 1,800,000 livres borrowed on future allowance.
The royal warehouses were empty causing the "ordonnateur" to buy
at high prices in local stores.01

Rochemore decided to call in

all the paper and issue a new currency in order to distinguish
his administration from the preceeding one.

His plan which

allowed only an eight day period of recall caused much discontent
and protest.

Worst still, Rochemore did all this without the

knowledge of Kerllrec who learned of it when he read it on the
public board.02

Needless to say, it occasioned a bitter

quarrel in addition to ill-feeling that already existed between
the two.

Meanwhile, Rochemore sent to Versailles his plan for

the financial stabilization of the colony in January, 1759*

In

it, he advocated the reestablishment of card money similar to the
one of 1744 but with one basic difference:
made in France.

the emission would be

The "ordonnateur" believed that his plan would

reduce prices of commodities and reestablish confidence in the

°°"Tableau des d£sordres et des malheurs qui agitent et
m&iacent la Louislane," Louisiana, undated and anonymous, AC, C13C1;
Vllliers, Deralferes armies, 98; Kerl£rec to the Minister, New Orleans,
December 3» 1T5&, AC, CIJA^K); Kerl&rec to the Minister, New Orleans,
September 25, 1758, ibid.; and Gayarr^, Louisiana, II, 84-88.
^Surrey, Commerce, 143; and Rochemore to the Minister, New
Orleans, August 17, 1756, AC, ClJAltO.
°^Gayarr4, Louisiana. II, 84-85; Rochemore to the Minister,
New Orleans, August 17, 1758, AC, Cl3Ato; and Surrey, Commerce,
143-144.
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colonial currency.

For his plan to succeed, there must be no

resorting to treasury notes except under absolute necessity.63
Whether or nor his suggestion was sound, the crown already
disenchanted with his work, totally Ignored his proposal.

However,

the crown did not Ignore Rochemore's unauthorized emission of paper
In 1753.

On January 19f 1759* the home government strongly

reprimanded the "ordonnateur" for violating the Instructions given
him before leaving France for his post In Louisiana.

Rochemore,

as Michel had done earlier, violated an exclusive royal privilege.
Because of this and In addition to his failure to consult the
governor, who most likely would have disapproved of the plan,
Versailles pronounced the whole affair as an unexcusable blunder
and ordered the recall of all the paper In question for redemption
In bills of exchange.

Finally, because of Michel's earlier

blunder and Rochemore's recent one, the "ordonnateur" was ordered
to furnish two semi-annual reports on the financial condition of
the colony and quarterly reports on bills of exchange Issued on
the French treasury.64
It was clear that the financial state of Louisiana was
deteriorating.

On February 25, 1759* Governor Kerlerec Informed

the crown of the deplorable financial situation.65

In another

^Lochemore to the Minister, New Orleans, January 2, 1759* AC,
Cl^A^l; and Surrey, Commerce. lMt-.
^ T h e Minister to Rochemore, Versailles, January 19, 1759» AC,
B109; and Surrey, Commerce. lUU-l^.

65Kerl&rec to the Minister, New Orleans, February 25, 1759*
AC, C15A41.
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letter on June 25* 1759. Kerlerec asserted that of 1,995,000 livres
In bills of exchange only about 200,000 were Issued according to the
dictates of the home government.

The rest was In speculation sold

between fifteen and eighteen per cent profit to merchants who
made up the difference by raising the prices of their merchandise.
Kerlerec also accused the treasurer of New Orleans, who In addition
to his fiscal responsibility was In charge of munition, of
provisioning royal ships with supplies from the royal warehouses
amounting to 200,000 livres and then drawing on the French
treasury a bill of exchange of the same amount, thus costing the
crown 1+00,000 livres.

Finally, the bills of exchange were sold to

speculators at a profit.®®

The "ordonnateur", defending the official

under him, denied the allegation.

However, in spite of Rochemore*s

family influence at Versailles, the crown responded to Kerlerec's
reports.

On August 29> 1759* lb decided to recall Rochemore.
"Your antipathy for Governor Kerlerec and a
disregard for all the wise council he gave you on
your arrival in the province; your haste, in
spite of his advice, to call in all the treasury
notes and to draw that year more than 1,800,000
livres in bills of exchange on the French
treasury...for these reasons and for many more,
founded upon your unsociable nature and incompati
bility with the colonial service...the crown has
decided to recall you to France ."®7

®®Surrey, Commerce. ll+5; and Kerlerec to the Minister, New
Orleans, June 25» 1759» AC, Cl^A^-l.
®7The Minister to Rochemore, Versailles, August 29 1 1759» AC,
B109; and Surrey, Commerce. lU6 .
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Family Influence at Veraallle8 prevented the implementation
of this order.

Thus Rochemore stayed on to harass Kerlerec to the

detriment of the colony .08

One is led to believe that Rochemore,

fully aware of France's disenchantment with Louisiana and her
involvement in a death struggle with England over colonies, took
advantage of the situation for personal gains.

Kerlerec's only

course was to point out the administrative abuses of Rochemore
to Versailles.

In a letter dated October 8 , 1759» the governor

accused the "ordonnateur" of selling merchandise destined as
Indian presents from the king's warehouses.

The goods were sold

at lower prices to Rochemore's supporters who resold them at a
500 to 600 per cent profit.

Thus the "ordonnateur" shared in

the gains and at the same time could show the governor a
balanced budget.

Kerlerec further accused Rochemore of jobbing

in merchandise in order to control prices.
Rochemore were common knowledge.

The dealings of

Public resentment against such

irregularities was increasing daily.

Unless one belonged to the

Rochemore clique, it was difficult for an official to find bills
of exchange.08

Such methods encouraged speculation to eat away

at the social fibers of the colonial society.

An appointee of

the "ordonnateur" sold bills of exchange in New Orleans at fifteen

^Gayarre, Louisiana, II, 86-87; Villiers, Dernleres annees.
140-141; and Surrey, Commerce, 146.
^Kerlerec to the Minister, New Orleans, October 8 , 1759> AC,
Cl^Al*-!; and Surrey, Commerce. lU6-1^7>
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per cent profit.70

The crown, Informed of Rochemore*s abuses,

demanded a full report on his administration and explanation on
how his secretary, Belot, had amassed 1*0,000 livres In less than
a year without Rochemore's Intrigue.71
Rochemore, In a letter to Versailles on October 12, 1759>
explained his recall of treasury notes.

He stated that Michel

and Vaudreull had resorted to the same expedient but Ignored the
accusations of Kerlerec and others.72

Even Rochemore admitted

that speculation in bills of exchange had become an established
business to the point of rendering the treasury notes worthless.73
The existing conditions in the royal treasury of the home
government did not help the financial disorder of Louisiana.

The

French treasury nearly bankrupt, suspended payment of bills of
exchange on October 15, 1759* and informed the officials in
Louisiana that it was no longer able to send the required
supplies.74

Kerlerec, who by the end of 1759 was almost in full

charge of the finances, was instructed to draw bills of exchange

7°Ibid.
7lIbid.
72Rochemore to the Minister, New Orleans, October 12, 1759» AC,
C15A^1; and Surrey, Commerce, 1^7-lU8 .

73Ibid.
74The Minister to Kerlerec, Versailles, October 15, 1759* AC,
Cl^Alil; and Surrey, Commerce, 148.
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only for the most pressing expenses and to hold the confidence
of the royal government.75
In the light of this, the financial outlook of Louisiana
was most discouraging in I76O.

Though disheartened by the

situation, Governor Kerlerec continued his efforts to rid the
colony of Rochemore's abuses .76
with 596,000 livres in 1758*

Rochemore began his administration

In October, 1759 > Rochemore had drawn

6 ,687,850 livres in bills of exchange much of it borrowed on the
allowances of 1759 and I76O .77
In I76O, the bitter struggle between Kerlerec and
Rochemore reached a climax.

Amid cries of "Vive le roi et

Monsieur le gouverneur," Kerlerec, supported by troops, entered
the "ordonnateur*s" house and seized the merchandise.

The

"ordonnateur" realized his term of office was nearly at an end.
Surrey describes his situation:
Rochemore, a man of less than mediocre ability,
deprived of his best political supporters by
this time, fearful of being murdered, was unable,
henceforward, to carry on extensively his evil
practices in the administration of the finances
of the province. Kerlerec was practically in
full control.78

75Ibid.
76The Minister to Kerlerec, Versailles, May 21, 1759* AC,
B109; the Minister to Kerlerec and Rochemore, Versailles, January 19,
1759, ibid.; Gayarre, Louisiana, II, 8k; and Surrey, Commerce, 148.
"^Surrey, Commerce, 1U8-149.

7eIbid.. ll*9; *nd Villiers, Derniferes ann^es, 9k.
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Kerlerec then formulated an elaborate plan to Improve the finances
of the colony.

Although his proposal might have relieved the

financial situation, the crown did not order its enforcement.
When Foucault became acting "ordonnateur" on May 20, 1760,
he was forced to buy supplies for the troops at high prices since
the warehouses were empty.
was rampant.

Abuses were everywhere.

Speculation

Irregularities in the management of finances

increased daily .70

The governor on July 7> 1761, wrote that

"France is to be pitied if it cannot find an 'ordonnateur' to
succeed Rochemore."80

Before the end of 1761, the French

government appointed D'Abbadie "commissaire ordonnateur" of
Louisiana to replace Foucault.
detailed instructions.

The new "ordonnateur" received

The crown, on the matter of finances,

permitted D'Abbadie to draw 600,000 livres in bills of exchange
for the present expenses of which 250,000 were to buy
urgent supplies fxasr Vera Cruz and Campeche and the rest to
purchase provisions from France.

However, no bills of

exchange would be redeemed without an accompanying report
explaining the purpose.

Moreover, to restore confidence in

the currency, the "ordonnateur" was ordered to evaluate the
exact amount of paper in circulation and send the statement,
signed by the "ordonnateur", governor and comptroller, to

"^Surrey, Commerce. 151S an<* Villiers, Dernieres annees.
1^4-11*5 •
^Kerlerec to the Minister, New Orleans, July 7* 1761 i AC,
C15A^2; and quoted in Surrey, Commerce, 151*
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Versailles.

The crown intended to retire the paper for silver.

D'Abbadie was commanded to act in conjunction with the governor
and comptroller of New Orleans.81

One must look into the finances

of the Spanish regime in order to evaluate D'Abbadie's performance.
In summary, the lack of an adequate amount of specie was
probably the main Impediment to financial stability and
commercial development in Louisiana.

The result was a run away

inflation and concomitant speculation, both of which kept the
finances of the colony close to chaos.

Thus, the consistently

uncertain state of colonial finance made commerce with Louisiana
unattractive.

With the exception of brief periods of active

contraband trade with Spanish colonies and the flow of Spanish
silver to New Orleans occasioned by European wars, French
Louisiana was poorly supplied with specie from France.

In fact,

the colony received only minimal financial support from the home
government.

The specie which France cent to the colony and the

Spanish silver which found its way to New Orleans immediately
left in payments for supplies.
From time to time France attempted to ameliorate the
financial situation of the colony; but the measures adopted
proved to be expedients.

France could have improved the finances

either by Increasing the purchase of Louisiana products or by
pouring large sums of money into the colony or both.

8lSurrey, Connerce. 152-1515*

But the

crown was unwilling or unable to do this.

Instead It blundered

creating a financial chaos and it blamed the "ordonnateurs" for
maladministration.

It is true that bitter quarrels between

"ordonnateurs" and governors and abuses such as those of
Rochemore did not help the financial situation.

The main

responsibility for the disorder steamed from Versailles.
It is evident from the correspondence that the position
of "ordonnateur" in the question of finances was the more
critical one.

Since funds were a constant problem, the fiscal

official held the more difficult task.

The "ordonnateurs" did

surprisingly well considering what they had to work with, for
even the most conscientious could do little to improve the
financial situation if there was little help from Versailles.
His work was however, more rewarding in the judicial realm.

C H A P T E R

VIII

THE "(XMflSSAIRE ORDONNATEUR" AND JUSTICE

Civil government began In Louisiana In 1712 with Antoine
Crozat.

The establishment of civil government and the enactment

of the "Coutumes de Paris" for its guidance was the beginning of
legal institutions in Louisiana.1

For the administration of the

"Coutumes" a law court called the Superior Council was established.
The two most important legal officers were the first councillor or
presiding judge, the "commissaire ordonnateur", and the "procureur
general", who was both the lawyer for the people and legal advisor
to the government.2

The other members of the Superior Council

were residents usually influential and of means.
The powers and duties of the "commissaire ordonnateur" in
the judicial realm can be divided into general and special duties.3
The "ordonnateur" by the terms of his commission as first councillor
was charged with the general supervision of colonial justice.

The

power of appointing or removing judicial officers was not vested in

1Henry Plauche Dart, "Courts and Law in Colonial Louisiana,"
LHQ. IV (July, 1921), 259.
^Ibid., 261.
3The format of the division comes from W. B. Munro, "Office
of Intendant," 27-29.
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his hands or those of the governor.

The crown reserved this right.

However, the "comnlssaire ordonnateur" and the governor nominated
In common individuals for the position of councillor to the
Superior Council.

The "ordonnateur" was instructed to closely

supervise the judical officials and empowered to intervene to
prevent miscarriage of justice.4

This was not always an easy task

since the councillors were not responsible to him or to the
governor.

When a councillor was on good terms with the governor

and/or with the Council it was difficult for the "ordonnateur" to
control him.

On the other hand, the opposite was to his advantage.

The "commissaire ordonnateur" as first councillor was empowered to
call letigation before him or have the "procureur general" call a
case before the Superior Council.

But then, the "procureur

general" did not always cooperate.5
The special judicial powers of the "ordonnateur" were more
definite.

The "ordonnateur" took cognizance of all criminal cases,

especially those which the crown considered serious such as treason,
sedition, and counterfeiting.6

In addition, the "ordonnateur"

judged all contestations related to comnerce and property.

The

latter occupied much of his time because the careless manner of

‘tSee instructions on page 105.
^unro, "Office of Intendant," 27_29.
^Ibid.

185
land distribution and the loose definition of property rights
invited disputes among the colonists.7
To reiterate, as expressly stated in the instructions to
the governors and "comnissalres ordonnateurs", the administration
of justice was the particular concern of the "ordonnateur".

The

governor was not to interfer with the administration of justice
except when called upon to execute its judgments.

Both were

ordered to supervise the officials under their charge in the
Superior Council, to jointly render an account of their conduct
and submit names for replacement in case of death or resignation.
But what concerned the governor in particular with regard to the
Superior Council was that the administrative military officers
should give the civil judicial officers the respect due their
office and that the colonists should maintain the same posture.
Furthermore, since the crown entrusted the Superior Council with
authority to render justice to its subjects, the councillors were
to have complete freedom in this endeavor.8

However, the practical

side of judicial administration was somewhat different from what
was prescribed by Versailles.
The procedure was rather simple.

There were no lawyers in

French Louisiana except for the first councillor and the "procureur
general".

A plaintiff seeking justice, entered the office of the

7Ibid.
e"M&noire du roi aux Srs. Vaudreuil gouverneur et Michel de
la Rouvlllifere commissalre g&nir&l de la marine ordonnateur de la
Louisiane," Versailles, December 23* 17^8* AC, B87.
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"procureur general" who, depending on his evaluation, advised the
plaintiff to see the clerk of the Superior Council.9

The clerk

then wrote out a petition which was signed by the plaintiff and
witnessed by the clerk.10

"If It was an Issue of fact or any kind

that required attention," the first councillor endorsed It thereby
permitting the petition to be filed.

It seemed the clerk did not

have that prerogative.11
The petition filed, orders were given by the "procureur
general" to service It and for the defendant to appear.

Meanwhile,

the sheriff of the court took the petition to the defendant and
presented him with a copy .12

The sheriff then endorsed the

original copy saying in effect:
"I certify that I took the petition and the order
in this case to John Stallth...; that I read to him
the contents of this petition, in order that he
might not say hereafter that he did not know what it
was, and that I then left a copy of the same with
him. In testimony of all of which I am making and
signing this return."13
The defendant, thus ordered to appear in court, went to the
"procureur general" or to the clerk to present his defense which

eDart, "Courts and Law," 264.
lQIbld.
XlIbid.
l2Ibld.. 26V265.
l3Quoted In ibid.. 265.
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was then written out and signed In a similar fashion.
soon followed.14

The hearing

This was the normal proceedure.

There is no evidence however, of a formal trial.

The

councillors along with the two lawyers of the Superior Council, the
first councillor and the "procureur general", usually sat around a
table and settled the matter after hearing the quarrel of "their
friends and neighbors."15

For more serious cases both the

prosecution and defense presented their views in writing; usually
the clerk prepared each version.

Sometimes the "procureur general"

prepared one and the clerk the other .16

As stipulated by the Edict

of 1716 concerning the Superior Council, civil cases required that
three judges agree while five must agree in criminal cases .17
For criminal cases, the "procureur general" initiated the
prosecution by an inquiry into or an investigation of the facts.
The accused was then confronted by a written report of the
testimony.

The accused, detained in jail and subject to

interrogation, was without legal assistance.

Though he could deny

the evidence and confront the accusing witnesses, he could not
attend the trial or cross-examine.

There was no jury; the case

was decided by the Superior Council after the "procureur general"

14Ibid.
15Ibid.
16Ibid.
17See "Projet de lettre patente...1'etablissement du conseil
superieur," Versailles, October 1, 1731> AC, C13A13* and Dart, "Legal
Institutions," 82-84.
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read the evidence.

Since there were no appeal, the judgment or

sentence was executed Immediately.18
A look at the "Records of the Superior Council" reveals the
nature of Its work, the numerous reasons for which the colonists
called upon the Council, the nature of colonial society, and last
but not least, the extent of the judicial duties and power of the
"comml88aire ordonnateur" In the Superior Council and In the
colony.18

For one thing, the records show that the Superior

lSHenry Plauch£ Dart, "Criminal Trials In Louisiana, 1 7 2 0 *
1766," LHQ, III (July, 1920), 279.
l8Petltion of recovery, summons to pay claim, sunmons to
reverse a trade in slaves, court orders, decisions in civil suits,
petition for auction of houae, petition to transfer contract, summons
in boat suit, petition for transfer of seized funds, petition for
annulment of seizure, petition in opposition, sale of house, inquest
ordered, summons to testify, petition for collaboration In closing
account, petition to fulfill contract, sunmons for hearing, petition
for new marriage contract, decision on marriage contract, petition for
action of redress, petition in suit of libel, summons of witnesses in
libel suit, testimony in libel suit, petition for inventory of legacy,
petition to collect, petition to attach property, sale of real estate,
seals placed on property, petition to sue against false witness,
petition for voiding of contract, petition for appointment of trustee,
petition to receive legacy, petition for old right of way, attachment
of goods, funds, contract of service and mutual profit, petition for
loan, petition to marry, petition to evict, petition over pipes,
statement of account, petition to waive hearing, petition to sell
house, report on Gentilly Road, petition to occupy, petition to cite
before court at New Orleans, summons in eviction suit, petition to
cancel sale, power of attorney, decision in sundry suits, testimony
in defamation suit, petition for open road, summons to deliver papers,
Attorney General's decision over the Gentilley Road, inventory of
personal effects, sale of surviving effects, petition for appointment
of guardian, defendant's acknowledgement of pleading, seizure of short
measures, defense in disputed marriage contract, and petition for just
judgment.
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Council was the center of legal activities In French Louisiana and
that the "comnissalre ordonnateur" had extensive legal and judicial
pswers over matters settled by and In the Council.20

By virtue of

his commissions of "ordonnateur" of Louisiana and first councillor
to the Superior Council, the "ordonnateur" was the source of all
power In deciding ordinary quarrels and disputes and over all
aspects of life, welfare, and property of the colonists.21

For

instance, most of the petitions and decisions were signed and
summons ordered by the "ordonnateur".

Furthermore, the "ordonnateur"

seemed to control the sale, purchase, auction, and occupancy of
houses and had similar power over property.

For example, here is

how a petition to occupy was registered in the Superior Council
on May 25, 1725:
Antoine de La Boublaye has acquired a plantation on
the Mississippi from Caron, baker, but it appears
that no real estate can be sold without the
Council's good pleasure. May it please the Council
to approve the transfer in question, so that the
petitioner may enjoy his acquisition. Aproved on
condition that the proceeds be consigned to
Company's treasury for payment of Caron's debt.22
In another petition to sell a house registered on May 50, 1725* one
finds the following:

^ S e e for example "Records of the Superior Council of
Louisiana," in different volumes of the LHQ.
21Henry Plauche Dart, "A Case in Admiralty in Louisiana, 1741,
Before Salmon, J.," LHQ. VII (January, 1924), 5“19*
22"Records of the Superior Council of Louisiana," LHQ. II
(July, 1919), 350.
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Undersigned Hebert, Canadian, being about to start
for Illinois, asks permission to sell a house of
his In this town to a private party, In case the
Company needs It not. Granted on condition of his
leaving half of the proceeds to the treasury. He
may use the other half for his trip, "although he
owes much to the Company."23
The petitions used after the departure of the Company of the Indies
indicate the greater authority of the "ordonnateur":

petition to

Superior Council to sell a house, permit for sale signed by
Salmon, October 21, 1726; petetlon to Salmon for permit to sell a
plantation, permit signed by Salmon, no date; petition to Salmon
for permit to sell a house, August 12, 1736; petition to Salmon
for permit to sell a house, signed by Salmon, February 9, 1736;
petition to Superior Council for permit to sell a house, permit
signed by Salmon, January 15, 1736; petition to Salmon for permit
to sell a lot, January 2h, 1733* and petition to sell a house,
permit signed by Salmon, October 7, 1735*24
Moreover, as the first judge of the superior court, the
"ordonnateur" dispatched judges to distant poets or impowered local
commanders where they held court and represented the Superior
Council of New Orleans.

Appeals from their decisions returned to

the Superior Council for final review.25

g3Ibld.. 33124See ibid., VIII, 119, 120, U 3 , 278, 1*80,
^Caldwell, "The French," 16.

and 676.
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Sometimes It was necessary for the "commissalre ordonnateur"
to form special courts to hear cases not defined In his Instructions
and or of unusual nature.

In October, 17^1, there arose an argument

between a ship owner and his captain over the repair of the ship.
The threatened ship owner laid the whole affair before Salmon who
soon realized that it was not an ordinary lawsuit between two
visitors to the colony but one of a more Important jurisdiction —
the admiralty.28

The adjudication of maritime matters was usually

decided by special royal judges.

After consulting "procureur

general" Fleuiau on the subject, Salmon, acting as an admiralty
court, heard the case.27
An earlier special court was created at the beginning of
173^.

On February 16, 173^» Salmon was given extra judicial power

to terminate and decide all the disputes between the Company of the
Indies and the colonists.

Two judges, appointed by the "ordonnateur",

were to assist him.28
The practical side of justice was influenced and conditioned
by the relationship between the governor and "commissaire
ordonnateur" and by the factions in the Superior Council, usually
the civilian and military.

Sometimes a governor exceeded his powers

in attempting to have his way in the Superior Council.

On January 15,

2®Dart, "Admiralty," 5“19^Ibid.
20Maurepas to Salmon, Versailles, February 16, 173^» AC, B6l.
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1733* Salmon informed the Minister that Governor Perier attempted
to have two councillors, D'Ausaeville and Prat, removed from the
Superior Council.

The "ordonnateur" adhering to Versailles'

advice of harmony with the governor, went along with the chief
administrator while Fleuriau, the "procureur general", openly
opposed the governor on the grounds that he had no right to
interfere with the judicial officers.
controversy developed in the Council.20

Thereupon a major
Perier was soon recalled.

There is no doubt that one of the main reasons for the crown's
action was his attempt to unduly influence the councillors.

While

some governors were outright despots at times others were shrewd
leaders of cliques.
"Ordonnateur" Michel gave a vivid account of the conflicts
between civilian and military factions in the Superior Council
which plagued the colony from time to time.

One might add, however,

that it was especially pronounced during Michel's administration.
On May 15, 1731* Michel complained to Versailles that Ensign
Duplessy, appointed by Governor Vaudreuil to command at the English
Turn, ill-treated Carriere, a civilian store-keeper.

The

"ordonnateur" inmediately sided with his appointee while Vaudreuil
accused the civilian of disrespect to a military officer.30
was determined to teach the military a lesson.

Michel

To add fuel to the

^Salmon to Maurepas, Mew Orleans, January 15, 1733* AC,
C1JA17; and Salmon to Maurepas, New Orleans, February 19, 1733* Ibid.
a0Michel to Rouill^, New Orleans, July 15* 1731* AC, C15A35*
Fregault, Vaudreuil. 297; and Gayarr^, Louisiana. II, 57*
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flame, the Duplessy affair was followed by a more serious one, the
Dernevllle affair.

It Involved a military officer, Captain Pierre

Henry Dernevllle, the son-in-law of "procureur gin^ral" Fleuriau
and a civilian named Battar.

According to Michel, both the father

and son-in-law attempted to cheat Battar In connection with the
sale of a mulatto belonging to Dernevllle.

On the other hand, the

attitude of the "ordonnateur" In publicly siding with Battar was
most incompatible with his position as chief judicial officer.
It was difficult for Dernevllle to find someone to defend him in
the Superior Council.31

Because of the inflamed nature of the

case, both the "ordonnateur" and "procureur general" removed
themselved from judging the case and since councillor K e m i o n
was sick, the decision was left to Vaudreuil, Major D'Auberville,
Roguet, friend of Fleuriau, Le Breton, and Lalande.

In order to

decrease the number of judges, the military clique summarily
decided not to use the services of Le Breton, acting "procureur
general".

Thus, the military controlled the judgment.32

Michel

openlyexpressed his indignition:
This is how justice is administered here and
will always be as such as long as the military forms
part of the superior Council. Everywhere else and
even in the Councils with twelve councillors only
the governor has a voice in the Council. But not
in Louisiana. H e r e where there are but four

3l"Records of the Superior Council of Louisiana," LHQ, XX
(1937), 1122-1131» Fr^gault, Vaudreuil. 298* and Michel to Rouille,
New Orleans, July 15, 1751, AC, C13A35*
^iichel to Roulll<£, New Orleans, July 15, 1751, AC, C13A35*
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councillors and or assessors, the governor, the
royal lieutenant, and major are always in accord
when a military affair arises. If the number of
military officers is not sufficient to swing the
decision in their favor, it is not difficult for
them to influence some of the other councillors.
The governor of this colony is like a golden calf,
adored by all. The governor is invested with all
authority whom nobody dares to displease. And
besides his military powers, he nominates in common
with the "ordonnateur" subjects for the Superior
Council. His choice always prevails. The
governor enjoys all the privileges of the time of
the Company of the Indies. Thus, supported by the
military and favored by the councillors, who dare
not displease him, the governor can always tilt
the scale in his favor.
The end result is that, unfamiliar with the laws
and "Coutumes de Paris", they judge and decide on
sight and influence others to the detriment of the
colonists and strangers who are forced to bow to
the tiranical military officers. For when one says
officer, everyone trembles. Furthermore, when a
military officer has any misunderstanding with a
civilian the former never fails to exclaim: "Are
you aware that you are speaking to an officer?"
If by chance, the dispute comes before the
"ordonnateur", the defense may be summed up in
these words: "What! Sir! he dares thus speak
to, or thus act toward an officer!" and although
the officer may be in the wrong, judgment is
always given against his adversary, because the
military influence is predominant in the Council
through the governor, the major, and the governor's
flatterers.3®
Needless to say, regardless of who was to blame, when the Council
was thusly divided, justice suffered.

33Ibid.: and Gayarr^, Louisiana. II, 57•
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The Instructions to the "coumisaaires ordonnateurs" indicate
that justice was badly administered in French Louisiana.34
not always the fault of colonial officials.

This was

As French rule neared

its end, there was a parallel between the progressive neglect of
the colony and decline of the Superior Council.
positions of councillors remained vacant.

For many years

On October 5, 1758, of

the four councillors prescribed by the Edict of May 22, 1731» for
the Superior Council in addition to the "ordonnateur", there
remained only Fontenette duly appointed and commissioned by the
crown.35
six years.

The office of "procureur g^n&ral" had been vacant for
Meanwhile, Roguet was acting "procureur general".

Kernion, Lalande, and Lafreniere were acting councillors.

Governor

Kerl^rec and "ordonnateur" Rochemore urged the home government to
fill these positions as quickly as possible for the sake of justice.36
In 1760, Kerl&rec informed Versailles that since the death of Roguet,
there was not one single titular councillor in the Superior Council;
Lalande, Kernion, and La Chaise were still without appointments.37
Finally, Versailles filled the positions on January 18, I762.38

^ S e e for exaiqple "M^moire pour servir d'instruction a M
Bobe-Descloseaux commissaire de la marine faisant fonctions
d 'ordonnateur a la Louisiane," Versailles, October, 1759 > AC, C13AB1.
35Kerlerec and Rochemore to the Minister, New Orleans,
October 5, 1758, AC, ClJAto.
36Ibid.
^Villiers, Dernieres ann^es. 112.
aeThe Minister to 1 "l^rec and D'Abbadie, Versailles, January

18, 1762, AC, Bill*.
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In spite of the views to the contrary held by Versailles,
justice In the hands of the "canmissalre ordonnateur" was well
administered.

In the context of the times, the ordinary legal needs

of the colonists were met.

The "ordonnateur" rendered greater

service to the colonists In this area probably because he possessed
a freedom of action which he did not enjoy In other spheres of
colonial administration.

C H A P T E R

IX

CONCLUSION

It was eighteenth century France with its mercantilistic
economic system and a colonial policy whose basic tenet was
that colonies existed for the mother country which attempted to
hold the vast and nascent colony of Louisiana.

France had neither

the material nor the moral resources to colonize Louisiana,
resources which had enabled her to conduct with more success the
colonization of New France and the French islands.

Be that as

it may, France had two main Interests in the lower Mississippi:
to prevent a foreign foothold at the mouth of the Mississippi and
to realize

commercial gains at Spain's expense.

The latter did

not materialize and the colony became a financial liability.
Louisiana received special attention at times, such as during
Governor Vaudreuil's administration.

But this is explained by the

changing diplomatic situation in Europe with its repercussion in
the New World.

Because of the Bourbon dynasty, the Family Compact,

and the rising threat of her hereditary enemy, France was forced
to retain Louisiana.

The colony was neglected.

But then, France

could not give what she did not have, what she vitally needed
elsewhere.

It was a matter of priority.

In short, Louisiana was

the victim of the international events of the times and became a
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pawn on the diplomatic chessboard of Europe.
never conquered by arms.

French Louisiana was

The fate of its population and immense

territory was decided in Europe.

In 17^2, union with Spain was

more important than Louisiana and other French possessions of
the New World.
Meanwhile, between 1731- *nd 1763* colonial administrators
strove to implement the designs of the home government.

One of the

two most important administrators was the "comnissaire ordonnateur".
Because of his financial responsibility, the "ordonnateur" often
bore the brunt of the crown's failures in the colony.

An

examination of the origin and nature of the office reveals the
important role played by the "commissalre ordonnateur" in the
colonial government.

It is evident that none of the fiscal and

judicial officials of French Louisiana was commissioned as an
intendant of finance, justice, and police.
The political authority of the colony was shared by a
governor and "commissalre ordonnateur".

The former was charged

with the military duties and the latter with royal finances and
commerce, while general administration of the colony was the
common concern of both.

However, conflict of personalities played

a disruptive role in French Louisiana because rivalry was ever
inherent between military and civilian officials whom the French
crown invested with dual authority.

The basic reason for this

conflict lies, however, not in Louisiana but in Versailles, in
the mechanism of the colonial administration.

Every colonial
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administrator found himself, at one time or another, in the
predicament of defending his position in the eyes of his superiors
in France.

But, with family influence at Versailles and a display

of political ability in the colony a governor or "comnissaire
ordonnateur" survived and advanced in the system.

Though the

governor and "comnissaire ordonnateur" were often at odds, they
did agree for the most part on the general policies of public
administration, such as population, agriculture, and commerce.
However, the history of commerce of French Louisiana is
in general a tragic one.

The growth of the colony depended on

the development of a stable trade with France, the French islands,
and especially with the Spanish colonies.

But there was always

at least one ingredient

lacking for the realization of stable

commercial activities.

When ships were available, there were

either no products or not enough with which to carry on trade.
On the other hand, when a supply of Louisiana products was
available, war or commercial restrictions imposed by the crown
hampered trade.

Without the contraband trade with the Spanish

colonies, Louisiana would not have enjoyed even those few periods
of prosperity which she had.
present.

But the financial problem was ever

The colony was consistently plagued with lack of silver,

inflation, and speculation.
The scarcity of specie was probably the main impediment to
financial stability and commercial development in Louisiana.

The

result was a run away inflation and concomitant speculation, both

200
of which kept the finances of the colony near chaos.

Thus, the

constant uncertain state of colonial finance made commerce with
Louisiana unattractive.

With the exception of brief periods of

active contraband trade with Spanish colonies and the consequent
flow of Spanish silver to New Orleans, French Louisiana was poorly
supplied with specie.

The colony received only minimal financial

support from the home government.

Besides, the specie which

France sent to Louisiana and the Spanish silver which found its
way to New Orleans imnediately left in payments for supplies.
At times France attempted to ameliorate the financial
situation of the colony.
mere expedients.

However, the measures taken proved to be

The home government might have improved the

finances either by increasing purchase of Louisiana products or
by pouring large sums of money into the colony or both.
France was unwilling or not in a position to do so.

But

Instead,

the crown adopted halfway measures, creating a financial chaos
for which the "ordonnateur" was blamed.

The bitter quarrels between

"ordonnateurs" and governors and abuses, such as those of Rochemore,
did not help the financial situation.

But the major responsibility

for the disorders steamed from Versailles.

It is evident from the

correspondence that the position of "ordonnateur" in the question of
finances was the more critical one.

Since funds were a constant

problem, the fiscal official held the otore difficult task to
perform.

But the "ordonnateurs" did surprisingly well considering

what they had to work with, for even the most conscientious could

do little to improve the financial situation if there was little
assistance from Versailles.
In the judicial realm, in spite of the views to the
contrary held by Versailles, justice in the hands of the
"ordonnateur" was well administered.

In the context of the times

the ordinary legal needs of the colonists were met.

The

"ordonnateur" rendered greater service to the colonists in this
area probably because he possessed a freedom of action which he
did not enjoy in other spheres of colonial administration.
The "comnissaire ordonnateur" was an indispensable figure
though not an intendant of finance, justice, and police, in the
administration of an area which was a pawn for the French crown
on the diplomatic chessboard of Europe.

B I B L I O G R A P H Y

PRIMARY SOURCES

Manuscript Materials

This study Is largely based on unpublished manuscript
material contained in one repository:

The Archives Nationales in

Paris.

I.

Archives des Colonies (AC)

Serie A: Edits, ordonnances et declarations. Volumes 22 and 23
contain a compilation of legal provisions for Louisiana,

1721-175**S&rie B: This series contains letters, orders and "m^moires"
dispatched by the Ministry of Marine to colonial administrators.
The following "r^gistres" were consulted: B25(170*0, 27(1705"

1706), 3M 1712), 35(1715), 38(1715-1716), 39(1717), **0(1718),
14.1(1719), **2(1720), *42-1(1712-1721), 143”H(1721-1751), *4*4(1721),
*45(1722), *47(172*4), **8(1725), *49(1726), 55(1751), 57(1752),
59(1755), 61(175*0 , 63(1755), 6*4(1756), 65(1757), 66(1758),
68(1759), 70(l7**0), 72(l7*H), 7**(l7**2), 76(l7**5), 78(17****),
81(17**5), 83(171*6), 85(171*7), 87(171*8), 89(l7**9), 91(1750),
95(1751), 95(1752), 97(1755), 99(175**), 101(1755), 103(1756),
105(1757), 107(1758), 109(1759), 111(1760-1761), 11*4(1762),
116(1763), 119(17614), 121(1765), 123(1766), and 132(1769).
Serie C: C13A: Correspondence general, Louislane. This series is
very important for the history of French Louisiana. It contains,
in addition to the annual budget of the colony, the common
letters of the governors and "commissaires ordonnateurs", their

202

205

particular correspondence, and those of other civil and military
officials. The author consulted C13A1 to Ml: Louisiana from its
beginning up through 1763; C13Bl(1699-1773) and C13C1(1767),
2(l699-172li), 3(1675-1736), and Il(l7l8-173l)- Both C13B and C
contain documents omitted from C13A.
Serie D2D: D2D10: Personnel militaire et civil, listes generales
Louisiane, 1716-1803; and D2C50: Troupes de colonies, Louisiane:
4tats-majors et generaux(1717-1803); compagnies detach^es
(169M1793) sdrte E:

Dossier personnel.

Serie F: F3: Collection Moreau de Saint-M^ry. F3 18, 19, and 20:
Guadeloupe: historique( 1635“ 1790) J 2ll and 25: Louisiane:
description et historique(l680-l806); 26 to 41: Martinique:
historique(1635-1803); 55 to 57: Sainte Lucie: historlque
(1605- 1803); 67 to 72: KLstoire des colonies: instructions aux
administrateur8(1668-1788); 78 to 95: Colonies en general:
repertoire; 241 to 243: Compilation of legal documents concerning
Louisiana; and 285: Colonies anglaises, espagnoles, francaises,
et Etats-Unis.

II.

Sdrie C:

C7:

Archives de la Marine (AM)

Dossier personnel.

Bibllotheque Nationale

Joly de Fleury: Number 1726 is a long document entitled "M^noire
sur la Louisiane". This "memoire" is believed to have been
written or inspired by "commissalre ordonnateur" Le Normant.

Printed Primary Sources

"Records of the Superior Council". An excellent inventory of the
deliberations of the Superior Council of Louisiana published in
English in the Louisiana Historical Quarterly. A great number
of these, preserved in New Orleans, are no longer legible. The
following were consulted:

204

lho. 11(1919): 528-342-; 463-485;
LHQ. VIII(1925): 118-148; 271-307; 478-507; 673-703:
LHO. Xl( 1928): 470-502; 624- 653;
LHQ. m(1929): 138-165; 304-330 ; 467-497;
LHO. XIII(1930): 119-160; 307-332; 488-518; 660-682;
LHQ. 3CEV(1931): 90-118; 245-270; 446-462; 570-605;
LHQ, XV(1932): 501-531;
LHQ, XVI(1933): 135-150; 330-338; 504-515;
LHQ. XVII(1934): 183-202; 364-384; 556-571;
LHQ. XVIII(1935): 161-192; 696-726; 976-1003;
LHQ. XIX(1936): 210-240; 751-777; IO78-III8 ;
LHO. XX(1937): 212-244; 1111-1140;
LHO. XXI(1938): 282-318; 564-609; 875-908; 1215-1252;
LHQ. m i ( l 939) : 2 2 6 -2 5 8 ; 531- 574; 8 5 7 -9 0 2 .
This list corresponds to 1743-1753*
Blanchard, Olivia (trans.). Memoir of Charles Le Gac. Director of
the Company of the Indies in Louisiana. 17T5-1721. New Orleans:
Survey of Federal Archives, 1938.
. Regulations. Edicts. Declarations and Decrees Concerning the
Commerce. Administration of Justice and Policing of Louisiana
and Other French Colonies in America. Together With the Black
Code. New Orleans: Survey of Federal Archives, 1940.
Charlevoix, P.-F.-X. de. Histoire et description general de la
Nouvelle France, avec le journal historlque d'un voyage fait par
ordre du rol dans JL 1Amirique Septentrionalle. 3 Volumes.
Paris: Chez Rolin, 1744.
Du Tertre, Jean-Baptiste. Histoire general des Antilles habitues
par le Francals. 3 Volumes. Paris: lolly, I667-167I.
Hennepin, Louis.

Description de la Louisiane.

Le Page du Pratz. Histoire de la Louisiane.
De Bure, I7 5 8 .

Paris:

3 Volumes.

Bure, 1683.
Paris:

McWilliams, Richebourg G. ^trans. and ed.). Fleur de Lys and
Calumet: Being the Penlcaut Narrative of French Adventure in
Louisiana. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1953*
Magry, Pierre (ed.). Maaolres et documents: Decouvertes et
etablissements des Francais dans l'ouest et dans le sud de
l ’Am^rique Septentrionale. 6 Volumes. Paris: Maisonneuve,
1879-88.
Rowland, Dunbar and Sanders, A. G. (eds.). Mississippi Provincial
Archives. 3 Volumes. Jackson, Miss.: Press of the Mississippi
Department of Archives and History, 1927*

205
Whitaker, A. P. Documents Relating to the Commercial Policy of Spain
in the Florldas. De Land, Florida: The Florida State Historical
Society, 1931*
Wroth, Laurence C. and Annan, Gertrude L. Acts of French Royal
Admlnlstration Concerning Canada. Guiana, the West Indies, and
Louisiana. Prior to 1791. New York: New York Public Library,
1930.

BIBLIOGRAPHIES, CALENDARS, AND GUIDES

Alvord, Clarence W. "Eighteenth Century French Records in the
Archives of Illinois," American Historical Association Annual
Report. I (1905), 353-^
Beers, Henry Putney. The French in North America: A Bibliographical
Guide to French Archives. Reproductions and Research Missions.
Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1937*
Bescherelle, M. Dictionnaire national ou grand dictlonnalre
claasique de JLa langue francaise. 2 Volumes. Paris: Chez

SimonTlS^'
Boimare, A. L. "ilotes bibliographiques et raisonnees sur les
principaux ouvrages sur la Floride et l'ancienne Louisiane,
depuis leur dicouverte jusqu'a l'^poque actuelle, accompagnees
de trois cartes de Guillaume Delisle publiees en 1703 et 1712."
(Preface signed, Paris, 1853)» ed* with intro. Grace King, LHQ,

I (1917), 9-78.
Cheruel, A. Dictionnaire historique des institutions, moeurs. et
coutumes de la France. 2 Volumes. Paris: Hachette, 1855•
Harisse, Henry. Notes pour servir a 1'histoire. a JLa bibliographic
et a JLa cartographie de la Nouvelle France et des pays
adjacents. Paris: Tross, 1872.
Hatzfeld, Adolphe and Darmesteter, Arsene. Dictionnaire general de
la langue francaise. du commencement du XVII siecle jusqu’a nos
jours. 2 Volumes. Paris: Librairie Ch. Delagrave, 1893*1-900.
Lanctot, Gustave. L ’Oeuvre de la France en Amerique du Nord.
Montreal: Fides, 1951•
Leland, Waldo G. Guide to Materials for American History in the
Libraries and Archives of Paris. 2 Volumes. Washington, D.C.:
Carnegie Institute of Washington, 1932 and 19^3*

206
Ouvrage ^labor^ par 1*association des archlvlstes francais. Manual
d *archlsvlatlque: Theorle et pratique des archives publlques
en Prance. Paris: S. E. V. P. E. N. , 1970.
Marlon, Marcel. Dictionnaire des Institutions de la France aux XVIIe
et XVIIIe aleclea. Paris: Picard, 1923*
Surrey, N. M. M. Calendar of Manuscripts in Paris Archives and
Libraries Relating to the History of the Mississippi Valley.
2 Volumes. Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Institute of Washington,
1926 and 1928.

SECONDARY SOURCES

Books

Baillardel, A., and Prioult, A. Le chevalier de Pradel: Vie d*un
colon francais en Louisiane au XVIII e slTcle. Paris:
Mai sonneuve, I92S .
Bateson, Mary. "The French in America (1608-1755)." Vol. VII, The
United States of The Cambridge Modern History. Edited by A. W.
Ward and Others. Cambridge, England: At the University Press,
1934.
Bezard, Yvonne. Fonctlonnalres marltlmes et colon!aux sous Louis
XIV: les Begon. Paris: A. Michel, 1932.
Blet, Henri. Histoire de la colonisation francaise.
Paris: Arthaud, 1956-1950•
Bourget, Alfred.
Plon, 1906.

3 Volumes.

Le Due de Cholseul et lfalliance espagnole.

Paris:

Carre, H. Le rfegne de Louis XV (1715-1775). Vol. VIII-2 of Histoire
de France. Edited by E. Lavisse. Paris: Hachette, 19055
Chambers, H. E. A History of Louisiana. 3 Volumes. Chicago and
New York: The American Historical Society, 1925*
Chatelaln, Verne E. The Defenses of Spanish Florida. 1565 to 1763.
Washington, D.C.: The Carnegie Institution of Washington, 1951.
Clark, John G. New Orleans. 1718-1812: An Economic History.
Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1970.

207
Crouse, Nellie H. The French Struggle for the West Indies. 1665-1715.
New York: Columbia University Press, 19^3*
Davis, Edwin A. Louisiana: A Narrative History.
Claitor, 1961.

Baton Rouge:

Delanglez, Jean. The French Jesuits in Lower Louisiana. 1700-1765.
Washington, D.C.: Catholic University Press, 1935*
Deschamp8, Hubert. Methodes et les doctrines coloniales de la
France. Paris: Colin, 1933*
Duchine, Albert. La politique coloniale de la France: Le mlnlstfere
des colonies depuls Richelieu. Paris: Payot, 1928.
Eccles, W. J. Canada Under Louis XIV. 1665-1701.
McClelland and Stewart, 19<&.

Toronto:

Fieldhouae, D. K. The Colonial Empires: A Comparative Survey from
the Eighteenth Century. New York: Delacorte Press, 19^7*
Folmer, H. Franco-Spanish Rivalry in North America. 152^-1765.
Glendale, California: The Arthur H. Clark Co., 1933*
Fortier, Alcee. A History of Louisiana.
Joyant and Co., I90V .

U Volumes.

New York: Manzi,

Fregault, Guy. Le grand marquis. Pierre de Rigaud de Vaudreuil et
la Louisiane. Montreal: Fides, 1932.
•

Pierre Le Moyne D'Iberville. Montreal:

Garneau, Francois-Xavier. Histoire du Canada.
Montreal: Editions de l'Arbre, 1 9 ^ “^ ”
Gayarr^, Charles.
New Orleans:

Fides, 1968.
9 Volumes.

History of Louisiana. l*-th. ed.
Pelican Publishing Co., 1963*

4 Volumes.

Giraud, Marcel. Histoire de la Louisiane francaise. 3 Volumes.
Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1953“1966*
Gravier, Henri. La colonisation de la Louisiane a 1*A>oque de Law.
Paris: Masson, 190^.
Gruder, Vivian R. The Royal Provincial Intendants: A Governing Elite
in Eighteenth Century France. New York: Cornell University

PressV 1968,
Hamilton, Peter J. Colonial Mobile.
Mifflin, 1911.

Revised.

Boston:

Houghton-

208
Hanotaux, Gabriel. Histoire de la nation francaise.
Paris: Plon-Nourrit, 1920-29*

15 Volumes.

Heinrich, Pierre. La Louisiane sous la Compagnle des Indes. 1717“1751.
Paris: E. Guilmoto, 1908.
Johnson, Allen. The Intendant as a Political Agent Onder Louis XIV.
Lovell, Mass.: Courier-Citizen Co., 1899•
Lauvriere, Bnile.
Baton Rouge:

Histoire de la Louisiane francaise. 1675-1959.
Louisiana State University Press, 1940.

Lavisse, Ernest (ed.). Histoire de Prance depuis les orlgines lusqu'a
la revolution. 11 Volumes. Paris: Hachette, I9OO-I9II.
Louis-Jarav. Gabriel. L'empire francaise d'Ameriaue. (1534-1803).
Paris: Librairie A r S d " C o l i n , I93S.------Lynch, John. Spanish Colonial Administration. 1782-1810: The
Intendant System in the Viceroyaltv of the Rio de La Plata.
London: Athlone Press, 195&.
Lyon, E. W. Louisiana in French Diplomacy. 1759-1804.
Oklahoma: University of Oklahoma Press, 193^.

Norman,

Madelin, Louis. Histoire politique de 1515 a 1804. Vol. IV of
Histoire de la nation francaise. Edited by Ernest Lavisse.
Paris: Hachette, 1900-11.
Martin, Francois-Xavier.
Gresham, 1882.

History of Louisiana.

New Orleans:

McDermott, John Francis (ed.). Frenchmen and French Ways in the
Mississippi Valley. Urbana, Illinois: University of Illinois
Press, 1969*
Michelet, J. Histoire de France au dix-huitifeme siecle: La regence.
Paris: Chamerot,
Mowat, Charles Loch. East Florida as a British Province. 1765-1784.
Berkeley, California: University of California Press, 1943*
O'Neill, Charles Edwards. Church and State in French Colonial
Louisiana: Policy and Politics to 1752. New Haven, Conn.:
Yale University Press, 19^*
Pares, Richard. War and Trade in the West Indies. 1759-1795.
Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1936.
Parkman, Francis: A Half-Century of Conflict: France and England in
North America. Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1920.

209

Pauliat, Louis. La politique colonlale sous _1'anclen regime.
Par1s : Calmann Levy, 1887.
Priestley, Herbert Ingram. France Overseas Through the Old Regime:
A Study of European Expansion. New York: D. Appleton-Century
Co., 1939.
Savelle, Max. The THpinm»tic History of the Canadian Boundary.
171*9-1765. New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 79W).
Schlarman, J. H.
In America.

From Quebec to New Orleans: The Story of the French
Belvllle, Illinois: Buechler Publishing Co., 1929.

Smith, Ronald Dwight. French Interests in Louisiana: From Choiseul
to Napoleon. Ann Arbor, Michigan: University of Microfilm, Inc.,
19^7
Soltau, Roger H. The Duke of Choiseul.
Blackwell, 1909*

Oxford, England:

B. H.

Surrey, N. M. M. The Commerce of Louisiana During the French Regime.
1699-1765. New York: Columbia University Press and Longmans,

1916.

Thwaltes, Reuban Gold. France in America. 11*97-1765. Vol. VII of
The American Nation: A History. Edited by A. B. Hart.
New York: Harper and Bros., 1901*-18.
Villlers du Terrage, Baron Marc.
Les dernlferes ann^esde laLouisiane
francaise. Paris: E. Guilmoto, 1903*
. Histoire de Jji fondation de la Nouvelle-Orleans (1717-1722).
Paris: Imprimerle nationale, 1917*
Wallace, Joseph. The History of Illinois and Louisiana Under the
French Rule. Cincinnati: R. Clarke and Co., 1893*
Wilson, Arthur M. French Foreign Policy During the Administration
of Cardinal Fleury. 1 7 2 ^ -1 7 1 *5 : A Study in Diplomacy and
Commercial Development. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University
Press, 1 9 3 &
Winsor, Justin. The Mississippi Basin. The Struggle in America
Between England and France. Boston and New York: HoughtonMifflin and Co.,' 1095.

210
Articles

Alton, Arthur S. "Spanish Colonial Reorganisation Under the Family
Compact," The Hispanic American Historical Review. XII (August,
1932), 269‘^ 5 o .
Bonnault, Claude de. "Le Canada et la conclusion du pacte de
famille de I76I," Revue d'hlstolre de l'Amerlque francalse.
VII (December, 1953)» 341-355*
Bordes, Maurice. "Les Intendants de Louis XV," Revue hlstorlque.
CCXXIII (January-March, i960), 45-62.
Bourguet, Alfred. "Le due de Choiseul et 1'alliance espagnole apres
le pacte de famille," Revue hlstorlque. LXXIV (1907), 1-27.
Boutruche, Robert. "Existe-t-il une continuite dans la politique
coloniale de la France?," Revue hlstorlque. CLXXII (1933)>
257-278.
Buron, Edmond. "Un prophete de la revolution americaine," Revue
hlstorlque. CIII (1910), 283-291.
Caldwell, Norman Ward. "The French in the Mississippi Valley,
1740-1750," University of Illinois Studies In the Social
Sciences, XXVI (19^*0“ 19^2)» Urbana, Illinois: University of
Illinois Press, 1941.
Christerlow, Allen. "French Interest in the Spanish Bnpire During
the Ministry of the Due de Choiseul, 1759"1761," The Hispanic
American Historical Review. XXI (November, 1941), 519“537*
Crisenoy, J. de. "Le personnel de la marine militaire et les classes
maritimes sous Colbert et Selgnelay d*apres des documents
inedits," Revue maritime et coloniale. XII (1864), 565-596*
Cruzat, Heloise H. (trans.). "Documents Concerning Sale of
Chaouchas Plantation in Louisiana, 1737-38," The Louisiana
Historical Quarterly. VIII (October, 1925)* 494-546.
. (trans.). "Docunents Covering the Criminal Trial of Etienne
La Rue, May, 17^7*" The Louisiana Historical Quarterly. XIII
(July, 1930), 377-390.
. (trans.). "Louisiana in 1724," The Louisiana Historical
Quarterly. XII (January, 1929)* 121-133*
. (trans.). "Municipal Legislation of Louisiana, 1744," The
Louisiana Historical Quarterly. VII (October, 1924), 567-569•

211

Dahlgren, E.-W. "Le comte Jerome de Ponchartrain et les amateurs de
Salnt-Malo." Revue hlstorlque. LXXXVIII (1905), 225-26?.
Dart, Henry Plauche (ed.). "Appointment of Members of the Superior
Council of Louisiana in 1762," The Louisiana Historical
Quarterly. XXI (July, 1938), 6^ M > 70.
. "A Case in Admiralty in Louisiana in 17^1, Before Salmon,
J.," The Louisiana Historical Quarterly. VII (January, l$2b ) ,
5-19.
. "A Criminal Trial Before the Superior Council of Louisiana,
May, 17^7." The Louisiana Historical Quarterly. XIII (July, 193°)»
367-390.
. "A Session of the Superior Council of Louisiana in 17V*,"
The Louisiana Historical Quarterly. VI (October, 1923)* 571-575*
. "Cabaret8 of New Orleans in the French Colonial Period,"
The Louisiana Historical Quarterly. XIX (July, 1936)* 578-583*
. "Courts and Law in Colonial Louisiana," The Louisiana
Historical Quarterly. IV (July, 1921), 255"2^9*
. "Criminal Trials in Louisiana, 1720-1766." The Louisiana
Historical Quarterly. Ill (July, 1920), 279"360.
. (ed.). "Decision Day in the Superior Council of Louisiana,
March 5 , 17 ^ , " The Louisiana Historical Quarterly. XXI (October,
1938), 998-1020.
. "Introduction of Jean Francois Pasquier as Councillor-Assessor
in the Superior Council of Louisiana, 1737>" The Louisiana
Historical Quarterly. X (January, 1927)* 68-75*
. "Laurent MacMahon, First Councillor, Superior Council of
Louisiana and Director of the Company of the Indies at New Orleans,
I73O- 3I," The Louisiana Historical Quarterly. X (October, 1927)*
517-528.
. "Politics in Louisiana, 172U," The Louisiana Historical
Quarterly, V ( July, 1922), 298- 3I5 .
, "The Career of Dubreuil in French Louisiana," The Louisiana
Historical Quarterly. XVIII (April, 1935)> 267-331*
. "The First Cargo of African Slaves for Louisiana, 1718,"
The Louisiana Historical Quarterly. XIV (April, 1931)* 163-177*

212

. (trans.)* "The First Law Regulating Land Grants In French
Colonial Louisiana," The Louisiana Historical Quarterly. XIV
(July, 1951), 3*46-3*48.
. "The Legal Institutions of Louisiana," The Louisiana
Historical Quarterly. II (January, 1919)* 72-103.
. "The Office of Counclllor-Assessor in the Superior Council
of Louisiana in the French Regime," The Louisiana Historical
Quarterly. XV (January, 1932), II7-II9 .
Dart, W. K. (trans.). "Ordinance of 1717 Governing Notaries in
Louisiana During French Colonial Period," The Louisiana
Historical Quarterly. X (January, 1927), 82-85.
Delanglez, S. J., John. "The Natchez Massacre and Governor Perier,"
The Louisiana Historical Quarterly. XVII (October, 193*0»

l&L-bkl.
. "Louisiana in 1717," Revue d'histoire de l'Amerique francaise.
Ill (June, 19^9), 9^-110.
Devron, Gustave. "A Chapter of Colonial History: Louisiana,
1717 to I75I," The Louisiana Historical Quarterly. VI (October,
1923), 5^3-567.
Dunn, William E. "Spanish Reaction Against the French Advance Toward
New Mexico, 1717-1727," The Mississippi Valley Historical Review.
II (December, 1915),
Eccles, W. J. "The Social, Economic, and Political Significance of
the Military Establishment in New France," The Canadian
Historical Review. LII (March, 1971), 1-22.
Fabre-Surveyer, E. "The Rocheblaves in Colonial Louisiana," The
Louisiana Historical Quarterly. XVIII (April, 1935), 332-3^5•
Filion^ Maurice. "La crise de la marine francaise, d'aprfes le
memoire de Maurepas de 17*4-5 8ur *-a marine et le comnerce,"
Revue d'histoire de l'Amerique francaise. XXI (September, 1967),
230-2*42.
Fletcher, Mildred Stahl. "Louisiana as a Factor in French Diplomacy
from 1763 to 1800," The Mississippi Valley Historical Review.
XVII (December, 193C>77"3^7-37^*
Folmer, Henry. "Contraband Trade Between Louisiana and New Mexico
in the Eighteenth Century," The New Mexico Historical Review.
XVI (19*4-1), 2*4-9-27*4-•

213

Fregault, Guy. "L,enplre brltannique et la conqu£te du Canada
(1700-1713)»" Revue d'histoire de l’Amerique francaise. X
(September, 1956), I53-I82.
Frostln, Charles. "Les colons de Saint Domlngue et la metropole,"
Revue hlstorlque. CCXXXVII (April-June, 1967), 381-^lU.
Garnault, E. "Les causes de la decadence du commerce de La Rochelle
au XVIII e sl^cle," Revue hlstorlque. LXX (1899), 53"67.
Gauld, Clarence P. "Trade Between the Windward Islands and the
Continental Colonies of the French Empire, 1683- 1763,"
The Mississippi Valley Historical Review. XXV (March, 1939)»

‘E73-lt91.
Glraud, Marcel. "Crise de conscience et d'autorite & la fin du regne
de Louis 3ttV," Annales: economies-socletes-clvlllzatlons. VII
(1952), 172-190 and 293-302.
. "France and Louisiana in the Eighteenth Century,"
The Mississippi Valley Historical Review, XXXVI (1950), 657-67!*.
. "La compagnie d'Occident (1717-1718)," Revue hlstorlque.
CCXXVI (July-September, I96I), 23- 56.
. "La France et la Loulsiane au debut du XVIII si&cle,"
Revue hlstorlque. CCIV (October-December, 195°), 185-208.
. "L'exacte description de la Loulsiane d'Etienne Veniard de
Bourgmont." Revue hlstorlque. CCXVII (1957)* 29-1*1.
’ "Tendances humanitaires a la fin du r&gne de Louis XIV,"
Revue historljue. CCIX (1953), 217-237*
* "Un aspect de la rivalite franco-espagnole au debut du XVIII
e si&cle (1713-1717)," Revue hlstorlque. CCXVII (1957), 250-269.
"Guadeloupe," Revue maritime et coloniale. XII (1864), 7l*~106 and
289-330.
Hamilton, Earl J. "Prices and Wages at Paris Under John Law's
System," The Quarterly Journal of Economics. LI (1936), 1*2-70.
. "The Role of Monopoly in the Overseas Expansion and Colonial
Trade of Europe Before 1800," The American Economic Review.
XXXVIII (May, 19W ) , 33-53*
Hardy, James D. "The Transportation of Convicts to Colonial
Louisiana," Louisiana History, VII (1966), 207-220.

214
. "The Superior Council In Colonial Louisiana," Frenchmen and
French Wavs in the Mississippi Valiev. Edited by John Francis
McDermott. Urbana, Illinois: The University of Illinois Press,
1969, 87-101.
Hauser, H. "The Characteristic Features of French Economic History
from the Middle of the Sixteenth Century to the Middle of the
Eighteenth Century," The Economic History Review. IV (1933)*
257-272.
Kellogg, Louise P. "France and the Mississippi Valley: A lesume,"
The Mississippi Valley Historical Review. XVIII (June, 1931)»
5- 22.
Kerallaln, Rene de. "Les francals au Canada. La jeunesse de
Bourgainville et la guerre de sept ans," Revue hlstorlque. LVIII
(1895), 308-353; LIX (1895). 31^-326; and LX (189^), 49-68.
.

"La prise de Quebec et la perte du Canada," Revue hlstorlque.

xc (1906), 307-335.
. "Jacques de la Chaise," The Louisiana Historical Quarterly. VII
(July, 1924), 447-448.
. "The Chevalier de Pradel," The Louisiana Historical Quarterly.
XII (April, 1929), 238-254.
King, Grace. "Motes on the Life and Services of Bienville,"
The Louisiana Historical Quarterly. I (January, 1918), 39"53*
Lafargue, Andre. "The French Governors of Louisiana," The Mississippi
Valley Historical Review, XIV (September, 1927), 15^-167.
Lamontagne, Roland. "La Galissoniere et ses conceptions coloniales
d'aprfes le memoire sur les colonies de la France dans l'Amerique
septentrionale," Revue d'histoire de l'Amerique francaise. XV
(September, I96I), 1^3"170.
. "L'influence de Jean Talon." Revue d'histoire de l'Amerique
francaise. VI (June, 1952) , 42- ^ lT
. "Temoinages de Barrin de la Galissoniere sur la situation
interne de l'Amerique francaise," Revue d'histoire de l'Amerique
francaise. XV (December, 1961), 333 343*
Lane, Frederic C. "Force and Enterprise in the Creation of Oceanic
Canmerce," The Journal of Economic History. X (195°), 19"31*
La Roque de Roquebrune, R. "La direction de la Nouvelle-France par
le miniature de la marine," Revue d'histoire de l'Amerique
francaise. VI (March, 1953)* 470-488.

215
Loncal, Jean-Marie. "La Loulsiane et les colonies espagnoles
d'Am&rique, I73I-171*8," Revue d'histoire de l'Amerique francaise.
XVIII (September, 1964), 19^-201.
Lonn, Ella. "The French Council of Commerce in Relation to American
Trade," The Mississippi Valley Historical Review. VI (September,
1919), 192-219.
Lynch, John. "Intendants and Cabildos in the Viceroyalty of La Plata,
1782-1810," The Hispanic American Historical Review. XXXV
(August, 195517 337-562.
Lyon, E. Wilson (ed.). "Moustier's Memoir of Louisiana," The
Mississippi Valiev Historical Review. XXII (September, 1955)»

251- 276.
Margry, Pierre. "Pierre David et la compagnie des Indes de 1729 a
1752." Revue maritime et coloniale. XVIII (1866), ^35“^57"Memoire de Bougainville sur l'etat de la Nouvelle France a l'epoque
de la guerre de sept ans (1757)>" Revue maritime et coloniale.
I (1861), 561-609.
Micelle, Jerry A. "From Law Court to Local Government: Metamorphosis
of the Superior Council of French Louisiana," Louisiana History.
IX (Spring, 1968), 85-107.
Moore, John Preston. "Antonio de Ulloa: A Profile of the First
Spanish Governor of Louisiana," Louisiana History. VIII (Summer,
1967), 189-218.
. "Revolt in Louisiana: A Threat to Franco-Spanish Amistad,"
Spain and Her Rivals on the Gulf Coast. Edited by Ernest F.
Dibble and Earle W. Newton. Pensacola, Florida: Historic
Pensacola Preservation Board, 1971, ^~55*
Munro, W. B. "The Office of Intendant in New France: A Study in
French Colonial Policy," The American Historical Review. XII
(1906), 15-58.
Ramsey, John Fraser, "Anglo-French Relations, 1765-1770: A Study of
Choiseul's Foreign Policy," University of California Publications
in History. XVII (1959), 1^5*264.
Sagnac, Ph. "La politique commerciale de la France avec l'etranger,"
Revue hlstorlque. CIV (1910), 265-286.
Sanders, Albert G. (trans.) and Dart, Henry Plauche (intro.).
"Documents Concerning the Crozat Regime in Louisiana, 1712-1717,"
The Louisiana Historical Quarterly. XV (October, 1952), 589”609.

216
Stenberg, Richard R. "The Louisiana Cession and the Family Compact,"
The Louisiana Historical Quarterly. XIX (January, 1956), 201^-209.
Surr'ey, N. M. H. "The Development of Industries In Louisiana During
the French Regime, (1673“1765)»" The Mississippi Valley Historical
Review. IX (December, 1922), 227-235Tarrade, Jean. "L'admlnistration colonial en France & la fin de
l'ancien regime: Projets de reforme," Revue hlstorlque.
CCXXIX (January-March, 1963), 103-122.
Thomas, H. M. "The Relations of Governor and Intendant in the Old
Regime," The Canadian Historical Review. XVI (1935)> 27"^0Winston, James E. "The Cause and Results of the Revolution of 1768
in Louisiana," The Louisiana Historical Quarterly. XV (April,
1932), 181-213-

V I T A

Donald Jile Lemieux was born at Lewiston, Maine, on
September 14, 1936 ,
1937*

Be graduated from Lewiston High School in

He graduated from the University of New Mexico, Albuquerque,

New Mexico, in 1962.

In that same year he entered the Graduate

School of Xavier University, Cincinnati, Ohio, and received a
degree of Master of Arts in 1963*
University during 1963-1965*

He then attended New York

1“ 1969* after four years of teaching

Latin American History at Louisiana Tech, Ruston, Louisiana, he
entered the Latin American Studies Institute at Louisiana State
University, Baton Rouge, Louisiana.
working toward a Ph.D.

Since then he has been

EXAMINATION AND THESIS REPORT

Candidate:

Donald Jile Lemieux

Major Field:

Latin American Studies

Title of Thesis:

(History)

The Office of "Commissaire Ordonnateur" in French Louisiana,
A Study in French Colonial Administration

1731-1763:

Approved:

M ajo r Professor and Chairm an

Dean o f the Graduate School

EXAMINING COMMITTEE:

SULAU.

l:SZ~r

Date of Examination:

May 1 1 f 1972__

.

